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"The Current Situation of the Kampuchean Revolution and the Building Up of Every Level of the Party's Cadres" (pp.1-41)

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## I. THE CURRENT SITUATION OF OUR KAMPUCHEAN REVOLUTION

Desire: To bring up the current situation of the Kampuchean revolution in order to examine the circumstances necessitating the building up of our cadre ranks at every level.

On the National Defence Situation and Building Up Cadres to Serve in the Duty of Defending the Country

Since the 17 April victory, a great victory, and making socialist revolution and constructing socialism quickly and rapidly, the Kampuchean revolution is now very influential both domestically and outside the country. At the same time, however, foes and adversaries (khang-satrauv) both inside and outside the country, including those in the imperialist sphere, the ring leader of which is American imperialism, those in the revisionist sphere, and the territory swallowing "Y", who are right alongside us, want to wreck our revolution at all times as well as by every method.

This is one circumstance. Given such a circumstance, what must our solution be? We are already fast-moving. But the shark are right on our tail. What must the solution be?

- Revolution vigilance must be high;
- National defence work must be set up well.

Who, however, are to put the Party's policies of revolutionary vigilance and national defence into practice. This is nothing other than the problem of cadres.

If the cadres are good, then revolutionary vigilance is high; if cadres are good, then national defence is valiant, razor-sharp and resolute. No matter how great the hardships, they will fight. They will fight in the face both of immediate and of protracted hardship. And they will fight at the level of shock assaults.

If these cadres are cadres of the enemy, will they defend / the country/? They would not defend it. It's the same whether they are in a general staff or in a factory.

This is the sort of an examination to make in order to see the need to be selective and purge cadres so that defense duties are fulfilled well. This is agenda item one.

The second agenda item is that some cadre elements are good alright. They love the Party and the revolution and successively make revolution. But they are soft and malleable. So long as an enemy hasn't attacked yet, nothing's wrong. When we attack

and win, they are valiant. / But/ once an enemy counterthrusts, they \_\_\_\_\_ (slunslao)/p.3/. Can guarantees and assurances be given that such cadres will be able to defend/the country/ or not? Impossible. In normal times, they could defend / the country/. But when things are complex, they cannot. It's a must to build up cadres having an resolute stand with enemies, a resolute combat stand, and who fight when things are complex and fight when we win and when we lose. Only with such cadres can there be guarantees.

According to experience, some people we can build up, and some people we cannot build up. Therefore, we must select good people to build up and then come in and take responsibility for defence.

The most recent experience is that testing in times of combat demonstrates the quality of the people for immediate and protracted building up. Don't look only at what they're saying or at appearances. It's a must to watch them in concrete tests. And don't just look at one period. In order that defence work be guaranteed and assured, it's a must to watch and build them up successively.

This is with external enemies, and it's the same with internal enemies. Internal enemies don't come to attack us immediately. But they come to bore internally among us, in our offices, in order to encircle us. They will attack us one day. These enemies come to be our hangers-on, staying right alongside us such that we can't see them; and being pleased with them, we promote them. No matter how stalwart we may be, we are stalwart alone we are not proceeding stalwartly from the Party's stance, not marshalling the Party's forces so as to guarantee good defence. In some instances we may be building up forces alright, but not be proceeding from the Party's stand in building them up; we are proceeding from our own individual stand, \_\_\_\_\_ (banchaoek-banchaoer).p5/, giving them this and that, etc. such cadres may love us on an individual level and defend us alright, but cannot be guaranteed. An enemy may come to nudge them and bit-by-bit, step-by-step, they shaken loose and turn to treason.

There are concealed enemies everywhere in our ranks, the Centre, the general staffs, the zones and the bases. It would be dangerous not to take measures in time. And what about the future? Into the future, both of the pair in contradiction will go on just the same. The enemy forces may be in retreat, but the same contradiction remains. Therefore, they will continue their activities further. It's thus a must to have good cadres. It's a must to be able to build up good cadres who are capable of analyzing right and wrong ever more clearly, so as to not let it be possible for an enemy to fool us. Our male and female combatants are good. But experience in this one period is that any enemy can fool quite a lot of them. Some cadres are good alright, but enemies have been able to dupe them.

It's thus a must to train and build up cadres. But simple training alone is not enough. There must be organizational measures. Organizational measures are taken by promoting higher the strong ones. Build up the average ones, and then go down to draw experiences, so that they get stronger and stronger. Build up the weak ones. They risky ones must be purged. And as for ones who are good already, but who don't improve, don't develop

despite successive building up, and whose bases are always deteriorating, there must be measures transferring them to go fulfill duties commensurate with their capabilities and bringing in strong persons to replace them. These are what you call organizational measures.

By what are good, average, not good, risky, strong and not strong to be judged? They are to be judged in the movement, not by study in school. This is a problem about which there must be dissemination among the masses, so they will be informed. If something is wrong, let the masses know. If something is right, let the masses know. Don't just cling to the organization for everything, because the contemptible traitors who are concealed form within wear the label of the organization, too.

If things are done in this manner, they masses will know when something is wrong that it in fact isn't the Communist of Party of Kampuchea; that it's this or that individual not putting into practice the line of the Party.

In analyzing any report, it is therefore necessary to examine it:

1. According to the system of organizing collectively; examine things step-by-step along collective lines within committees and in conferences.
2. Take up the reports for examination and monitoring by also examining the concrete movement.

In fact we have faith in our system of organization. Bu it is also necessary to take a look at how it is reflected in the mass movement. We must analyze and judge cadres step-by-step.

We now consider that our Party is already strong, and that is why we have been able to sweep cleanly away more than 99% of the contemptible major concealed enemies boring /form within/. But supposing if they were able to strengthen and expand and make a comeback someplace: that would mean that place was weak. Things throughout the country must be examined like this. Each zone must be examined like this. Each sector must be examined like this. Each district must be examined like this. Each cooperative must be examined lie this. The army and ministries and offices must be examined like this. The enemies are already weak, but if they are able to strengthen and expand and make a comeback, that would mean we would be weak. It's necessary to take measures transferring cadres.

This is how we put the problem. In fact, we shouldn't let the enemies strengthen and expand. There must be constant shock assaults. It's necessary to carry out shock assaults to build up core cadres. If there are a lot of core cadres, then we are already strong. As for how to build them up, select them from among the mass movement. Whoever fulfils duties well is to be selected for training and build-up and to be promoted. Remove anyone who is weak and send them to fulfil duties on other battlefields that are of secondary important.

Past experience is that we have been able to seep many enemies cleanly away. The number of cadres has been reduced a lot, but the quality of the Party has risen a lot. The movement in 1977 is stronger than the movement was in 1976, the reasons being.

1. The quality of our Party has risen because it is clean.
2. Second/sic/, we have selected core cadres from below for building up as new cadres at every level, and are able to fulfil duties more strongly and with better quality than before.

Carry out the task of testing in the movement according to such experience, and then make selections. And if we are not subjective in our selections, if we choose collectively in accordance with democratic centralism and feel out the opinions of the masses even more, then the absolute majority of the cadres we select will certainly be the right ones, and the ones about which we are mistaken will be an absolute minority. Cadres will thus always be improving.

#### ON THE SITUATION OF THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION AND BUILDING UP CADRES IN ORDER TO SERVE THE MOVEMENT FOR SOCIALIST REVOLUTION

The situation of our socialist revolution in 1977 is that we have expanded and developed it a still higher degree than in 1976 in the following aspects:

**THE FIRST ASPECT:** the general condition of our collectivist regime is better and better, more and more stalwart than last year. The collectivist systems of unions among the workers, in the army and in the ministries and offices are more and more stalwart and better and better than before. Things are more and more clear-cut and better and better appreciated in the ideological sense, and organizationally things are more orderly.

**THE SECOND ASPECT:** the old, exploitative relations of production cannot raise their head again: they cannot arise again in even minor or meager ways. On the contrary, the new, collectivist and socialist relations of production are forever being strengthened and expanded. And this socialism is a socialism of the people throughout the collectivity. It is not for the private sector.

**THIRD ASPECT:** With the non-use of money and salaries, we have been able to continue further to eliminate these noxious capitalist tools. We will not have a revisionist return. Any ideas of saving money or putting away property are withering away. The Party's proletarian stand is being ever more strengthened and expanded. We have strengthened and expanded our stand of self-denial. Our standing is coming ever closer to the collectivist stand of the proletariat and becoming ever more distantly separated from the private stand of the capitalists.

**FOURTH ASPECT:** We have continued to put the dictatorship of the proletariat further in practice.

There has been a bringing to the fore among the masses of democratic centralism and of dictatorship over the capitalist and feudal classes and over the revolution-betraying enemies who oppose the revolution.

Another aspect is that the stances of our Party members and male and female combatants are more developed than before. They have an every more increased understanding of our socialist collectivism, about which they are ever increasingly clear. From 1975 to 1976 a lot of them got their socialist collectivism organizationally. The reason for this that are Party understands that there are levels.

Second, the traitors aren't training and propagandizing: they increasingly resort to exaggeration and can propagandize only privately. Among the ranks of the masses, therefore, most go along with socialism, with collectivism and with the way things are organized. In 1977, however, although there are those who just go long organizationally, there are also a lot who go along via appreciation. For example, in 1976 a number of elements were still quite blurry about the revolution, about whether or not the revolution might smash them sometime, whether or not it was going to keep them around. And the enemies were keeping on propagandizing. Now that we have been able to sweep the enemies cleanly away, we have been able to train such elements correctly, and they have ever warmer feelings about us and an important degree of faith in our regime. There are still problems about which they require additional training and building up, but to an important extent they have ever warmer feelings about us. They already have a greater basis of faith.

This one good circumstance of our revolution.

But the socialist revolution must be continued further. Our collectivist systems must be further strengthened and expanded in order to guarantee that our revolution is assured, so that there will be no revisionism. If there were to be revisionism, it would mean being somebody's flunky. Don't let capitalism return. If capitalism returns, then things would be the way they were in the previous period, when the worker-peasant classes became the object servants of the capitalists and feudal landlords. If things were to go revisionist, the worker-peasant classes would also lose state power. The country would become a satellite of somebody else. It wouldn't be a single-layer satellite, either. It would be a double-layer satellite: a satellite both the territory-swallowing "Y" and of revisionism. That would be ultra-serious. If things were that serious, we could lose territory and lose the nation, just like we already lost Kampuchea Kraom.

It is for precisely this reason that we must continue to make socialist ever more increasingly deeply. Who is that will continue to make socialist revolution further? It is the entire Kampuchean people, under the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. If the Communist Party of Kampuchea leads according to an orientation of socialist revolution, the people will go along with this orientation. But if the Communist Party of Kampuchea were to lead according to a revisionist orientation. The people would also go along with this orientation, too.

The key factor is that of Party leadership. Within this factor. The Key factor is that of core cadres. If the Party Centre walks down the correct path of socialist revolution, then they entire Party will walk down this road. The problem of key importance that is thus posed is that of cadres: cadres in the Centre; cadres in the zones; cadres in the cooperatives, in the army and in the ministries and offices.... Cadres are the cores for continuing further to make socialist revolution according to a staunch stand that is neither left nor right. If we are left we will be unable to gather forces. If we are right we are endangered. We must protect against both, but basically we must protect against being right, because the true nature of our society is that the rightist forces still exert a strong pull, and this is how it is worldwide. The experience of 1976 clearly demonstrates this among us internally. There were temporary hardships in the form of food shortages in some places, and collectivism was attacked and the people were let go of and allowed to go private. This is how we were attacked in some instances by treasonous elements. In other instances, however, although the elements involved were good alright, their stances were nevertheless not stalwart and they let things get out of hand unintentionally, allowing enemies to attack collectivism. They opened the door to things private. Thus although they had not yet deviated qualitatively, they had nevertheless changed quantitatively. The collectivist stance thus lost out to the stance of the stance of privateness. These cadres did not have stalwart stances of socialist revolution and taking responsibility vis-a-vis the people. They pushed the masses aside and let them go private. Is anything solved by going private? For a period, we can be hoodwinked by privateness, but once this period is past, it cannot be a solution. Clearly, there would be chaos at that point. Only when the collective force of the masses are gathered is it possible to solve the issues of water, of tide-over food and of seed for production.

