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
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
**THE INTERNAL PARTY MAGAZINE
PUBLISHED EVERY MONTH**

REVOLUTIONARY FLAG

ISSUE 11 NOVEMBER 1976

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Standing upon the Great Victory
Of
The 1976 Plan
Resolve to Go on the Offensive to Implement
The 1977 Plan of the Party
Even More Strongly



On 17 and 18 November 1976, our Party held its Second Nationwide Economics Conference. Cadres responsible for every field throughout the country attended this conference in an atmosphere of firm confidence and with a mighty fighting spirit. On this occasion, the Comrade Party Organization Representative made a report summarizing the results of the great success of the 1976 Plan, examined the reasons for our successes, and raised several correct and incorrect experiences in order to progress toward 100 percent achievement of the 1977 Plan. We would like to publish the presentation of the Comrade Party Organization Representative in its entirety for our comrades to study and draw additional experience inside the concrete movements in the various locations to continue pushing the offensive to finish the 1976 Plan well and to go on the offensive to accomplish the 1977 Plan 100 percent successfully.

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The Party's Second Nationwide Economics Conference

17 and 18 November 1976

**(The Presentation of the Comrade Secretary
Party Representative)**



Today we meet to hold the Party's Second Economics Conference. Last year we held the first conference after the 1975 annual study session. Traditionally, we must hold an economics conference every single year. Thus, we must continue to do this in 1976.

However, this year's economics conference is different. Last year, in November 1975, we did it in a rush. We did not yet have experience on building the economy in our country, and we also had just emerged from the war. As for this year, we have much experience, experiences in rice farming, in sorting out the food supply for the people, in restoring the economy and building and defending the country, more than we had in 1975. Furthermore, during 1976 we also had a plan for building our economy. In tandem with this, we also have a 1977 Plan.

We disseminated these plans in every Zone and Sector and to the various ministries by having meetings to thoroughly discuss the plans and gather opinions. Therefore, we were able to absorb them, and we have more experience than we did in 1976.

As for the core content that we must work with at this time, the primary points are as follows:

- First, we will report the results of the 1976 Plan and the work that must continue on to finish the 1976 Plan
- Second, a number of matters related to the draft 1977 Plan
- Third, miscellaneous matters

I. On the results of the 1976 Plan and the tasks that must be continued to finish the 1976 Plan

On the results of the 1976 Plan

What are the results of the 1976 Plan? Defeat, or victory? Few victories, or many?

We clearly grasp this situation in order to draw experience and to move forward strongly.

The core content about which I wish to inform you at this time is that the Party has made successive assessments every single month. However, the core content about which I am informing you is not yet complete. Significantly, comrades in the base areas close to the concrete movement in individual locations are helping to assess and draw additional experience.

During 1976, what did the Party determine had to be done? Has the Party been able to judge our work or not, and if so, how was it?

The work that we did and are doing during 1976 was done in many fields: agriculture, industry, commerce, communications, and other fields like propaganda and education, social action, public health, etc. But the most important work was increasing the production of rice. This is the fundamental matter, the key related to the life and death of our revolution, our people, and our country. So then, this is why the conference in November 1975 determined that during 1976 throughout the country we had to go all out in growing rice to reach three tons of paddy per hectare whether we grew one crop or two. To achieve the goal of three tons of paddy per hectare throughout the country, we have to sort out a number of problems: water, fertilizer, seed, cultivation techniques, plowing and harrowing, transplanting, etc.

Now, speaking just about three tons of paddy per hectare, were we able to do that, or not? To what extent were we able to do it? To what extent were we unable to do it? For what reasons were we able to do it? For what reasons were we unable to do it? What is the direction for sorting this out in the future?

Up until today, the total results for 1976 are: We were able to achieve 90 percent of the three tons of paddy per hectare quota.

- First, we grew rainy season rice using October and late rice. By mid-year, the Party concluded that we had reached 70 to 80 percent.

- Second, early year the transitional rice was early rice and some ordinary rice. The total nationwide was 150,000 hectares. Adding the early year rice harvest with the rainy season's, we see that the 1976 harvest increased to 80-85 percent.

Third, the year-end water-expulsion rice. Some locations along the river have not yet made the 1976 Plan because they are waiting for the water levels to drop to expel the water. Now these locations are still in operation during this month of November 1976. Therefore, adding this rice harvest to the 1976 total, we will get approximately 90 percent.

These numbers are estimates made by being meticulous to the maximum, and there is the potential to exceed them. However we determined to use the average of 90 percent.

The Party has determined that these 90 percent results are a very great victory, not merely a normal victory, because the Party assumed that 1976 is a key year.

Why is 1976 a key year for our revolution?

Back during the war, the Party determined that 1973 was a key year because we were in difficulty at that time. The American imperialists and their servants gathered all their forces to come and attack us. However, we were able to sort out the key in 1973, and we achieved a great victory. As for building the country after liberation, the Party assumed that 1976 was also a key for the following reasons:

- First, we had just emerged from a war. In 1975 we had serious difficulties in every field, both inside and outside the country. Inside the country we had to sort out food supplies for the people, sort out medicine, shelter, security, etc. As for outside the country, the enemy struck some too. We had to defend the country and defend revolutionary state power. There were many problems during 1975 that we had not yet sorted out when we entered 1976. So, during 1976 we were in a state of serious shortages; it was not easy.

In this state of difficulties in every field, we were still able to seize victory and we were also able to achieve the Party's 1976 Plan. In this difficult state, if we achieved just 50 percent or less than 50 percent, we assumed that would be strong. However, we were able to achieve 90 percent.

- Second, we systematically prepared to build the country.

Even though we had just emerged from war, the Party said that we had to build socialism quickly at marvelous great leap speed. It had to be fast like that so that the enemy would be unable to step on our heels. In order to be able to go fast, we had to have food supplies and sort out the livelihood of the people.

- Third, we were able to defend the country to the maximum. Enemies from every direction want to wreck our revolution. Our revolution, like every revolution in the world, always has enemies, also has opponents; this is normal. As our revolution becomes even more correct, there will be more enemies that want to wreck us using every means.

However, our achieving the 1976 Plan was a key enabling us to be able to defend the country and enabled us to push forward even faster.

What is the concrete meaning in terms of implementation?

First, the 13 bushel regime. We succeeded in the key year of 1976. Therefore, in general we were able to implement the 13 bushel regime plan for the people throughout the country. The Party is determined to achieve the 13 bushel regime 100 percent, and to not let it drop to 12 or 10. So then, each location in every Zone and Sector must gain mastery. The majority of districts have enough. Some districts and subdistricts and cooperatives have irregular problems, but we sort them out together, sort them out collectively in every Sector and Zone, meaning there are no shortages.

Why did the Party designate 13 bushels?

Because of the economic and political meaning. The objective was to let the people have enough to eat. For centuries the laboring people have not had enough to eat. During war, the people had to withstand many pitiful hardships, not being able to make ends meet. After liberation, during 1975 and 1976, during this one and a half year period, the people still have shortages. Therefore, this is why we have gone all out to increase production during 1976 to supply the people so they will have enough. When the people have enough to eat, the people are warm and push the movements of socialist revolution and building the country to even greater leaps. Why do we carry out revolution? For the people. Who carries out the revolution? The people do. So then, the rice harvest must serve the people. When the people have faith and confidence in socialist revolution and building socialism, the enemies inside that oppose the collective and demand a return to privacy will clearly be defeated. Enemies outside will clearly be unable to do anything to us.

Therefore, we must implement the 13 bushel regime during 1977. Specifically, there are four regimes: Number one forces, three cans; number two forces two and a half cans; number three forces, two cans; number four forces, one and a half cans. Number one forces are men and women. Normally men eat more than women, but when we eat collectively there are no shortages. When we are able implement this regime as the Party has determined, we are able to sort out many problems. In particular the people will be healthy and various diseases and illnesses can be sorted out. So then, we must absolutely achieve 13 bushels and maintain the 13 bushel regime meticulously and not let the enemy wreck it, not allow them to burn paddy stockpiles and steal and destroy paddy. When we have firm stances and meticulous measures, the enemy is unable to wreck this.

- Second, keep enough seed. It is imperative to think about keeping sufficient seed rice in general during 1977, and in particular the ordinary [middle] variety and the late season [heavy] variety. In general, we have seed rice.