There is another example in the boundary between things private and thing personal. This is a complex problem, and there can be a lot of switching back and forth. It's not good if there's a lot of switching back and forth. The stance of such cadres have a stance of co-existence between the collective and the private. And if they themselves already have such a stance, then they are forgiving vis-à-vis cadres beneath them, male and female combatants and the masses. They don't build them up. They forgive a little here and a little there, and the stance of privateness is forever being strengthened and expanded.

And once there is already a stand of co-existence, then policy implementation is lax. Organizing is also lax, according to a stand of coexistence between the private and the collective by which anybody may be brought into service. This change is quantitative, quantitative change in political terms, quantitative change in ideological terms, quantitative change in organizational terms. It is not easy to bring about a recovery. Fighting will also no be strong. Take as an example the former Zone 304. It is our virtue that we saw the quantitative changes that were taking place and we took successive building-up measures. The struggle was a strong one alright, but it was an internal struggle. We did not yet see it as an antagonistic contradiction. Then once the contemptible Thuch was out, he just did things according to his own stance. After a period, enemies were swarming all over Zone 304. This guy was an enemy, and he

actually carried out activities. As for those among us who are good, they can easily slide without being conscious of it.

What we want to say here is that it is very easy to slide across the boundary between socialist revolution and revisionism. The boundary between the communal and the personal is very easy to slide across. As a person each of us may take account of the personal and the communal in striving to build ourselves up, in striving to fight at doing our tasks or not to fight at doing our tasks, and in proceeding from personal or communal grounds in assigning this or that person to a post. All of this could involve adverse effects on the socialist revolution.

What we want to demonstrate here is the necessity of continuing the socialist revolution further. Don't be subjective: that we are already proceeding quickly and nothing is wrong. Don't be subjective, as the boundary between the private and the communal is very easy to slide across.

We must build up cadres constantly in order to continue on to the next shift. It is an ordinary thing that in the movement some cadres expand and develop further, some cadres stay at a standstill, and some cadres are terribly slow and retrogress. Our main policy must be to indoctrinate, nurture and build up the cadres who are stalwart, and to have them go and take over responsibility for the most important battlefields, while removing mediocre cadres and putting them in charge of battlefields of secondary importance. This how to examine things when we go down to the bases.

Socialist revolution requires cadres with a staunch stance of socialist revolution. This is a very deep problem which is more complicated than other problematic areas because of how easy it is to slide. It is very easy to mistake the boundary between the personal and the communal are demanded. This is a complicated problem, but if we take pre-emptive measures and constantly draw lesson, we will have mastery.

On the one hand, we already have stauncher collectivist bases than before. On the other hand, we have already deeply analyzed the problem, so we also have a deeper grasp of the problem than before. However, privatism nevertheless remains right together with us, in each of us as a person, inside the whole society. It is thus necessary further to continue the battle.

It is necessary to build up cadres so they understand the boundary between the private and the communal, whether it is necessary to proceed from the communal or the private. They must be made to understand this: whether one proceeds from the private or the communal in resolving internal contradictions, deploying cadres and solving various problems. The necessity of being most stalwart is the most important core. Veteran cadres must be built up, and the masses must be built up. There will be instances in which veteran cadres currently in positions of responsibility will remain forever stalwart. In a minority of instances they may retrogress qualitatively, but we must strive to build them up so that the number who fall by the wayside is minimized.

Second, we must build up cadres who do not yet have positions of responsibility. If such is the case, new cadres will certainly emerge step-by step. We will not run out of cadres.

#### THE SITUATION OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION AND BUILDING UP CADRES TO SERVE THE PARTY'S SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

The situation of socialist construction in 1977 is a much more powerful one than in 1976 both as regards solutions on the water spearhead and solutions on the paddy field, compost, industrial, handicrafts, transportation and other spearheads.

But we must be interested on two points for future solution.

First point: According to initial reports, some bases have been able to over-achieve the plan while achieving the plan in some spheres and not achieving and not achieving it in some spheres. These interconnections are relevant to the people's standard of living and also to country-building.

A general examination would show that the movement is strong, comparatively twice as strong as it was in 1976. But its strength cannot yet achieve the requirements stipulated in the plan. This situation demonstrates to us that we still have shortcomings.

Second Point: It can be seen that constructing socialism in every sphere demands a gradual annual acceleration of our journey. What for? In order to serve our strategic requirement of proceeding quickly and keeping ahead of the enemy. If this year it's three tons and six tons, next year we must go beyond three tons and six tons, in 1979 we must go further beyond and in 1980 even further beyond. This is a requirement.

In implementing the 1977 plan, while there was much on the sphere of virtues, there were many spheres. We must clearly see the strong and weak points in order to take preemptive measures as regards point of view.

To summarize, we see the socialist construction movement as being every where stronger than in previous years, but if we think in terms of numbers things are not yet on accord with the requirements of the plan. This is our shortcoming. We do have shortcomings, but we have them in a situation of point of view as regards solutions, to solve things such that our socialist construction is increasingly stronger. Those places that have already achieved the plan should go beyond it, and those places that have not yet achieved the plan must be made to achieve it.

How can things be made increasingly stringer? Our examination has already shown that the leadership factor is the determining factor. The line and ideology are already exist; the only remaining problem are organizing for and putting the line into practice. This is where cadres come in: there must therefore be a solution about cadres so as to impel socialist construction forward strongly in every sphere.



Past experience is that wherever staunch core cadres exist, things get solved no matter how much hardship and complexity there may be. By contrast, wherever cadres are not strong, things don't get solved no matter what the objective conditions may be. Objective factors are thus only secondary. No matter how much hardship there may be, we can still get things solved. The question of cadres is the determining factor, the key. Cadres who strive to put into practice the socialist construction line coming up with solutions for water and compost and to deploy forces to be on the attack in matters big, medium and small, to be on the attack in the beginning, middle and end of the year and to be on the attack on the paddy fields and with regard to rear crops helpful to paddy and rice, these cadres come up with solution both as regards the people standard of living and export. These are problems of cadres. Where do such cadres emerge from: they emerge from the movement; in acting while drawing lessons, their quality is at the same time nurtured, whether they are cadres in the bases, factories or in ministries and offices. In ministries and offices, for example, the core tasks are those of the offices. If, however, there are good core cadres who direct production in the ministries and offices well, they reduce the supply of rice that the state need provide, and there is thus even more rice left over for export. If, however, a lot of state help is needed, a loss of capital for export is brought about. In order to economize, it is thus necessary to have core cadres in the ministries and office, so there need be no additional purchases. In some ministries and offices there are more implements, in the form of oxen, horses, carts and water buffalo, than in the cooperatives. At the same time, however, they need to demand additional state support. Such are forces buried. Do whatever can be done so that there are no such buried forces. If there is a single pair of oxen, it must be used in production. Burying it would have an adverse effect on socialist construction. It's the same at the bases. Don't let such forces be buried, whether at or in the bases or in the ministries and offices. If they are not being used because we are busy with something, they must be turned over to the cooperatives. Don't let these forces be buried. This is what being imbued with the line of socialist construction is, and cadres in every ministry and office must therefore look to see whether any buried forces exist. If they do, they must be used so that they come back to life. And if they are not to be used, they should go to the cooperatives so that they are not buried. It's the same for the army.

It's the same at every base: don't let forces be buried. Only when there are core to deploy them will forces not be buried. It's also the same in the factories: it's necessary to economize on iron and miscellaneous material. Core cadres must be the first to act in this way, in order to be models for other people.

Examination show that some places are able to economize well.

There has been good economizing at many bases, especially in the small artisan's shops in the cooperatives. All scrap iron odds and ends are put to use. However, while the majority of the zonal factories are economizing, some remain wasteful, and in the case of Phnom Penh factories, there's a lot of wastefulness. Forces are therefore not only buried, but also wasted. There has been constant training alright, but we lack cores. There can be a solution to this only once we have built up cadres. Will we be able to build up cadres so as to be able to economize on nails and screws and miscellaneous material? Children can

be cores, and so can women. When at five o'clock the bell is rung stopping work, five minutes can be spent gathering up material and putting it away. Raise this as an organizational line and then do training and core-building.

As for agriculture, enemies excepted, our cadres are generally pleased with socialist construction in agriculture. Contradiction do exist, however, as regards their appreciation of how to deploy forces and manage water and how to plow and transplant: some know how to do these things, but other's still don't. We must therefore build them up. Concrete experience in working in the paddy fields I required in to order to build up the ranks of such cadres. Simply studying the line is impossible. You can't say whether quick-and-close transplanting is right or wrong. You can't say whether slow-and-separate transplanting is right or wrong. It varies according to each concrete situation, with easy variety of paddy seed. Concrete experience is therefore needed, and it is necessary for cadres to be built up in the movement.

To produce two paddy crops/a year/, there is a need for meticulous organization in every sphere: as regards seeds, water, broadcasting seeds, transplanting, harvesting, deployment of forces,...etc.

There must also be research about varieties of paddy-seed, into agricultural chemicals and elimination of rodents. This requires cadres in many agricultural spheres. We build up and select cadres in the movement. Animal husbandry also requires cadres-building and selection.

Agricultural problems are indeed complicated in many spheres. Will we nevertheless be able to build up cadres? They can be found by selecting male and female combatants by their classness.

Selecting and building up cadres systematically is a practical necessity, particularly in the cooperatives. Letting things just continue to slide is impossible. For example, there's nothing strong about letting elements who are not good tend oxen. It is necessary to select our male and female combatants. It's the same on other spearheads: cadres-building is a must.

It's also the same in the artisans' shops, the factories and on the rubber plantations. It's necessary to build up cadres with a stand of leadership responsibility. There may be instances in which those without such a stand do no wrecking, but they will work at a mediocre pace. If they possess such a stand, they will be forever gathering the masses' opinions and drawing lessons step-by-step. Thus, year by year, things will go from strength to strength.

**II. ON THE SOURCES FOR AND ORIENTATIONS IN BUILDING UP CADRES TO SERVE IN NATIONAL DEFENCE WORK AND DEFENDING THE REVOLUTIONARY STATE POWER AND TO SERVER SOCIALIST REVOLUTION AND SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION.**

Wherein are the sources and what kinds of orientation must be in order to build up cadres to server in defending the country and the revolutionary state power and socialist revolution and socialist constriction?

**FIRST ORIENTATION:** It is necessary to build up the Party Center. It is necessary to build up the Party Centre because it is the core of the Party as a whole. As it takes on large responsibilities, acting as a core is a must. If someone in it does not act as a core and cannot fulfil its duties; they must set them aside and let someone else who is capable of doing so fulfil them instead. This is our Party's organizational line. Cause of the Party's need for core cadres, thorough penetration of this line everyone is a must, so that every one is clear-cut on this matter. What kinds of core are needed? Cores in every sphere, who must understand culture and understand this as a line. We have such understanding so that if someone puts things into practice wrongly, we can give guidance in time. This is the way things are in terms of social action and health, too. We said it was normal for the people to suffer shortages in 1975 and 1976, that it is normal for them to suffer shortages in 1977, and that it will be normal when they suffer shortages in 1978. Enduring shortages is normal in making revolution. It is, however, to pass through them and leave them behind quickly. If that's not happening, it means that we are not yet imbued with the Party's line. It will be necessary in 1978 to put the Party's systems completely into practice. The solution is more bananas, tubers, sakou / \_\_\_ / and corn.

It's the same with shelter. Shelters are tactically homes in which the people will live appropriately in every case in 1979-1980/ we aren't yet building strategic homes. We are building tactical home so that the people can in the meantime have appropriate shelter, but don't let things be too shanty-like.

What we would like to talk about here is building up cadres of the Party Centre such that they are imbued with Party's line in every sphere, as well as imbued with the political line of gathering forces. Politically, each cooperative must be well-administered with a maximum gathering of forces, so they mustn't allow forces to be split up. They must also be imbued with the Party's foreign policy.