- Third, rice for export. We must export hundreds of thousands of tons of rice during 1976. Our being able to export rice like this after a war casts a tremendous

influence in the international world. We sorted it out by ourselves with independence/mastery/self-reliance, and within just two years we have enough to eat and have enough seed, and we export too. So then, we have a mighty influence in the international world.

As for the water shortage problem, that still exists. However, when we have sorted out the rice problem like this, we have outstanding preconditions, outstanding both inside our revolutionary framework and in the world revolutionary framework.

During 1976 we still have many difficulties, but the enemy, neither the external nor the internal, has been able to do anything to us. By 1977 the collective regime will sink even deeper roots. The people will be even warmer, and our movement to build socialism will gain even more momentum. Subjectively, we will be even mightier in every field. The enemy will be unable to do anything to us. Even though they still continue to try to wreck us, our forces grow fatter and mightier.

Is our revolution able to move forward, or not?

The matter has been brought up some inside our Party, just as it was brought up previously. Now it is the same.

Previously the Party gave instructions to make guerilla attacks since the Party had confidence that only by guerilla attacks would we be able to strengthen and expand ourselves. But within the Party ranks some comrades raised the question of whether or not we would be able to make it barehanded. Experience made it clear that we could make it and were able to strengthen and expand ourselves and even wage a five-year war and defeat the enemy. During the five-year war, the Party had to wage war alone with independence/mastery/self-reliance, attacking however many of them there were. Some comrades in the Party raised the question of whether or not we could fight and defeat the American imperialists when they were so strong and we were so small. So then, there was some hesitant opinion. Only after we achieved total victory did it become crystal clear. After liberation we raised the goal of fighting for three tons. The general understanding was that it was not doable. Some comrades said this; some comrades said that. They did not oppose the Party; they just raised problems and were hesitant. So then, these forces were not enemies. It was because this was not crystal clear. By the time we had achieved it, opinions were already in unity.

It is the same with the 1977 Plan. In general, we are in unity. However, some raise the question: Can we make it, or not?

Now we have sorted out the 1976 Plan. That is our great victory that has led our Party, people, and Army to be in unity with one another. This result casts a powerful influence on the work of defending the country, because when our people are strong, when our Army is strong, the enemy coming from outside is unable to attack us. We know how to fight; the enemy is no more clever than we are.

Thus, we do not fear the enemy attacking us from the outside. The important thing is we must be vigilant about their henchmen inside. However, when the Party is firm, the people are firm, and when there is enough food, when the people have confidence in the Party and in socialist revolution, anyone coming to attack us will be unable to do so. The people will smash them by themselves.

The reasons for our victory

1. The leadership factor:

First, our great victory came from the Party's leadership.

The Party throughout the country, the Party at every echelon, absorbed the lines in every field and implemented the lines correctly, in particular the line of economics in terms of agriculture.

Furthermore, the Party carried out profound socialist revolution in a state of mighty and successive class struggle. The Party implemented the absolute dictatorship of the proletarian class to absolutely defend the worker-peasant state authority, not allowing enemies inside or outside to take it back. Furthermore, the Party absolutely struggled to eradicate private ownership both inside the national society and inside the revolutionary ranks, especially inside the Party ranks. Without facing the risks of socialist revolution and class struggle, we would not have gained such a great victory. Markets would probably have come back; the cities would have come back; foreigners may have come back to oppress us again too. Why? During 1976 the enemy carried out strong activities. They had their networks inside the country that have been embedded inside our ranks for a long time. They made propaganda against socialist revolution, against the collective, against the cooperatives, and they agitated for the return of the private regime. However, because our socialist revolution was profound, the bad elements embedded inside the Party's ranks and outside the party were totally scattered and overthrown by our people and our Revolutionary Army. Without strenuous class struggle like this, the enemy would have already entered our country.

On into the future, we must continue to struggle and fight even stronger. Only when there is struggle to fight to eradicate all opposition forces inside the country can the movement to build our country gain momentum. So then, we must carry out extremely strong class struggle within ourselves, within our units, within our Army, within the cooperatives, within the unions, within the offices and ministries, by successive political, ideological, and organizational training. The absolute majority follows the Party and is loyal to the Party. There are only a few elements that are groping around or are lost.

We have confidence in our Party, in our Party members. Our Party must be strong. If not, we will not fight and defeat the enemy. We will not be able to reach three tons. We will not be able to build the country quickly. We will not be able to defend the country. The enemy already oppresses us. Can our Party be strong, or not? We truly are strong, and we truly can do it. Actually, we have already done it.



Combatants of our Revolutionary Army on the offensive harvesting and putting away the rice harvest extremely quickly so they can rush to join in digging reservoirs and canals to sort out the water problem for the people and cooperatives on the offensive to make production in 1977 even mightier.

2. The people factor:

Our people are very brave. Our people are marvelous. Marvelous is not a n exaggeration. They are tremendous. That is a fact. They were already marvelous once during the war. In building the country during 1976, they were marvelous once again in the sense that we were faced many shortages but we were able to accomplish the Party's plan. The people have firm faith in the Party; they follow the Party; and they are able to carry out and accomplish the plans of the Party.

We respect the people because the people are marvelous. What they have done is unimaginable. This leads us to have an even stronger faith in the people. During the war, we had faith in the people. After the war, we still have faith in the people. In the future we will have strong faith in the people. When we have this faith, we do not run away and abandon the people: we do not betray the people. It is imperative to respect, love, and serve the people and to really use the people as our teachers. The people have already made tremendous sacrifices when compared with us. The people have sacrificed everything. The ones that have a lot of ownership are the cadres of the Party. Party documents say to cast off private ownership. It is not difficult. When we study from the people, we are able to cast it away. Seeing the people make such sacrifices, we do not stop to think about private ownership anymore. We are not entangled in family problems or with relatives. We must gather up our families and relatives to go to the cooperatives, not gather them up from the cooperatives and bring them to the vicinity of some office or ministry. It is imperative to strengthen and expand the cooperatives and to lighten the offices and ministries to the maximum.

We assess results in order to study, not to be happy about the numbers on food sufficiency and keeping seed rice. We must see that the people withstood great hardships, struggled and fought very hard, and sacrificed to a very high level before we were able to achieve such a victory. The cost is incomparable. Seeing such a cost, we must respect, we must be courteous, and we must concentrate on the people with all of our hearts.

3. The Revolutionary Army factor:

Our Revolutionary Army is very brave and audacious. It is the pure, dictatorial instrument of the Party. It is able to defend the country, the land borders, the sea borders and internally. The Army smashes any enemy attacking from outside. The Army smashes any enemy carrying out internal activities. Our Revolutionary Army maintains security to the maximum during conditions in which we face many shortages in food supplies, medicines, and clothing.

4. The rear battlefield factor:

The ministries, offices, and various specialties that did not directly increase production also made contributions to this victory, for instance Propaganda and Education, Social Action, Public Health, Commerce, Industry, Communications, Public Works, Foreign Affairs, etc.

Some technical problems related to the rice harvest

This year the rice is good. One base area is like another. Locations with poor soil also have good rice, for instance Kampong Speu. So, this year's rice farming movement surges in great leaps. This is the overall aspect.

We assess an number of technical problems related to the rice crop. What are the other aspects?

1. Water:

We set a 30 percent target for paddy dikes and feeder canals during 1976. We were able to do that by May 1976. At the same time, we sorted out water with canals and large reservoirs and with additional dams and canals, and this has led us to a greater mastery over water.

- First, we did a lot. So when the rains came we were able to retain water because we had paddy dikes and canals to hold the water. We have transformed nature to an extent.

- Second, flood waters. This year a number of low-lying areas in the flatlands were flooded. The Northwest was flooded the most, tens of thousands of hectares, in particular Preah Netr Preah District and Phnom Srok District in Sector 5. In the East, Tbaung Khmum was flooded. In the North, Sector 43 was inundated. Likewise in Sector 106.

The floodwater situation made us understand problems with the water movement. Previously we did not understand. Now that we do understand, we are unafraid. We have drawn upon experience and through this experience we were able to sort out the contradictions with floodwaters.