Build up Methods: Hold Centre-revolutionary outlook on life meetings. In addition, it's necessary to go all out to study on one's own. Take advantage of 15 or ten minute chances to read the Party's documents, as this helps to build up a stand of adopting the line and then going down to see how it's reflected implementation, and because we need the light of the line in order to lead at the core level. Simply reading the Party's annual activity reports does help us to understand problems, and reading the Party's resolutions does help to rectify our orientation. There will otherwise be instances in which we will be sucked into practical work and forget the Party's major orientations, such as the orientation of cadre-building.

In addition, members of the Party Centre must have a regimen of studying with all cadres in the zonal and sectoral committees and there must be a system of holding revolutionary outlook on life sessions in the zonal and scetoral committees. We may even hold outlook on life sessions with zonal assistants so as to understand each other more

and more and be closer and closer to one another, and so that they will have the courage to build us up.

Moreover, we must pay attention to further expansion of Centre assistants according to the Party's line of clear-cut biographies, clear-cut activities and clear-cut class nature. Centre assistants are a seedbed for continuing to build the Centre up further. A large number of elements will certainly be good. A small number will not be good and fall back down. This is a normal rule. It would seem that in the future our selection of Centre members and assistants will be better and better than before, because we are proceeding from a cleaner Party than before.

**SECOND ORIENTATION:** In the current conditions, it is necessary to pay attention to cadres in the districts, which as an important level for the Party's core cadre-building. Some district members already have one foot in the sectors and another in the cooperatives, and they are thus an important bridge linked to the cooperatives.

Since the clean sweep of enemies in 1975-76, we made arrangements in the sectors, districts and cooperatives, but especially in the districts. From an examination of arrangements in the districts these days, the districts' bridge-cadre status is conspicuous, and it can be seen that 70-80% of the new district cadres that we have brought up to take charge of the districts are good. They are good in class nature; have done well on their way through the movement, not staying on the sidelines but in combat; are militant in nature; respect organizational discipline and are honest with the Party and revolution; and have engaged in labour right alongside the labours, right in the mass movement, right in production. They have stuck with the mass movement and joined in the mass movement to look for and attack enemies. They thus have the capital with which to attack bureaucratism, mandarinism, authoritarianism, etc.

The drawback that still exists is their lack of experience in one matter or another. For example, because they still don't have experience in taking broad responsibility, they don't have experience in being prescient when looking for enemy ploys. In addition, shortcomings exist in their experiences in effective deployment of forces. However, such deficiencies are temporary, and basically they are good, valiant, gallant and brave, and they fight. These cadres are the cadres for future service to socialist revolution. Their true nature is different from that of cadres who have only been in offices and only examined documents, reports and the mere back-and-forth correspondence in letters.

All these district cadres have the potential to become strong cadres, strong sector, zone and Centre cadres. We must make them maintain their class nature and stay on in the fray. We must deepen them and make them continue to stick it out with the movement, the masses and the cooperatives. With such connections they will simultaneously understand defence, class struggle and building up. Such district cadres differ from the cadres who we previously purged. These earlier cadres did not stick with the masses; they were controlist and would invite themselves to eat and drink all over the place. We must be thoroughly meticulous in building up the new cadres and selecting additional new cadres for build-up.

**THIRD ORIENTATION:** The types of persons who must be built up as cadres include ordinary Party members, persons from core organs and members of the progressive masses. Among these, maximum attention must be paid to the progressive masses.

From one perspective ordinary Party members are not good because where they are enemies exist and they have for the most part been influenced by the enemy, although are ordinary Party members who are good alright in other spheres, particularly among those who still haven't been given any position. Most such persons are basic class elements. They appear to be culturally weak slow-pokes, but they are by true nature honest with the Party. They will do honestly any duty turned over to them. Attention must be paid to building up this type.

It's the same with core organs. A part of them are under enemy influence, but another part is good, particularly those male and female combatants who have a basic class nature with a weak culture but are honest with the Party. We must pay attention to the build up of all such persons.

It is necessary to pay the most important attention to the progressives. Progressives exist plentifully everywhere, and the majority remain clean, particularly among the basic classes they are like new raw cloth, first quality pure white raw cloth, first quality pure white raw cloth. They still haven't been trained by the enemy places were rich. However, after liberation, they sank. In 1970 they sank a little, in 1971 they sank a little. We didn't know. It wasn't until 1976-77 that we knew. Only then did we go to rehabilitate them (sdar). After only one semester of rehabilitation, the situation evolved back to good. However, because we had not gone down, we had left things so that the situation had evolved to sinking for 6-7 years.

For example: Some places, the problem of meals and drink has not yet been achieved according to the ration. In examining this aspect, it would continue to sink further. This situation must be rehabilitated in time. If there is no rehabilitation, the situation will be forever sinking further.

Where there are shortages in terms of meals and drink, there must be resolution.

Resolve things by helping to provide food is one thing. However, it is necessary to resolve the responsible cadres.

Some other places are also this way, too. The situation is forever sinking slowly (lich-lung sroem) step-by-step. Now we are already rehabilitating things step-by-step. We must continue to do so further.

In some places, the situation is still sinking a little bit. Cadres must be resolved in order to rehabilitate them.

2. The second aspect is that going down to the bases you see the good aspects. Every place has good aspects, it's only that they may be few or many. In going down to the bases, these good points must be impelled forward further.

Another reason why we must build up progressives is that in the cooperatives we need many ranks of cadres outside the Party. A 1,000-household cooperative must have cores numbering in the hundreds. It will only be possible to find them by looking for them among the progressives.

Only by doing build-up with such orientations will it have a systematic, basic and mass character. We can only select cadres among the masses once they are in ferment. In a 500-household cooperative, at least 1,000 progressives exist. We can build up 100, 200 or 300 cadres among these 1,000 persons to take charge of the oxen, compost, storehouse-defence and catering spearheads and child-care. Experience show that it is already possible to do this throughout the country, even if some places have been able to do it more and others less. Select those with a basic class nature for build up, send them to do things, draw lessons with them, have them study for a half day or day, and then send them to do more things. We can build them up if this is the way it's done. In one or two years we will have resolved the problem of finding enough cadres to go and grasp cooperative throughout the country. We must have such a systematic solution. Building up a cooperative chairperson or two is no solution. There may be good persons among them, but, basically, the enemies will be marshalling their people as well.

Marshalling our cadres by relying on progressives and proceeding from this class line is in accord with our strategy. The basic classes are those closest to the socialist revolution. They are inherently proletarian or semi-proletarian. Second, they engage in labour right alongside the masses, and to the extent that they do, they can construct socialism and draw technological lessons among the masses. To the extent that they are proletarian, they are most self-sacrificing, and to this extent they can defend the country well.

For example, in some places the people higher up have better classness than the people below. It is thus necessary to impel further forward the building up of cadres higher up in order to make the higher up stronger and stronger and come to help below. This is the problem of cadres.

The problem of production is like this, too. We go down and understand the concrete problems, help bring about resolutions, and impel forward the movement ever more increasingly quickly.

For example, higher up the politics are good and the classness is good. However, the possibilities of socialism are greater below. Therefore, if we only \_\_\_\_\_ (angkeim) higher up, we will not be able to be quick. The only thing would be to bring cadres from higher up to impel forward production below in order to carry out shock assaults and to impel forward the movement to construct socialism.

Therefore, going down to the bases is not only getting out of predicaments (dah kon), is not only resolving complicated problems. Going down to the bases in right at the level of carrying out shock assaults. Carry out shock assault to build up old forces and in particular carry out shock assaults to build up new forces. Don't go with only a defensive stand and of resolving only complicated problems. Carry out shock assaults to build up forces and impel forward the movement. Don't \_\_\_\_\_ (angkiem) only old forces. Old forces must be build up, but the important thing is to build up new forces in order that these forces will impel forward old forces.

## 2. In order to Build Up Cadres in Accordance with the Mass Criteria.

Such an examination strengthens our faith in the basic classes. Other classes are not as good as the basic classes. They are inferior in labour and in self-sacrifice.

The proletariat and semi-proletariat are naturally more protean in the movement for socialist revolution than other classes, but they will be even more protean to the extent that they understand things better and better.

What about the middle peasants and the rest of the petty bourgeoisie: must we build them up? We must, but only for use on secondary battlefields and under the leadership of the proletariat, or, concretely, under the leadership of cadres emerging from the basic classes. No matter what our technological shortcomings may be, we must nevertheless not pull back from the Party line. Although we may have some technological shortcomings, we must proceed stalwartly from socialist revolution to go all out to produce rice to feed ourselves. We will work on other problems step-by-step. We will work step-by-step on paddy and other technologies. We will proceed stalwartly from the hearth of socialist revolution and a collectivist stand to work on them step-by-step. If technology were to be advanced but our collectivist stand not stalwart, things would go revisionist a little bit at time.

Is this the correct line? It's correctness is demonstrated in our movement. Cooperatives administered by bad class elements are without rice to eat. Cooperatives that are put together right and administered by good classes have good internal solidarity and produce enough to eat and to have a large surplus for provision to the state. This is the result of the subjectively strong character of their leadership. Their overall leading committees are good, as are each of their spearhead committees. At this point we would like to discuss the problem of deployment of cooperative cadres.

## One Can Only Agitate (bamphoh) the Masses

In order that the masses will be bubbling forth (phol-phoh), it can only be that they have been made to understand the Party's line. Our political line, our line of 3 tons and 6 tons, our line of attacking the enemy, our line of gathering forces must be made understood by them in order to gather all the forces that can be gathered. If the masses are not agitated to make them understand, it will only be possible to build up one cadres here and one cadre there.

If the masses are made to understand and are bubbling forth, it will be possible to build up a lot of cadres and rapidly.

The Way: Select 100, 200, 300 basic classes for training and then have them go do things. And then call more to come in. Train them in depth according to each class. The basic classes will be able to go into depth. Other classes and the new people must also be trained. But pay important attention to training poor peasant and lower-middle peasant.

If the masses are clear-cut on things, the masses will be certainly bubbling forth. The enemies will be in maximum isolation and the dubious and waverers (steak-stoer) may be won over to our side (ouh-teanh). Cadres will then forever be found.

Proceed from a class line in marshalling cadres, who are the soul of the revolution. The cadres-types that must be found for the period of socialist revolution are those who can most absorb the essence of socialist revolution, and this means none other than the poor and lower-middle peasants.

### III. A NUMBER OF CADRE-BUILDING PROBLEMS TO WHICH ADDITIONAL ATTENTION MUST BE PAID

#### 1. The Problem of Building Every Level of Cadres Up in the Concrete Movement

To what must determining attention be paid in making judgements about cadre-building in the Centre, the zones, cooperatives or in ministries and offices. We must take as the determining factor their concrete implementation to tasks. Also proceed from an examination of their concrete task-doing in / Party/ life meetings and in study.

The basic and determining factor in judging whether a cadre is strong, average or weak is what they have done concretely in carrying out tasks.

We already have unity on this. Some of our cadres, however, seem to feel that practical work is something separate from cadre-building work. These are inherently inseparable. Going down to monitor work at the bases will result in our having an even more increased understanding of the cadre situation, of what is available and what is lacking in the people's standard of living and of the extent to which they are able to produce paddy.

1. We can immediately have solutions for and rectify things.
2. We can judge cadres are strong or weak, and what the reasons for their weaknesses are, whether we can continue to train and build them up more, whether we can build them up or not, and what kind of further transfer measures we must continue to take.

What we want to show here is that practical work is not separate from cadre-building work. In the past, we have not linked practical work with cadre-building work.



Cadres can be built up only once there is an analysis of the extent of their strengths and weaknesses, of how to train them, of whether they can make a go of it or not, so that they might be transferred somehow or another.

Cadres-building is not merely a matter of schools. No matter how correct the contact we may have with them in school, we can only understand them to a limited extent because we don't see them in the movement.

If we go down to the bases and monitor things there, we can see which bases are weak and which are strong. We can do an analysis and find out what the reasons are: whether they are political, ideological or organizational; and then continue to do more training. We can transfer those who don't improve with training to some new duty, so that they may be replaced by strong persons.

Some comrades are good, good by class nature and honesty with the Party, but are nevertheless not strong. We can have an understanding of this, if it is the case. Our understanding is that there must be a solution, that if there is no solution, a contradiction will exist between the work and forces that are not strong.

Therefore, go down a lot and do a lot of practical work, but do so in connection with cadre-building work. Only by going down can the problems be seen.