Example: The flood in Tbaung Khmum. Water flows from the mountains and from the high ground of the rubber plantations and then floods the lowlands. How can we sort that out? We must solve that in two ways:

1. Build reservoirs up above, and when the water comes we can hold it back.

2. As for the water that we hold back, let it out along paths that we build, main canals or canals.

By doing this, we can sort this out. Square reservoirs one or two kilometers on a side, depending upon the soil conditions. When water flows into the reservoirs, we do not let it flow all over the place all the time. Whenever we must let it out, then we go ahead and let it out. Therefore we solve two contradictions:

1. We are able to solve floods.

2. During times of drought, we use that water by releasing it into the canals to flow into our rice fields.

Example: In Phnom Srok, Sector 5, Northwest, we sort out the upland reservoirs as done in Tbaung Khmum, and let the water flow along canals at our command. However, Phnom Srok is more difficult than Tbaung Khmum, because in Phnom Srok the reservoirs were broken-up above. Generally speaking, we use the line to sort out contradictions; we don't use technology to sort them out.

- Third, there has been a lot of rain, and upper rice is very good.

Example: Rice in Kampong Tralach Leu is very good. The soil is all sand, but the rice is good because there was water. But in later years when there is not much rain, will the upland rice be good like this? Most of the upland areas are dry. So, this must be sorted out. We don't claim that this year the rice was good, so in later years we must go on the offensive with upland rice again.

The Party has instructed that most of the highland rice fields lack water. It is imperative to go on the offensive to work the fertile soil. However, the lowland soil is fertile. Therefore, we must go on the offensive to work the fertile lowland soil and to sort out the water problem. As for the upland rice being good this year, that is not yet the rule. It is like that in Bauribau too: the upland part is not good; we must gather forces to work the lowland part.

This year we are able to sort out a lot. There was no substantial technology. The masses could do it themselves. The forces of the masses are fully capable. Therefore no difficulty arises; we can sort this out.

2. Fertilizers:

Previously some locations have used some fertilizers, but generally speaking, throughout the country the brothers and sisters have not used fertilizers. During 1976 the Party whipped up a tremendous movement to use fertilizers throughout the country. We estimate that we made an average of one million tons of natural fertilizers.

These fertilizers increased our harvests. Bad soil that previously produced one ton has produced two tons. Two-ton soil has become three- or four-ton soil. This is the experience of the very first year of fertilizer use throughout the country. Through this experience we can greatly expand natural fertilizers in the future.

In the past we did not think about cattle and water buffalo urine at all. This is a type of fertilizer that is no less advantageous than manure. We must organize the use of cattle and water buffalo urine.

We have a lot of experience with fertilizers. Natural fertilizers are far better than chemical fertilizers. In 1977 we will not purchase from outside. We will go on the

offensive with natural fertilizers that can be made inside our country. Natural fertilizers make our soil good every single year. So then, we don't chase after chemical fertilizers. Today a lot of *tontreankhet* plant remains. This year we used one percent. So then, *tontreankhet* plant is a tremendous industry.

3. Seed and a number of technical matters:

Good seed: Good seed gives good rice yields. This is very clear. With the same seed, if we select the good grains it will give ever better yields.

Some technical matters: Plowing and harrowing, seeding, and transplanting must be concentrated upon more. For example, transplanting far apart gives low yields. Transplanting close together gives high yields. But, some locations demand transplanting far apart. We must draw experience, making allowances for the state of the soil, the seed, and the actual conditions. Maintenance and weeding pushes and increases rice yields. This year our rice fields were beautiful in general. In the Northwest, due to a shortage of manpower, some rice fields still had some wrinkles. This year our rice fields are beautiful. In one or two years they will be even more beautiful, and this will make us love the rice fields, love the collective regime, and see that collective rice farming is very much stronger than private rice farming.

So then, the word "lovely" has a meaning like this. The oppressor classes don't know the meaning of this word. They say they don't know fresh and lovely when there is no love. Our fresh and lovely comes from our revolutionary world view, from our proletarian class stance. Only when the masses do it, when a proper revolution does it, can it be fresh and lovely like this. If we have university technicians do it, they won't be able to do it like this.

Generally speaking, we were are to follow our plans, and this leads us to see that:

- Are our people, our Army, going all out to fight?
- Some people are still weak and sick, but even though there are serious shortages, the people go all out to transform Kampuchea to be fresh and lovely. This is the heroism of our people under the leadership of our Party.

Seeing this, we will strive harder to fulfill our missions and will strive to concentrate on the people and push our movements of socialist revolution and building socialism to even greater leaps.

The tasks that must continue to be done to finish the 1976 plan

We must care for our rice crop to the maximum by preventing flood damage, protecting against spillage during harvest, threshing and transport, by storing it well, and by being vigilant and not letting the enemy destroy it by any subjective means.

Therefore, we must take the following measures:

- Parrot-wing green variety rice must be harvested and sun dried for one day. Do whatever is necessary to not let this rice over-ripen. If it is not harvested in a timely manner, it will bend over at the neck and break, then break apart and scatter.

- Set up mobile threshing machines in the locations that have them. Thresh immediately after harvest. To make it easy, don't tie the sheaves; gather the rice for the machine to thresh right away; don't wait to transport the rice home. By doing this, we don't have to worry about transporting the sheaves of rice. This is because if we harvest and have to tie the sheaves of rice before transporting them, rice will be scattered and spilled time after time and our losses will be great. So, at any location that has threshing machines, we will set them up to thresh right there at the harvest location. We have few machines, but we will keep on trying.

- The enemy will surely seek out every means to destroy our rice. They may destroy it in the fields. They might destroy it in the storehouses. Be vigilant that they do not steal it and hide it, etc. This is a strenuous class struggle that goes on every single day; it is a contradiction in the society that we must get a grasp on and put measures in place to guard and protect against to the maximum. We must have mastery at all times.

Our slogan is: *Don't let one grain of rice be damaged.*

When we fulfill this mission, we will achieve the 1976 Plan to the maximum and will create the pre-conditions for us to go on the offensive even more strongly during 1977.

II. A Number of Matters Concerning the Draft 1977 Plan

We raise a number of matter concerning the draft 1977 Plan in term of views and stances. In the Zones and Sectors, you comrades have already discussed this. You comrades responsible for the Zones and Sectors already grasp these matters. Furthermore, you comrades have already studied them in the school. We will only further clarify some matters, that's all.

1. Agriculture

A. The rice crop:

Our 1977 rainy season rice-farming plan is already clearly been set in the draft 1977 Plan.

During 1976, we made nearly three tons of paddy per hectare. So then during 1977, we surely will be able to really make three tons; this is not beyond our capabilities.

Can we do it, or not? We have clear confidence that we can do it, and it will not be as difficult as it was during 1976. During 1976 we were short of food supplies, the people were sick, our labor manpower was weak, and the animals were sick. By 1977, our food regime will be sufficient and the illnesses of the people will have lessened. The livestock will have corrals and good care. So then, our labor manpower will be stronger than it was during 1976. Furthermore, the Party has experience regarding rice farming, water, plowing and harrowing, seeding, transplanting, seed, and care and maintenance.

However, in order to achieve the plan, we must have a clear activity line, meaning we must strike accurately by selecting fertile soil with mastery and sort out the water problem in order to push the yields to the maximum. We are not greedy. We have a lot of fertile ground left; we will leave the bad ground for now and select the good in order to get ready.

During 1977, when we achieve the Party's plan, that will be a very great victory.

B. Various crops:

The remaining land must be readied and planted with various crops, both food crops and industrial crops.

1. Food crops: Corn, mung beans, peanuts, soy beans, sesame, and fruit crops and vegetables of every kind.

2. Industrial crops: Cotton, jute, sugar cane, tobacco, kapok, coconuts, bamboo, tubers, quinine trees, pine trees, etc.

3. Planting methods: In the cooperatives, in the unions, in the Army, and in the ministries and offices. For example: Of 360 days a year, we use only seven days for planting. Some crops are very simple and the harvest can be sold for a high price, for instance, kapok, jute, quinine, Persian lilac, etc. Potatoes must be grown strategically, for consumption, for animal fodder, to serve industry, and to make medicines. Papaya is easy to plant; it can be planted anywhere. Pine oil serves a strategic military purpose and can be sold for a high price.