1. When we see deficient points, we do an analysis and join with others in coming up solutions. Two aspects always exist everywhere. The first is the negative aspect: the existence of enemies and shortcomings in the people's living standards, ...etc. This is the aspect which requires solutions. If there are no solutions, things will go on sinking further and further, and this aspect exists everywhere.

For example, some places, which before their liberation were well-to-do even when others had nothing, nevertheless went downhill after their liberation. They sank a little in 1970 and a little in 1971, but we didn't know. We only knew in 1976-77, and only then did we go to rehabilitate them. The situation evolved positively after only a half-year, but because we had not gone down to these places, we had allowed a sinking evolution of the situation for 6-7 years.

For examples, in some places, the problems of food to eat and to drink haven't been resolved to accord with the ration, and an examination shows that this aspect of things could continue to sink further. There must be a timely rehabilitation of this situation, otherwise, it will sink further forever.

Solutions are needed wherever there are shortages of good to eat and water to drink.

A solution which helps to provide food is one thing, but it is also necessary to have a solutions as regards cadres.

Some other places exist where things are similar, where the situation is forever going slowly downhill, step-by-step. We are now already carrying out rehabilitation step-by-step, but we must continue to do so further.

Some places exist where the situation is still going downhill a little bit. In order to rehabilitate them, there must be solutions as regards cadres.

2. The second aspect is that going down to the bases allows you to see the good aspects. Every place has greater or fewer good aspects. When going down to the bases, you must impel the good points further forward.

For example, in some places the class nature of the highlander is better than that of the lowlander. It is therefore necessary to impel further forward the building up of highlander cadres to make them stronger and stronger and so they can come to help down below. This refers to the problem of cadres.

It's the same with the problem of production. By going down to and understanding concrete problems, we are able to help come up with solutions and impel the movement ever more increasingly quickly.

For example, while the politics and the class nature of the highlanders may be good, the possibilities for socialist construction may be greater below. We therefore can't be quick if we only \_\_\_\_\_ / agkiem/ higher up. The only solution is to bring highlander cadres down to impel forward production below, such that shock assaults are carried out and the socialist construction movement is impelled forward.

Going down to the bases, therefore, means not only getting out of predicaments or resolving complicated problems, it's also the right thing to do in terms of carrying out shock assaults to build up veteran forces and in particular to build up new forces. Don't go with a defensive stand of only resolving the complicated problems, but to carry out shock assaults to build up forces and impel the movement forward. Don't \_\_\_\_\_ /angkiem/ only the veteran forces. Veteran forces must also be built up, but what's important is building up new forces so that they will impel the veteran forces forward.

2. Cadre-Building in Line with the Mass Criteria Can Only Be Done By Agitating the Masses

The masses will be in ferment only if they have been made to understand the Party's lines: our political line, our line of 3 tons and 6 tons, our line on attacking the enemy and our line on the gathering of forces must be understood so that we can gather all the forces that can be gathered. If agitation is not done to make the masses understand, it will only be possible to build up one cadre here and one cadre there.

If the masses are made to understand and are in ferment, it will be possible to build up a lot of cadres and build them up rapidly.

The method is to select 100, 200 or 300 persons from the basic classes for training and then gave them go do things. Then call more in. The depth of their training depends on the class. With the basic classes you can go into depth. Other classes and the new people must also be trained, but pay important attention to training the poor and lower-middle peasants.

If the masses are clear-cut about things, they will certainly be in ferment, and the enemy will be in maximum isolation, while the dubious and the vacillating can be won over to our side. It will then always be possible to find cadres.

Revolutionary Flag, Special Number, October-November 1977  
First draft 10.87

"Further Raise the Quality of the Party Leadership in Order to Lead in Defence Duties and the Duties of Continuing the Socialist Revolution and Building Socialism" (pp.42-74)

Requirement:

To study and learn from the Party's new leadership documents at this time so as to meet the requirement of raising to a higher degree the quality of the Party Leadership. It is to be raised at the level of putting our action line into practice, and leading and carrying out our work better and better and more and more effectively; at the level of being more and more imbued with the meaning of the Party's political, ideological and organizational lines, so that we can lead in the achievement of our duties in accordance with the Party's annual plan and in defence tasks, in continuing the socialist revolution and in the construction of socialism.

#### AN EXPLANATION OF THE REQUIREMENTS

If we do take ever-higher leadership responsibility, we will fight ever more gallantly. /kliev-kla/.

Leading and carrying out work better and better and ever more effectively at the level of putting into practice our action line means paying attention to figuring out how to achieve a hit with every blow. Otherwise, there will be instances in which although we have attacked, we have only wasted forces and time and produced nothing. It is imperative to get a lot of results, but if the action line is not effective, the results will instead be few.

This comes about in some places, for example, where heavy rice is grown and we either are slow in letting the water in or have to let it in before the paddy is ripe.

This comes about, for example, in some places where we are growing heavy paddy and, on the one hand, we are slow in being able to let the water in while, on the other, it's necessary to let the water in when the paddy isn't ripe yet.

This may happen, for example, in relation to "sealing bridges, making troughs", an action line about which we are not yet clear enough to be effective. In some instances, it's better not to seal bridges and you get better results from making watergates, because if the passageways are small, you won't get a lot of alluvial soil.

It may happen, for example, when making troughs on earthen dams. If the dam breaks, the troughs are broken, and we thus have to make two only to get one.

It may happen, for example, when some dams break, and we have to reconstruct them. We lose a year, and we have built a dam twice only to get one dam.

All these examples demonstrate the necessity of paying attention to figuring out how to make the action line work, so that what's done one year gives many years' service.

It's the same with building the people's houses. Before building them, you have to figure out how to do it. If you still haven't figured out clearly how you're going to do it, don't do it yet. You can't serve the people's requirements in a timely way if you do things too haphazardly/??/ \_\_\_\_\_/top-taeng/.

Another example is that in some places there are a lot of houses, but they're just all over everywhere, with each individual originating the idea of where building wherever it might occur to them to do so. It's necessary to have a common planning map and to set up one house at a time according to it. Otherwise, we'll be tearing houses down and putting them up forever, which is a big waste of energy.

Each structure torn down and put back up is a waste of energy adversely affecting annual production, the people's living standard in that year and the Party plan for that year. You have to figure out how to make the action line work so that there won't be any tearing down and putting back up.

#### CONTENTS OF THE DOCUMENT

#### 1. INCREASE EVEN MORE DEMOCRATIC CENTRALIST LEADERSHIP OF THE PARTY, WHICH MEANS GIVING IMPORTANCE TO FURTHER STRENGTHENING OUR STANCES OF LEADING COLLECTIVELY WHILE TAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR DUTIES SEPARATELY

Here we would like to stress only two problems:

1. The necessity of paying attention to firming up more strongly the stance of collective leadership;
2. The necessity of firming up more strongly the stance of taking responsibility for duties separately.

We understand what collective leadership and separate responsibility are. All that remains is to increase their strength. Both collective and separate here are one in reality, as these two things must be together in a single unit of organization. You must study collectively as well as otherwise, and we must hold committee meeting by level as well as otherwise, Just as we must have interchange and discussions with one or two other people, as well as with more, in order to exchange opinions back and forth and have a clearing off accounts/??/ \_\_\_\_\_ ty-toat/ about what must and mustn't be done.

In conjunction with this, however, individual responsibility must be increased. What is the content of separate responsibility?

The Centre can only be strong like we want it to be if every one of its members is strong in their own bases. They will then have experience of their own to contribute when participating in meetings and have clear-cut opinions, and when they go back down their dissemination of the resolutions of the Party Centre to their bases will also be strong. Both what is provided to the Centre and what the Centre provides in return will be strong.

It is necessary to do whatever must be done in order that we are strong when separate. Each of the members of the Centre has duties. Whether it's what the Comrade Secretary is responsible for and the Comrade Deputy is responsible for, whether its which bases or which ministries the other Comrades are responsible for, each has their own work. If all our legs are of equal length, then our journey will be quick, but if they are not, we won't be strong.

If, for example, there exist complications regarding defence in a certain zone, the entire country will be anxious and preoccupied about it, and it will retard work throughout the country.

The same example obtains in construction: if there exist complications in a certain zone, if it is weak and the people are starving and thirsty and facing hardships in their standard of living, other places have to help, and thus if they've walked forward three steps, they have to walk back two. This is what comes about when there's unevenness among the separate. If most of the sectors and zones are facing hardships, it pulls the entire country backward.

Our orientation for resolving this problem can only be increasing our separate strengths. Each of us must go all out even more, all out in common study and common life-outlook sessions; all out in personal study and drawing lessons personally, and all out in studying from the bases and having life-outlook sessions in the Zone Committees. In a word, we must each go all out to build ourselves up. We will thereby become able to resolve other problems quickly and lead strongly in every sphere.

We must strive to be oriented in an on-target direction, because if we merely strain after the work, there will be instances in which the light of the all-sphere line will be unclear. We cannot be imbued with the all-sphere line if, in putting it into practice, we solve only one problem or another, but don't go all out to examine our practical work, to consider it and study from it, to connect it up with other things and reflect up on it. Only by going all out will we be ever more imbued with what the line means when put into practice and will we be ever more razor-sharp ideologically and ever stronger organizationally.

One method is most effective for building our separate selves up, and that is consistently going down to the practical and being alongside the mass movement for which we are responsible. We go down in order to understand what the strong and weak points are and to study and draw lessons from what has been done right and what has been done wrong, and in conjunction with this, we take the plan down for consideration with the zones, sectors and districts. We must go down fairly often to the places where

complicated problems exist, in order to understand these problems more and more deeply and help to resolve them more and more effectively. After going down, hold meetings with the others involved and draw lessons.

Currently, circumstances are favorable for us going deeper and deeper and drawing a whole lot of concrete lessons. We should look at the movement in order to have a view of the cadres.

Concretely, we are improving a lot of alright in collective terms, as well as improving in separate terms, but fairly slowly when compared to the collective.

Part of the objective reason is enemy harassment of us.

But what's important are our own subjective reasons, that our stances of taking responsibility separately and of function as cores for leadership are really not high yet, and the quality of our leadership is not yet such that breakthroughs are made in problem resolution. Some comrades who go down to resolve things together with the collectivities of the lower levels are able to do so, but when some cadres return, there are endless complications and endless anxieties. This results from not having broken through to a resolution of the problem. There are some problems that cannot be resolved immediately. But we stand fast as a result of the staunchness of our stance of taking responsibility for coming up with solutions. When we see problems, we see that they must be resolved. If we can't resolve them today, then we have to resolve them tomorrow.

The leadership line of our Party is: "from the masses to the masses". The masses do right and the masses do wrong, but basically they do right. We must proceed from experiences of what the masses do right in order to come up with solutions when we experience them doing wrong. The masses will provide us with a whole lot of helpful opinions if we industriously hold lesson-drawing conferences.

We will have a very great potential for socialist construction if the Centre, the zones and the sectors are all strong both collectively and separately, along with the cooperatives and ministries and offices. We can be strong in separation, however, only once we pay attention to cadres-building.

## 2. Increase Our Appreciation and the Firmness of Our Grasp of and the Solidity of Our Always Proceeding From the Party's Line in Every Sphere

There must be political quality in order that there be quality leadership. Only once we are imbued with the political line in every sphere and what it means to put it into practice concretely according to our own practical experiences will we have political quality, which we need very much in order to be able to function as cores.

The national defence line must also be understood in terms of concrete implementation and according to what sorts of practical experiences we have vis-à-vis the enemies within and in our right and wrong implementation of the line. Our foremost

negative experience is that enemies have been able to bore away among us. This is one part of our negative experience.

Our second mistake is that we are not yet proceeding solidly enough from the Party's line to eliminate enemy remnants: The Comrade "K" / first letter of the alphabet / experience was a negative own with our own flesh and blood. In some zones, as in the case of the contemptible... and the contemptible...., we let things slide; we were not absolute. They didn't halt their activities and they were able to work us more.

We must be imbued with an understanding of the job of putting into motion implementation of the line of socialist revolution, and one can only understand by doing, by being industrious in doing, in drawing lessons and studying from the essentials. Incantations /?/ \_\_\_\_\_ /rup-mon/ won't do, as they will be unmasked in the movement/??/. The dictatorship of the proletariat is an example of why simple incantations won't do. You have to understand the problem of how to deeply the Party's forces to be able to put the dictatorship of the proletariat into practice, as well as the problem of how to set up the worker-peasant alliance to be able to gather other forces while putting the dictatorship of the proletariat into practice through elimination of the counter-revolutionaries. If these problems are not understood, then our forces will be split and this means giving forces to the enemy. If we don't build up the Party's forces and the worker-peasant alliance, we will be able to put the dictatorship of the proletariat into practice, whereas if we are able to build up the Party's forces and the worker-peasant alliance, then we will be able to gather other forces.

The personal and the common are, for example, related to capitalism and socialism. If one slips/?/ kralieh/ \_\_\_\_\_ / into the personal, then one goes capitalist, whereas if one proceeds stalwartly from the common, then one is standing solidly on socialism. We must proceed stalwartly from the line to be able to analyze problems.

Take for example that a socialist line proceeds from independence/mastery. If one has independence/mastery and is self-supporting, mustn't expand too much. It means that we are not yet imbued with a line of building socialism with independence/mastery and self-reliantly if when building a dam for which 10,000 bags of cement are needed, we use up 3,000 bags, or if we build reservoirs and feeder canals once and they break and a second time and they break, thereby expending a lot.

Take this example of being imbued with what it means to put into practice the line of independence/mastery: striving to produce a lot of paddy while a food supply nevertheless exists, and if there is paddy, there's an even greater food supply. If things are otherwise, then one is not imbued with the line.

Take for example if we think only of gathering up so that we have everything we need for ourselves. Those who do this are not yet imbued with the line of building socialism with independence/mastery and self-reliantly. Self-reliance is going all out for maximum innovativeness, so that even with only a little capital a lot of results can be produced.



Take for example the need to understand and be imbued with the Party's political line of gathering in friendly forces of support worldwide. We must have an understanding of and be imbued with this so that in our capacity as leading cadres we will be able to gather in both domestic and foreign forces to mobilize our movement.

There's only one way to such imbuement: studying, drawing lessons and hold life-outlook sessions together. In addition to this, we should study personally, study from political, ideological and organizational documents while holding them to see how they are reflected in the concrete movement in our bases and throughout the country, so that we are imbued with their meaning in terms of concrete implementation and in giving effective guidance to others.

### 3. It Is Necessary to Pay Increased Attention to Always Doing Clear-Cut Political and Ideological Work in the Leadership

We would like to stress that the essence of leadership is doing what must be done such that those who receive our leadership are clear-cut and clear-sighted. Only if they are satisfied with our leadership will they be valiant. If we are leading, but they are not crystal clear and don't understand, they won't be valiant or militant. They will instead therefore be ramshackle. Effective leadership necessitates doing whatever must be done to make those be whom we lead valiant, and in order for this to happen we must do whatever must be done so that they have a clear understanding of their duties and have a clear-cut political, ideological and organizational understanding of what implementation means for them.

We must join with them in an analysis by which they can clearly see their strong points and their weak points. If you only show them their strong points, they will optimistically subjective. If you only show them their weak points and points of difficulty, they will be pessimistic and not valiant.

The second agenda item is to proceed from an analysis of strong and weak points to getting together to take measures to resolve things. Joining together in coming up with solutions is a requirement in order that they be able to way the path ahead and things don't get clogged up. This is because leadership is resolving contradictions, and if you merely mete out blame and don't find ways of resolving them, things will get clogged up, contradictions won't be resolved, and no way out of problems will be found.

This is the principle, but, concretely, immediate resolution is possible. Resolution must be step-by-step.

If when you go you see nothings but the strong points and you don't look for the weak points in order to resolve them step-by-step, one day things will become stifled. If when you go you see nothing but the weak points, all we see is that a certain unit of organization is weak, we are not leading. We must come up with solutions. And if we have such solutions, the faith of the cadres in the leadership will be more and more

strengthened. They will study from this, just as we study from this, and our forces will be forever in ferment and never stifled.

4. THE LEADERSHIP MUST MAKE A CLEAR-CUT ANALYSIS OF EVERY PROBLEM AND EVENT IN ORDER TO ADOPT CLEAR-CUT AND EFFECTIVE MEASURES.

The most difficult thing in the problem of leadership is whether you can or can't see the concrete reality of each individual, each unit of organization and each base, whether or not you can see it clearly and whether or not you can see it in every nook and cranny. This is what we are talking about when we say its necessary to have a firm grasp on the situation and a clear understanding of it, whether in a limited context, a large context or a worldwide context. The most difficult thing is whether or not one has a correct analysis of a problem. Take for example the analysis of a cadre. If we analysis his strong and weak points correctly, we will be able to build him up rapidly. If, on the other hand, our analysis is incorrect, we will not be able to build him up. It the same for building up the entire Party. If we don't find what we're looking for, we will be building everything up scattershot, not building up on target on problems.

This problem is a complicated one. It's complicated to analyze either a cadre or a unit of organization. Some people go too far in analyzing the strong points and don't see the weak points, to which they don't pay so much attention. Some people go too far in analyzing the weak points and see only the weak points, according to their own subjectivity, and don't see the strong points. Either way their analysis is thus wrong. Wrong analysis creaties difficulties for the solidarity question. It's necessary to correct analysis of others according to their levels, and this is the most important problem.

How can it solved?

- Everybody must proceed from a loft spirit of taking responsibility.
- One goes to solve a problem so that it is impelled forward quickly and measures are adopted that do resolve it and don't hold back the movement, so that we don't in our own subjective way make it more and more complicated. If we go to solve it once but can't, then we have to re-examine it.

In order to be able to solve a problem, it is necessary to proceed from a stand of responsibility, so as to have a clear analysis of each individual, unit of organization and base. The method for ensuring correct analysis is to analyze collectively with units of organization and with the bases. Listening is not enough: you have to ask questions and have interchange in order to understand. We then bring together the analytical opinions and suggest opinions for further interchange in order to bring out the concrete reality in its entirety. We must ferret out a further understanding of the problem.

One a problem is discovered, measures must be adopted to deal with it, including both immediate and protracted political and organizational measures.

Analysis is the problem at the root of leadership.. Our past experience is that order to analyze correctly it is necessary:

1. to processed from the party's all-round line;
2. to rely on, have faith in and agitate the masses in the Party, the army and the people. Thus, even if an analysis is not yet entirely correct, we will be able to proceed further with our analysis step-by- step through reliance on the masse.

Initially the traitors hated the "y" alright, but they were weak in terms of their analytic viewpoint and their viewpoints on patriotism and national honor; they analyzed the "y" as strong and feared and respected the "y", and so step-by-step they went into the service of the "y" and betrayed their own nation and their own people.

The only way to raise analytical quality is therefore to be imbued with the lime of the Party, It is necessary to strengthen our stand vis-a-vis the line and our ideological and organizational stands firmly and consistently.

We must go all out to analyze collectively and individually. Every problem must always been seen from two perspectives.

For example, seeing only enemies, betrayal and utter darkness when there incidences of treason; and not seeing we have already swept the enemy cleanly away and the new forces are expanding and flourishing.

A similar example is that when listening to reports and it is about the good side of things, we must ask whether there are nay difficulties.

It's the same for analyzing enemies: it must be seen that they have strong and weak points, and not only strong points; and when we have seen the enemy's weakpoints, we must not subjectively see only these. We must see the enemy's strong points so as to be on our guard.

Our party's stance of analysis according to such independence/mastery has resulted in our being independent. We are independents both in language and in substance.

**5. INCREASE LEADERSHIP SO THAT IT IS BETER AND BETTER BY GOING ALL OUT TO IMPLEMENT ACTION LINES BETTER AND BETTER AND MORE AND MORE CORECTLY AND EFFECTIVELY**

The Party has clear-cut political, military, economic and foreign policy lines, and in the past we have already put them into rapid practice. In the days to come, we must put them into even more rapid practice.

In order to be ever more rapid, it is necessary to have ever more effective action lines.

Military, we must effectively put into practice the action line that we call the combat line. We must put the combat line into effect practice on both the western and the eastern frontiers. With a stand of not being terrified, a correct military line and effective combat line, we will be able to defend the country.

It's the same in economics. We're already clear about 3 tons/6tons, about which land we work once and which twice and about the line for coming up with solutions for water, but in order to know how to put them into practice it's necessary to have correct action lines. We are drawing lessons step-by-step about these problems.

The water-solution line is:

1. Solution by big reservoirs;
2. Solution by medium reservoirs;
3. Solution by small pools.

Main forces attack the big reservoirs. district forces attack the medium reservoirs. And the forces in the villages attack the small pools. In this way, water will exist everywhere for oxen, water buffalo, hogs, poultry and human beings. Our experience in 1977 has been drought and more drought. The people had to go four or five kilometers to get water, and second had to waste time waiting for it. We have not yet been able to resolve this contradiction because our action line on the water problem still isn't effective, which in turn results from our action lines for employment and deployment of forces.

With regard to the paddy-farming line, some places only attack on a large scale and not on a small scale. It's not sufficient to attack only on a large scale as there's not enough water. We should therefore attack on large, medium and small scales, taking advantage of small-scale attacks to use up all water potentialities. When we say make savings we're talking about on or two hectares or even half a hectare.

Our experience has been that some places are constantly on the attack, and that the people are therefore without worry and constantly have healthy, beaming faces. Some places, however, are not constantly on the attack but are only on the attack two or three months a year. They wait for the reason to arrive. if we are constantly on small-scale attack, we will constantly have something to put in our pots and be able to maintain our produce/?? / \_\_\_\_ / phal-thoar, p.62/ in graneries.

Another example relates to attacking paddy in big, medium and small ways, but also attacking other food supplies, tubers, sakou, trav, papaya and other fruits and vegetables. At the front we can take advantage of whatever time is available to make one or two attacks, whereas in the year there should be constant attacks every day. This can be done anywhere. From now on we must set up vegetable planting, in order that we are in time while the soil is still damp. Every ten families must have about a hectare of tralach, squashes and cucumber. Our action like must be made clear, and we must make clear on which spearheads we are attacking and how we distribute our forces. Don't just tell others what to do. In addition, our tatic for being able to eat immediately is beans, kuor and trap.

Squashes and tralach are strategic for when we go down to work the paddy fields, that is, for the time when planting is difficult. And sugarcane is only for mounds; it can also be planted where we're growing paddy, even if it's only grown in one season, like hat others do along the river banks. Those for us in the paddy fields can also do the same. The problem may arise that the soil damp and of how to dry it out. Ask the people, and dig drainage ditches to let out the water and dry the soil.

It is necessary to figure out who does what and when to do things. This is the line of people's war in national construction: the entire people are doing things, not only the main forces.

Another action line relates to handicrafts and industry. The current formulation/lam-noam/ is that Phnom Penh, the xones, the sectors, the districts and the cooperatives are all involved. This is a correct action line according with people's war. Every place is involved, In the old society, it was necessary to make a trip is foot to buy an ax or a shovel. Now there will be no more shortages of shovels, because they are being made everywhere. In the days to come we will have to make things ourselves, to buy iron with which to make our own digging and hoeing tools(chap). The action line is to expand our handicrafts and industry according to the mass criterion. As the days pass step-by-step every place will have mastery. This is the only way the movement can be served. If all you do is wait for Phnom Penh, nothing will get done in time.

There must be action line solutions for other action lines, such as that of growing paddy once and twice. Angkor Baurei, for example, doesn't need to bring in any water. Everything is sealed off and then gates are made, not letting water in from the outside. If rainwater comes in from above, means are found to drive it out. Work is constant. If there is constant work on 60,000 hectares, then working it twice is 120,000 hectares. when it rains and floods, various areas may be submerged such that 20,000 hectares are lost, but 100,000 hectares remain nevertheless. If we estimate an average of four tons per hectare, we'll get 400,000 tons Just in Angkor Baurei alone. In order, however, to carry out such an attack, we must set up permanent worksites and granaries and not let thing be ramshackle. This is what is meant by action line. In this way Angkor Baurei's energies do not lie dormant, and in the days to come we will have ever more water and will ever more master the problem of pumping the water out.