This the operational line, following the stance of independence and mastery of our Party. We can sort out these matters; this is not beyond our capabilities. This does not demand machinery or tractors. This does not demand any fertilizers. When we operate like this, within only four or five more years we will have completely transformed Kampuchea. For one thing, the rice crop, and for another, the various others crops, will be everywhere. On this point we want to say that our country will be transformed into a crop garden everywhere, in every base area, every unit, and every office and ministry.

When we have all of this, we will have everything else, such as steel, artillery, aircraft, boats, etc.

We must run like this to be fast. We have only our bare hands, but with our line is like this, we will clearly be fast. We have the land and have the people; however, if our line is not correct, even if we go all around the world begging and borrowing from others, we will not be able to build the country quickly. We would certainly be someone's slaves.

C. The various pre-conditions for serving agriculture:

1. Water:

For 1977, the direction is it is imperative to be two or three times stronger in comparison to 1976.



During the cool season, the people in our cooperatives are on the offensive to make lots of fermented fish paste to supply to the cooperatives to make their livelihood well-off make them ready to participate in achieving the Party's 1977 Plan quickly and completely.

- First, it is imperative to keep concentrating on paddy dikes and canals, large and small, by concentrating on water control gates, both wood- and cement-built. By experience, the flow gates must be somewhat large; going small cannot be guaranteed; in particular, only when the flow rate is tens of thousands of cubic meters can they be guaranteed. For example: At a canal in Sector 5, Northwest, a gate is too small and could not handle the flow and the gate was torn away. This experience shows that the gates must be large. Example: At Taing Kôk, the gate was well-built, the same size as the canal.

- Second, it is imperative to concentrate on reservoirs to retain and store water, the maximum amount of water.

- Third, it is imperative to build more feeder canals and canals than were built in 1976 to send water from the uplands to the lowlands or else to send water from the lowlands to the uplands.

These ways of finding water have a strategic meaning. When we sort it out like this, within three or four years we will have one hundred percent mastery over water.

As for paddy dike and feeder canal systems, we will keep going; we will not abandon that. Experience in Sector 106 shows that we must make reservoirs. In Tbaung Khmum in the East, we must make reservoirs, squares one or two kilometers on each side or two kilometers wide by three kilometers long, on high land, depending upon the state of ground. The objective is to get hundreds of thousands or millions of cubic meters of water for use in the Sectors or districts. In the North in the vicinity of Phnom Santuk, we also make reservoirs; we make them on high ground, so we do not need to use machinery. When using water in the dry season, we just open gates and let it flow straight to the rice fields in the lowlands. The Northwest is the easiest place to make reservoirs. The uplands have mountains, forests, and streams and can hold back as much water as we please. For one thing, they hold back water so that there will be no rainy season flooding. For another, they hold back water for dry season use. In Sector 6 in Pursat, there are locations to make reservoirs to hold millions of cubic meters of water. The highlands are all mountainous and have water sources and high land. Therefore they can be act as reservoirs by us putting up dams from one mountain to the next. Phnom Thibadei, Koah Kralor, might be made into tremendous dams. Bauribau, Kampong Chhnang, may hold stream water and act as upland dams.

Our country has very good pre-conditions: mountains in the upper part, flatlands down below. We can hold back as much water as we please. In other countries they have 80 or 90 percent mountains, but they are still able to do this.

- The way to make upland reservoirs: Use district or Sector manpower; there is no need to use other forces. We make just one or two corners because the other corners are mountains; then we use the fewest resources. When we make reservoirs like this, we have no need to build very large or very deep canals. We dig moderately small canals, just

enough to let the water flow. When we dig deep canals across high ground we use a lot of manpower and time.

The way to make reservoirs in lowlands: We must make small reservoirs connected together. When we make reservoirs that are too large that run for tens of kilometers, it is difficult for the water to flow. We make small, connected reservoirs, and in the rainy season when the waters from the uplands are strong, we open them to let the water in.

One hectare of land during the dry season uses an average of 3,000 cubic meters of water.

Generally speaking, throughout the country, any location is able to make reservoirs. We make connected reservoirs. Subdistrict manpower can make them; there is not need for district manpower to make them. We need not fear we will run out of land. We have lots of land left. When we do it like this, within five years we will have mastery over water throughout the country. That is very fast.

Sorting it out like this, within five years we will have mastery and the problem of machinery will not arise.