The same can be done elsewhere to a greater or lesser extent, according to the topography. It's the same in Ponhea leu, both in the west and the east. In this way we can see that our potential is very great both for paddy and com.

In the Northwest, we must constantly attack the Steung posat and the Steung Sankae, and attack 100-200 hectares here and there. If we attack posat in this manner, 3,000 hectares presents no difficulties. It's the same with the Steung chinit: we must start attacking it now, attacking after the harvest, without waiting for early next year. This would be a big waste of water, because it would both disappear into the ground and run off (huot-chreap).

Attack right up close to the dams, not far away from them. We should grow corn and tubers all over the mounds, using the full water potential.

The forces that are attacking along Route 5 in the vicinity of Boeng Po would win in a bigger way if they went down lower to attack, such as a Tuol Ampil. This is the action line of setting up to attack wherever it is possible for the attack to break through and achieve the plan. Don't attack \_\_\_\_/angkiem/ higher up. We have little capital. We should attack on target in lucrative places, and that will mean success in producing a lot. And this is putting into effective practice self-reliance and independence/ mastery.

It is necessary here also to implement the action line for seed rice. First, to produce a lot, look for light seed rice. Second, plant before harvesting by planting on the highlands. Then plow after harvesting and there will immediately be seedlings for transplanting. Set up the action line smoothly. Setting things up this way would mean that the forces stay in on place and will have shelter, water,/? phok? \_\_\_\_ p66/ and fruits and vegetables. If they were to go to distant places, there would be a lot of difficulties and things would be very ramshackle.

Another action line relates to deciding in what proportions to grow paddy, krachav, cotton, beans and ingor. This is an action line for supplementing and for exporting in for currency. It should be brought up as a line for discussion in the cooperatives in this manner.

The action line for cadre-building must also be made effective and simplified so that it can be easily understood by others to whom this work can be turned over a little at a time. Only be going from a little to a lot and from small to big can the building up of basic class cadres be guaranteed and assured.

6. To Lead One Must Have Clear-cut Plans, Especially Organized and Meticulous Agendas and Have Figures Solidly Gripped in Your Hands

We would like to explain further something of what concrete implementation means. It relates to how much two-crop land we have and how much water we have, and how much of these we employ in the rainy season and how much we took advantage of to put to use in the dry season in order to utilize our water potential entirely.

As leading cadre we must go down and grasp and examine things personally so that we can grasp clearly the concrete potentialities. We should go together with our follow cores to examine how much water there is, how many hectares it can be put into and how to dig ditches in order to utilize our water potential entirely.

How many hectares can the 1 January dam attack this dry season in Santouk and in baray. It's the same for Steung streng, the baray-Toek Thla reservoir, and Steung Siem Reap. It's the same in the East, kracheh and the Northeast. we must constantly plant both paddy and tubers.

We must grasp other figures: how many people there are and how much labour force there is and how much they eat; how much rice and how many fruits and vegetables must be grown. How many kilograms of fruits must ten people eat. We must have a firm grasp of how much paddy will be eaten and how much will be said and how much shortfall there is. We must have a firm grasp of how much of a shortfall there is in order to have an action line this dry season for growing how much of what to make up for it. Some places have enough to eat, for seed rice and to export 50,000 tons, but have to grasp what actions they can set up, how much more of what they can grow for eating in order to save on rice, and how much more rice can be exported.

#### 7. TO ELAD ONE MUST RELY SOLIDLY ON THE BASSES: THE MASSES IN THE PARTY, THE ARMY AND AMONG THE PEOPLE

In order to be able to rely on the masses, we must without any vacillation whatsoever possess, place, deepen and strengthen our faith in them.

Some people still don't believe in the masses in terms of concrete implementation, particularly in times of hardship. Some people may in some instances, when treasonous elements exist, see nothing but treason and say that the masses have betrayed.

Some places are always reporting, for example, that the masses want to run away somewhere. In fact, however, if we resolve the one or two persons who have gone bad and then proceed with our administration the masses are good.

2. Go to learn from the experiences of the masses, ask the masses, gather the opinions of the masses and have interchanges with the masses. Don't just go to have rallies at which guidance is given. Have discussion rallies, but don't make them too big: have 50-100 people. When their opinions are in unity and they offer opinions about how to make improvements, they will be valiant. The masses will have faith in the waterworks plans if we gather their opinions. We must similarly gather their opinions about other plans according to our democratic centralism.

3. One having gathered the opinions of the masses, we must agitate the masses so that their energies will not lie dormant. Plant in the rear and do waterworks and grow rice at the front... etc. Powerfully agitate these movements.

At the same time, good order must exist and there must be rectification such that we are not disoriented. We are not disoriented. We must pay attention to placement of leading nuclei.

Our past has experienced the fact that the profitable aspects of night work are small, whereas there are a lot of costly aspects:

1. Adverse effect on health;
2. Expenditure of electricity;
3. But the biggest losses are political and ideological.

It's impossible to administer tens of thousands of people working at night. The peace-unionists/?/\_\_\_\_\_ santisampoan/ engage in activities and immorality, and there are therefore political and ideological losses and, indirectly, organizational losses and losses of strategic forces.

**8. INCREASINGLY RAISE THE QUALITY OF LEADERSHIP BY ALWAYS CONSTANTLY STRENGTHENING AND EXPANDING THE STAGES OF MASTERY, INNOVATIVENESS AND ORIGINALITY AND CARRYING OUT SHOCK ASSAULTS AND BEING MILITANT**

Such is the inherent nature both of the proletariat and of every communist and mastery in terms of work, particularly of leading cadres.

We mean mastery in terms of political, ideological and organizational stances and mastery in terms of work, particularly in times of hardship. If mastery is lost, then our army will break and run.

Another form of mastery is pre-emptive mastery of every problem, such that mastery is not lost. Pre-emptive mastery is already having rice to eat ready, water ready and chemical-making offices ready, having mastery in clothing and shelter and over the enemy, so that the enemy cannot attack us first.

Make prior estimates according to our plan and then set things up. Mastery here means the opposite side in the contradiction with the loss of mastery. If you wait until you're out of seed rice to go looking for it, that means you've lost mastery. If you wait until there's no more paddy to eat before going to look for it, that means you've to look for it, it means you've lost mastery.

To have mastery in cadre-building and socialist revolution means not letting things go revisionist.

Someone who has a stance of mastery is always thinking, and therefore is always having original ideas.

This year, for example, some places still have shortages. They must therefore have mastery about how to attack streams and the Tonle Sap. They must plant paddy, plant corn and plant everything, militantly carry out shock assaults and not sit around doing nothing.

It's the same militarily.

1. Mastery is a viewpoint that although the country is liberated, enemies still exist who want to torment us, and we must therefore have mastery in terms of revolutionary vigilance. We will thereby figure out pre-emptive defense measures to adopt.

How must we defend islands. We must make advance preparations regarding how to have mastery of water and food supplies, so that if the enemy comes, we can carry out shock assaults.



It's the same along the border. How is the front line to do guard duty, what's to be in the intermediate areas and how are the rear lines to engage in production? How are the front lines to patrol and place mines? We are in a shock assault condition. If the enemy comes in, he must be smashed.

This is the meaning of mastery. The leadership must therefore always be figuring out what to do. If, otherwise, work is carried out at an ordinary pace only to barely get by, there will be more danger.

#### 9. THE LEADERSHIP MUST ALWAYS CONSTANTLY TEND AND NURTURE GOOD INTERNAL SOLIDARITY AND UNITY

Leadership is only possible if forces can be gathered. Being able to gather forces means having a capacity for solidarity. If one gathers forces well, then one will have good solidarity. If one is only average at gathering forces, solidarity will be mediocre. If one is capable of gathering only a few forces, then there will be little solidarity.

A lot of qualifications are needed if one is to be capable of solidarity and unity. Let's recall a few agenda items.

1. It is necessary to possess a stance of taking responsibility for solidarity and unity. This is fundamental.

2. One must correctly implement the Party lines: its political, ideological and organizational lines. Everyone must be built up so that everyone is gathered in: the only thing is that some forces are category 2 and some are category 3. But they must all be gathered in if we are to be strong. If there is solidarity among everyone in the Party Center we will be strong. If we only achieve 80% solidarity, we will achieve only 80% strength. It's the same in the zones and in every unit of organization.

The Party Center must act as a model and aggregate solidarity so that the entire Party will have faith in it. The Party Center is a unit of organization that speaks jointly, but each comrade of the Party Center must be the like this.

We must go all out to correctly implement our political, ideological and organization lines so that the entire Party will have faith in us. Our stances must be staunch, but our training methods, our methods for explaining things and building up must be easy going (reap sa) so as to win hearts and minds, so that others will have a clear-cut understanding, so that there won't be any clashes, fissures or cracks. We must be correct but give guidance in an ordinary and equal manner.

If there is solidarity in the Party Center, then there's solidarity in the entire Party. If the members of the Party Center have solidarity, then the units of organization that the members of the Party Center administer will have solidarity. This we will be very strong.

#### 10. LEADERSHIP MUST FIGURE OUT HOW TO STRENGTHEN AND EXPAND CADRE RANKS AT EVERY LEVEL SUCH THAT THEY HAVE MASTERY AT ALL TIMES

Once political, ideological and organizational lines exist, there must be understandingly correct implementation of them. Cadres must therefore be constantly built up, strengthened and developed in the Party Center, the Zones, the Sectors, the districts, the cooperatives, the army and in the ministries and offices. Attention must be paid here to Party Center and to district cadres. Attention must also to be paid to party members, members of core organs and in particularly to the thousands and tens of thousands of progressives among the masses.

Revolutionary Flag, Special Number, October-November 1977

first draft

10.87

"Learning in Abbreviated Form from the History of the Kampuchea Revolutionary Movement"(pp.93-112)

"Learning I Abbreviated form from the History of the Kampuchea Revolutionary Movement Under the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea"

Requirement:

1. To examine our Party's analysis of and reasons for discovering contradictions in the context of national-democratic revolution, and via such analysis of contradictions, to adopt clear measures or a struggle line for gaining victories. furthermore, to do an analysis that will make visible the contradictions in the new period of socialist revolution and socialist construction, and, via such analysis, to adopt a create line for gaining victories.
2. To examine past procedural line in the national-democratic revolution to see clearly for purposes of our experiences in leadership and socialist revolution how we must proceed to vin and not to lose, not to suffer excessive losses or zigs and zags.

The Document's Essentials

This document is a joint summary of our people's more than 2,000 year struggle movement. It is a summary of all its aspects, aggregating them in a social-scientific form, according to the science of Marxism-leninism, and in the form of a history of our people's struggle, proceeding on the basis that the people are the makers of history in their struggle with mature and in their class struggle against exploiting classes. Compiling historical documents according to the people's stand and making history according to a Marxist-Leninist stand is different from the stand that one or two dignitaries are the makers of history.

Second this document has been compiled in the form of the practical struggles of our people, with a desire to demonstrate that our Party has led the struggle correctly, in a manner appropriate to each situation. This document therefore clearly demonstrates the reasons for this. We are not raising incantations; we are clearly bringing out our reasoning.

The essence of this problem is very important for elevating the quality of our Party's leadership. we analyze ourselves to see how far we have now gotten and what else we must do. This is the essential importance of our study .

Note : We are not bringing chapter I up for elucidation.

CHAPTER II

ON THE NATIONAL-DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION

There problem of analyzing the contradictions in Kampuchea society; We have stipulated a number of problem in the analysis of contradictions in Kampuchea society:

- It is necessary to discover the antagonistic, life-and-death contradictions. Such analysis entails complicated problems. In the history of our Party, discovering them has been no easy matter.

We say that we made a national-democratic revolution in our country because upon analysis we saw that there was an antagonistic contradiction with the feudal landlords and externally with imperialism.

There were in the Party a number of the opinion that this was not the case. Similarly there were in the world a number of the opinion that this was not the case.

We would like to tell you about a some of the problems over which there was struggle:

The contemptible Siv said there was no class struggle and that Sihanouk could lead. There was therefore opposition to the national-democratic revolution in the ranks. Second, according to documents we discovered in 1976, according to answers given by the contemptible Phin, a group of them opposed the national-democratic revolution and our party's analysis of the contradictions. This refers to the contemptible Phin and his faction. Thereafter came the contemptible Ya and contemptible others. They opposed our analysis of the contradictions.

They said there must be coexistence in the world just as there must be coexistence domestically with Sihanouk. This was therefore not merely a matter of analysis of contradictions raised for discussion, it was something against which we had to struggle. If our analysis had been defeated, the danger to us would have been greater than that which befell Indonesia. However our analysis won because the majority of cadres were in life-and-death contradiction with the enemy; the enemy was regularly looking to smash our cadres. As for these guys, they seemed in form also to be in contradiction with the enemy, but in reality they were capable of coexistence with Sihanouk. The contemptible Phin and these other contemptible were capable of coexisting with Sihanouk. Others seemed to be in contradiction, but in reality they had connection and had joined our Party to attack it.

Externally, starting from 1977, some people disagreed that there was already clear class differentiation in Kampuchean society. They were strongly influential, such that if they merely uttered one word, some other people in the country would listen up. what we mean to say is that externally we were also obliged to struggle.

At the same time there was a theory that the national bourgeoisie could lead the revolution.

We therefore had to struggle for a clear-cut analysis of our society.

Second, we clearly stipulated the enemies of the revolution.

Third, we clearly stipulated the forces of the revolution and clearly put into practice what was meant by implementation of revolutionary forces. if there was an incorrect specification of forces, then our attacks would be defeated. The worker-peasant forces were the base. Secondary to them were those petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie who were willing to follow the revolution.

Concretely, we did not rely on the forces of the workers. the stance was then the workers were the vanguard force (kamlang sruoch), but they did not concretely become the vanguard force, which concretely could only be the peasantry.

We therefore were not copying from anyone. We analyzed our society concretely and adopted a line of our own according to our concrete circumstances. this is an experience which other parties may consider. If a backward agricultural country takes the workers as the major force for attacking the enemy, it will not win.

Even now highly industrialized countries that want to engage in struggle must promote the peasantry if they are to be able to fight guerilla war. We mean what one rely on for forces. In terms of stance, however, one must proceed from the workers if the struggle is to be victorious, because the worker stance is the most acute.

In making revolution one must correctly manage forces if one is to fight to victory. In making war, one must manage forces correctly. In attacking each post, one must manage forces correctly if one's attacks are to break through. Only if one solidly manages the forces of the worker-peasant alliance can one gather in other class forces. Only once we had established our worker-peasant alliance were we able to get Sihanouk and Penn Nouth to come with us. If we hadn't had the forces of the worker-peasant alliance, we wouldn't have been able to gather in such persons. they didn't want to come with us, but when the thunderstorm broke, they were obliged to take refuge in our shelter.

It's the same on the economic battlefield: if one is to be strong one must marshal forces correctly. If they are not correctly marshalled, we will not be strong. Otherwise, there won't be any water, fertilizer or economy. The only way to achieve 3 tons /6tons is to correctly, effectively and strongly marshal forces. Strong here means qualitative strength: the forces must also be large in number, but this is secondary. Quality is what's important.

We adopted all methods for proceeding: the overt, semi-over and covert form of struggle, with the covert form as the base ... etc.

Cadres who are already involved in implementation must learn about this problem in order to have more faith, but new cadres must also learn about it. Furthermore, this is also experience for the world as well.

We must learn once again from our line of people's war according to the stances of independence/ mastery and self reliance in order to build up, strengthen and expand further this stance which we already have, as well as to continue to build up cadres further according to this stance.

In 1968-69 we had very good experience in proceeding with people's war.

1. It led to a strengthening and tempering of our stance of independence/ mastery.
2. It led to our being able to defend, strengthen and expand our forces.

In the absence of testing able in war of 1968/69 though 1970, we might have been endangered, because if the absence of 1968/69 we would have had no experience of independence/ mastery. We might have again fallen into the channel of the era of the struggle with the French, because even though we already had a line proclaiming independence/mastery and self reliance, we would nevertheless have not yet had any testing of it. The 1968/69 testing of us was therefore a strengthening of our stance, and

the war with American imperialism was merely a continuation of it because he already possessed the capital of 1968/69.

- we had capital in terms of stand.
- we had capital in terms of forces.

The factor of forces, however, was secondary. The stand factor is the fundamental factor. This problem is brought up in order to further build up our Party and our male and female combatants.

We have now entered a somewhat abundant stretch. If we were not to follow the stance of independence/ master and self-reliance, we might waste ammunition and various material. In the army we must utilize only what is necessary and not yet utilize what is unnecessary. It is especially imperative to pay attention to the training of cadres who haven't been through things and firmly indoctrinate them with the stance of independence/mastery.

To return to summing up: our analysis is rational and we adopt a rational line. We don't make take up or follow mere dogma.

Why, for example, did we take covert forms of struggle as our foundation. Back in 1965 some people told us that if we took covert forms of struggle as the foundation the revolution the revolution would be endangered, that only once we had massive forces broadly based would we be able to protect our forces. But we had our reasons for saying that it was necessary to take covert forms of struggle as our foundation.

We bring up this document to resolve a number of viewpoints that are as yet unclear domestically and as regards foreign affairs.

### CHAPER III

#### ON THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION AND SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION

In the analytical parts of chapter III we analyze the following: first, national defence duties.

Our country is now independent. We are independent in every sphere: militarily, politically, economically, culturally and socially.

Do, however, contradictory aspects exist? They do. Our external enemies and adversaries are still trying to find ways to torment us. Our internal enemies and adversaries are still trying to discover schemes by which to wreck us.

This is why we put forward the duty of national defence, so that we will have a regular grasp of this duty and never forget it. Even though we may have brought up this duty it might still be forgotten if we didn't bring it up again. We even brought it up in the Constitution.

The duty of national defence is not brought up world wise

Our second analysis is for the duty of continuing the socialist revolution. it is our analysis that:

- We have smashed the old relations of production.
- We have set up the new relations of production.

- The collectivist regime is being strengthened and expanded more and more.
- Money is not being spent.

Thus we have basically solved major contradictions:

-We have basically resolved the contradiction between the cities and the countryside, between cadres inside and outside the Party and upper and lower echelon cadres,... etc. Contradiction of authoritarianism, militarism, bureaucratism and of cadres having better rations than the people in some sphere or another remain, but are secondary contradictions that must be further resolved but are not fundamental contradictions.

-We have also been able to resolve the contradiction between those who labour with their hands and those who labour with their minds. What little remains as a remnant of old classes we will resolve further.

Our strides have therefore already been long.

At the same time, do any other contradictions still exist? They do. Contradiction between class origins that continue to exist as left over and emerge as stands, attitudes and as privatism in relation to material and work. It's all of this which is not yet pure socialism, and it is for this reason that it is necessary to continue further in the duty of socialist revolution, so that collectivism will be strengthened and expanded more and more, and that privatism will fade away more and more and not be able to return. Suppose that the people lack rice and water and we abandon the people to return to things private; that would mean we weren't making socialist revolution. Suppose we were to select only upper-strata middle elements as cadres; as cadres, that would mean we weren't making socialist revolution and after a stretch, the private regime and the capitalist system would come back.

To return to summing up, we have analyzed the contradictions and brought up the reasons why we must continue the socialist revolution, and in connection with these reasons, we strengthen our stand so that there can be no flip-flop between the personal and the communal. Communalism is the essence of socialist revolution. Personalism is the essence of the bourgeoisie.

Our third analysis is of socialist construction duties.

The productive forces of our people have now been liberated and we must continue to do this further. Along what path must these liberated forces walk? If they were to walk along the old path that would be the same path of capitalism. They must therefore walk in the direction of socialism, which is what we call socialist construction. This is why we carried out collectivization and organized cooperatives. We started doing this back in 1973 and we continued doing it further after liberation. We gather forces in order to build up the country according to a collective orientation. Otherwise the exploiting classes would make a come back.

Another reason we are doing this is that its only by proceeding from collectivism that the country can be build up rapidly. If one looks only at the change in the past two years,

they have been very quick compared to what happened in the previous 100 years. During the past 100 year there weren't any such reservoirs.

It might be asked whether it wouldn't be easier to just let things go back private, wouldn't it be easier to allow a return of freedom. Such freedom would be capitalist freedom of the entire people. Its not the right to freedom of the workers and the peasants: even the rich peasants have the right to freedom of production.

There are our reasons. We must educate our male and female combatants about this reasoning so that there will be no vacillation.

Defending the country, making socialism and socialist construction all require gathering forces.

Supposing if we were able only to gather a few forces and there were a lot of contradictions among our forces: could we defend the country? we could not. this is why all forces that can be gathered proceeding from the worker-peasant classes. Even the feudalists, the rich peasants and the capitalists, so long as they go with us and not with the enemy, are a gain for us. Back during the national-democratic revolution they were in contradiction with us over the loss of land, but they stayed with us because they still had some land to work. Even if this group didn't go into the army it was nevertheless a political force for us.

Currently, too, we can gather all the forces that can potentially be gathered by demonstrating the interests they have in staying with us. They are in contradiction with us to the extent that they have taken a loss in their interests, but they have unity with us to the extent that they can coexist with us, they and their children and grandchildren.

Supposing if they go over to the enemy by running away to Siam, they go as desperados, to act as lackeys of the Siamese, hiring themselves out to the Siamese. If the Siamese use them as soldiers to come and attack our revolution. they will be endangered. But if we train them so that they know what it means to love the nation and so they can see the country's expansive progress, we will be able to gather them more and more. A certain number of them will not come over, but a certain number will clearly come with us. these forces alone are tactical forces, assisting forces. their children and grandchildren will have better characteristics than them because contradictions will not be personal ones as in the cases of their parents. If their parents were 100% exploitative in nature, they will be only 50%. If one has them get involved in the fray of the movement for a stretch, we can utilize them as our tactical forces and not let them go over to the enemy.

It is necessary to gather forces to defend the country and for socialist revolution. To construct socialism it is necessary to gather forces to the maximum, to gather them in the political, ideological and organizational senses. This is speaking about the entire country. It's the same if one is speaking about each cooperative. If forces are well-gathered, we make a great gain for our forces. If we gather assisting forces well and they are more and more clear about things, they are more and more forces for us.

Where as previously they might have planted one clump of tubers, they now plant two or three clumps, which is a great gain for the revolution.

Such is the reasoning of our analysis and in the means by which we proceed, and the movement demonstrates whether or not it is correct. Our movement in this two year period proves that our reasoning is basically correct. We must therefore continue further.



- In Defence: the enemy would have like to come ant commit aggression against us further. We must continue to be highly and firmly vigilant. We must continue ever etter to gather and marshall our defence forces.

-We must continue the socialist revolution further such that our procedures are ever closer to socialism and ever more distant from capitalism so that capitalism cannot return to create chaos.

-We must further construct socialism ever more strongly. We have already proceeded far in our journey and constructed a lot. Compared to the old society we have built a lot more and done better.

We see that we are already very quick, but a lot is lacking in this speed, lacking in the task of service to an all-round stance of independence/mastery, as we are not yet comprehensive. This is why have a lot of socialism left to build.

In the past, in the old society, it seemed that there was abudance, that everything was available, but the country was a lackey to other and beholden to others. we for our part, would like to build up the country by independence/ mastery.

This is why we have to contract socialism and construct it by shock assaults, by constant resolution of contradictions. the import thing is to solve the water problem.

To carry out shock assaults powerfully, it is necessary to gather forces correctly and well. And one can only correctly gather forces if there is cadre-building and this cadre-building is according to a correct line.

In proceeding in our work into the coming era we will encounter additional new contradictions. We must have a clear-cut analysis and a correct reasoning in order to adopt the right measures.

We raise thereby the quality of our movement and we join thereby in contri-building to the worlwise revolutionary movement.

In order, however, to contribute well, we must continue the following well:

1. Defend the country well.
2. Continue the socialist revolution well.
3. Continue socialism well.

The key to continuing further well is the necessity of correct analysis and of possessing good cadres- a nuclei of leading cadres – and possessing a consistently powerful mass movement following the Party's political line.

Revolutionary Flag, Special Number, October-November 1977

first draft

10. 87

"Learning From Our Four-Year Plan " (pp.113-128)

"Learning From Our Four-Year Plan"

### Requirement

1. In order to examine and draw positive and negative lessons from our 1977 experiences and in conjunction with this to prepare for a precise stipulation of the figures for the 1978 plan, to demonstrate increasingly clearly our viewpoint with regard to whether or not and to what extent the four-year plan for 1977-80 can be achieved in four years in the agricultural and industrial spheres, and why; also included in this requirement is adopting a viewpoints of examining what the potential is for implementation of the strategic aim of modern agriculture in 10-15 years.

It's the same with agriculture: we examine things, draw the positive and negative lessons of 1977 experiences and prepare to stipulate the figures for the 1978 plan, elucidating increasingly clearly the 1977-80 four-year plan and examining what the potential is for implementation of the strategic aim of modern industry within 15 to 20 years.

2. The second requirement is adopting a viewpoint regarding what extent of the paddy must be marshaled as food supply and what extent for export, and ho other crops are going to be marshaled for export. In other words, how many forces do we have, how much paddy field do we work and how much of other plants do we grow.

### THE ESSENTIALS OF THE DOCUMENT

The Party Center's analysis of the 1977 plan as it has been traversed so far is that although we have a lot of strong points, some weak points nevertheless exist.

- labour forces in some places are still not strong;
  - our action line in some places in still no effective;
  - complicated contradictions and class struggles remain in our new society.
- we see these objective difficulties:
- external enemies continue to harass us;
  - the natural hardships of drought and flooding are obstacles for us.

We have seen all the hardships and blessings and proceeding from the hard and easy points we are marshalling to conquer or even overfulfil the 1977 plan.

We would now like to get into an examination of the 1977 plan, and we would like to make an over-all examination of it. In the discussions, it is suggested that each base put forward clear figures: how much one-crop and two-crop land there is; how much

is produced; how much is eaten; how much is seed rice; and how much is surplus for export.

Both agricultural and industrial production movements are much stronger compared to 1976.

Second, if we speak about the crop situation, and particularly our rice crop, we can see that it's many times better than last year. We saw last year that our crop situation was very strained, but this year most of the paddy is flourishing.

We can also see that we have utilized more seed rice and seedlings this year than last.

We are making better use of fertilizer than last year, and also better use of water. This is because whereas last year we carried out strong shock assaults for about 30 to 40 days, this year were on the attack for from 75 to 90 days. We have therefore gotten more from our attacks. Last year, we merely waited on the rains and our attacks were too greatly rushed.

It's the same with industrial crops. We see that the East has been able to achieve the plan, and to overfulfil the plan for planting new rubber tree seedlings.

Handicrafts and industry have similarly undergone a greater expansive development. Factories have been strengthened and expanded from bottom to top, particularly those working iron. Textiles have also been strengthened and expanded. From this viewpoint we can see that the movement is good. The masses are doing things in common everywhere. The Zones are always being increasingly expanded, and it's the same in Phnom Penh. We can therefore see that there has been a lot of expansive development which is taking good forms.

This problem is the format and the basis for the implementation of the 1977 plan, as it is for the years to come.

In conjunction with this, a lot of shortcomings exist, both subjectively and objectively.

The initial figures for paddy still don't fulfil the plan. Some places have overachieved the plan, some places fulfilled it and some places fallen short of it, but if one makes a joint summary for the entire country, we still have fulfilled the plan in terms either of the amount of one-crop land or two-crop land. According to estimates, some places are far over 3 tons, some places are a little over 3 tons, some places are considerably over and some places have fallen short.

There are two orientations for solutions in the shortfall:

- work at the end of the year and in the dry season; this is where fertilizer and water exist;

- some places, however, have fertilizer but not enough water.

Things are put forward in this manner for clear analysis and then solution.

Those places that possess fertilizer and water must drive forward increasingly strongly, whereas those places that lack water must strive to utilize the full water potential.

Take for example Sector 3 in the Northwest Zone: according to the figures we have now examined 40,000 tons of paddy remain, which would be 20,000 tons of rice. This is already overfulfilment, but we must carry out further shock assaults.

According to the figures, there is a 10,000 ton paddy surplus in Sector 1. One the having built the Steung Batdambang dam, will we be able to do 1,000-2,000 hectares of end-of-year paddy? Attack in concentration and by cooperative. One the harvest is in, immediately carry out shock assaults, without postponements leading to the loss of water.

According to the figures, Sector 7 takes more than 10,000 tons both for eating and for seed rice. However, we passes the steung Posat dam, and will therefore continue to attack in order to survive in terms both of eating and seed rice, with something left over for export.

Sector 2 has already fulfilled the plan with a little bit extra, but must carry out additional attacks because it possesses the waters of the steung Posat and the steung Maung.

Sector 5 also possesses water that can be attacked further.

If the Northwest Zone were to strive to attack another 150.000 tons of paddy, that would, on the one hand, be a great victory. On the other hand, we must strive to nurture our current paddy more.

According to the figures, the Southwest is falling short, but is possesses the strategic locale of Angkor borey. It must in addition strive to attack more along the dams.

The west, central and the north also have potential. the only place that is most difficult is the East because of its lack of water sources.

We must therefore strive to carry out year-attacks, and not be hesitant about continuing into March 1978 . It doesn't matter, because even if we are harvesting into March of 1978 we will nevertheless able to have two crops in 1978, too,

The army around Phnom Penh must also carry out shock assaults.

#### ON VARIOUS FOOD CROPS

The requirement of carrying out shock assaults with regard to various other food crops is for having food supplies and for saving on paddy so that a lot of it can be exported.

Starting from 1978 our requirement is that the people must eat properly according to the ration. If we eat fresh tubers for breakfast, we can save up rice for export.

We must therefore grow tubers, sakou and various other crops ubiquitously. Both the army and the offices should grow them. We must produce food crops to the maximum in order to save on rice for export to the maximum.

In addition we must save to the maximum on oil and petrol, machinery and nuts and bolts.

Industry should slack off on construction for the movement and save on capital. We must first give thought to production.

To sum up: we are in good shape in many ways, but we must go deeper into every problem in order to impel our virtues forward and correct our deficiencies so as not to allow our potentialities to lie dormant.

## ON PREPARING TO MARSHAL OUR FIGURES FOR THE 1978 PLAN

How must we set the figures for the 1978 plan according to the positive and negative experiences of 1977? How about the paddy figures.

They must be stipulated in accordance with the party's stance, which stipulates that we must constantly carry out shock assaults and must increase the figures.

It may not be necessary to increase the one-crop land, if one is speaking in terms of the entire country. Must, however, the amount of yield per hectare be increased? It would appear that it must be increased to 3.5 tons per hectare. Only when there is a plan is there a combat impetus to follow the plan. Moreover, various criteria are better than in 1977: the land and the water are better than before. And two-crop land must be doubled.

Is it possible for us to attack in such a manner? Back in 1976 we dared to lay down 3 tons, and a good number of places made three tons. In 1977 we were better qualified for 3 tons than in 1976, because we carried out stronger shock assaults than in 1976.

One having set up the land and the water, then set up the seed rice correctly. It would appear that in circumstances in which the climate is irregular, medium paddy is better for mastery than heavy paddy, because even if one transplants at the end of September/beginning of October, enough impetus can be achieved, whereas with heavy paddy, if one transplants at the end of September, the problem of bareness is already posed.

As for the problem of two-crop, in some place it can remain the same, but in most places it must be increased, because we have now got good water management, and also during the 1978 dry season we will be strengthening existing waterworks and expanding by making new ones.

It is suggested that we also be even more clear about miscellaneous crops: cotton, krachav\_\_\_\_, sugar cane, beans, corn, Ingo\_\_\_\_, industrial woods for medicine manufacture, kapok and bamboo. Lay down clear-cut plans for them and figure out ways to grow them in according to our forces.

It's the same with animal husbandry: oxen, buffalo, horses, chickens, ducks hogs, etc.

It's also the same with social welfare and culture: it is particularly suggested that attention be paid to medicine-manufacture offices.

## VIEWS ON SETTING UP TO ACHIEVE THE FOUR-YEAR PLAN

We must do whatever must be done so that our most important. Only if there is water can the agricultural plan be done.

Examination of the following is therefore suggested.

- In 1977, how many hectares were our waterworks able to serve in the dry and rainy months;
- How many more hectares can we work in 1978.
- How many more can we work in 1979;

- How many more can we work in 1980.

The meaning in terms of implementation of 30-40%, modern agriculture is not that every district must achieve 30-40% . Some districts may achieve only a little and others a lot: We must strive to expand strongly wherever there are favorable circumstances.

In the West, for example, don't attack the uplands. It is necessary to attack the lowlands strongly, and such lowland attacks must be correctly managed. they shouldn't be nibbling/ prabich/ attacks, but attacks that open up whole tracts.

How much are our requirements for doing paddy and miscellaneous crops?

Our paddy requirements are for:

- eating
  - seed
  - reserve stock
  - some for export so as to serve import

The highest annual limit for export should be no more than 800,000-1,000,000 tones, because if all we do is paddy we won't have any forces.

we must do miscellaneous other crops:

1. In order to make raw materials to be our own masters: cotton, krajav \_\_\_\_\_, medicines, bamboo, wood-tubers/ damlaung-chhoe/ \_\_\_\_\_.
2. Other export products: beans, sieng \_\_\_\_\_, green beans, peanuts, coffee, corn.

The way to proceed: Paddy must be done according to plan every year, while raw material products and miscellaneous other products for export must be done step-by-step.

## THE ORIENTATION FOR INDUSTRY

A country can be called industrialized only once national, zonal and lowerlevel industry possess the following bases:

1. light Industry
  - Industry serving the every-day living standard of the people: weaving, soap, ink, hot-water toothbrushes, toothpaste, plates, pots, spoons, shoes, flint for lighters, matches, cigaretters, pencils, pens, ... etc.
  - Food supply industry: canned foodstuffs, sugar cubes, ... etc.
2. Heavy industry
  - The metallurgical sphere: pig iron/ dek sruoy/, steel/dek thaep/, copper, lead/ sammar mnhaum/ \_\_\_\_\_, ... etc.
  - Various machine industries: flour-makers, mechanized flowers, pumps, ... etc.
3. Mining Industry: iron mining, precious stone mining, ...
4. Energy Industry: energy from petroleum product, energy from electricity (fuel-burning or water powered).
5. Communications Industry: railroads and waterways.

6. chemical Industry: various acids and soda/ sout/ \_\_\_\_\_
7. Construction Industry: cement, tiles, wood.

Such is the orientation for what industries we will do in 1978, 1979 and 1980, whether nationally or in the zones. We must thus grasp the essentials of industry in order to set up industry annually according to this orientation and our capital. We have such a view in order to think things through in advance.

#### WAYS OF PROCEEDING IN ORDER TO MANAGE ALL-SPHERE PLANNING IN A LIVELY MANNER AND UBIQUITOUSLY EVERYWHERE

It is necessary to proceed either from the top to the bottom or the bottom to the top at every level: either from the Center to the zones, sectors, districts and cooperatives; or from the cooperatives to the districts, sectors, zones and Center.

There must be all-sphere planning in the Center, the zones, the sectors, and cooperatives. We have already been dealing with this problem in such a form, and now we must go all out to do it better and better. The cooperatives must be made to understand, and they must go all out to make all-sphere plans. If the cooperatives were to be doing this well, we would have a good foundation, because the cooperatives are our society's fundamental unit of organization and possess every sphere:

- agriculture
- industry and handicrafts
- culture, education and training
- social welfare and health

They possess every sphere of agriculture:

- food supply crops
- industrial crops
- edible fruit crops
- husbandry

They possess every sphere of handicrafts:

- blacksmithing shops
  - woodworking shops
  - brick, tile, water jar and vase kilns
  - weaving

Cooperatives are thus changing their appearance step-by-step throughout the country, and are undergoing expansive development with mass characteristics. As each cooperative undergoes expansive development.

We suggest that things be set up such that each district has a model cooperative in such form, and that, proceeding from this model, other cooperatives are set up step-by-step within the district.