- The way to make reservoirs using water from the lowlands: For example, in Sector 25 of the Southwest and in the East, we make reservoirs using river water by pumping water into the reservoirs. For example, In Sector 22 in the East there is the Tonle Tauch. On one side there are vast rice fields and the soil is good too, but there are no water sources. So then, make reservoirs along the Tonle Tauch, moderately small reservoirs slightly above ground level, and pump water into them. In the dry season, send the water into the rice fields. This problem of machinery is not difficult, as long as there is rice. Any location which does not pump into reservoirs loses a lot of land. When pumping into reservoirs, we gain mastery. Later on, the problem of machinery will not be difficult. Later on we will even make hydroelectricity.

This is strategic organization of water. This year we gained experience in sorting out water. In later years we will have more even more experience. By doing it like this, within five years we will gain full mastery over water. We will draw successive experience, shrinking the time from five years to four.

2. Fertilizers:

What is the outlook in using and sorting out fertilizers?

- This year we gained a lot of experience. We used tree leaves, grass, *tontreankhet*, water coconut, lakebed soil, and animal manure, and we even used human excrement as well. We used mountain soil. We used everything. The movement was very mighty.

- Shortfalls: We still use them in far too ancient ways. We use *tontreankhet* leaves: chopping them up uses a lot of manpower. We have little manpower from the people. So then, find a way to sort this out with suitable machinery to chop up grass and straw. Is that doable, or not? We can sort that out because it is no more difficult than threshing machines are. When we make these machines, we profit greatly in terms of manpower. They have already done this in Battambang. In Industry, they will concentrate more on this matter.

- Cattle, water buffalo, and pig manure: In the past much was lost. This came from us not having corrals for cattle and water buffaloes. When we have corrals, preparation and organization is easy; we get a lot. One head of cattle gives five liters of urine on average during one day and one night. How many cattle and buffaloes do we have? Lots of them. If we figure 1,000,000, we get 5,000,000 liters every 24 hours. If we figure by year, we get 1,800,000 tons of urine. So then, we must set up corrals using brick and cement with flow trenches leading to nearby reservoirs. Each day we will get all the cattle and buffalo manure and urine. We are able to sort out the corral problem. Each cooperative has one or two corrals depending on whether the cooperative is large or small. Expending the manpower of a small production unit only for two days, one corral can be built; nothing is purchased from foreign countries. We will make thatched roofs. If there are no leaves, we will use reeds or straw for a while. This is not hard. At locations that flood, we raise the ground level a little bit; we can sort that out in a day or two. When there are corrals, the cattle and buffalos sleep easily and have the strength to work for us; they produce fertilizer for us too. We were able to fight and defeat the American imperialists, to fight and overthrow the feudalists and capitalists. Are we able to do this, or not?

When we work like this, by 1977 our fertilizers will double and triple. By 1978, they will increase even more. Other countries don't have cattle and water buffaloes like we do.

- Pig manure: Pig pens are made the same. When they are made like the cattle and buffalo corrals, we will be able to use all the manure and urine. Pig manure and urine is higher quality than cattle and water buffalo manure and urine. We raise a lot of pigs: they provide meat and we get fertilizer too.

3. Seed:

Starting now it is imperative to think about seed stock. Select the best rice. Are we able to do that, or not? We can do that in the cooperatives by arranging the manpower. We don't yet have much of the *kramuon sâr* and the 7 decimeter varieties. We will select rice inside our country gradually for a while.

Good seed must be stored separately. If there are 100 grains, plant all 100 grains. Don't let those 100 grains drop to 50 grains. Experience has shown that seed stored in large storehouse is no-good. When it is stored in bags or small stockpiles, quality can be maintained for a long time.

4. Agricultural chemicals:

Up until today, we have made a lot. However, the quality is not yet high. We must continue to make them because they are already 50 to 60 percent effective.

At the same time, we will monitor the experiences and gradually summarize the experiences. By doing so, we will have agricultural chemicals to serve the needs of our rice crop very single year.

From what we know, many agricultural chemicals are made from botanicals. When made from botanicals, they do not impact animal life such as fish. Using artificial chemicals impacts the fish.

5. Agricultural implements:

In 1976 much progress was made. In 1977 we must keep being innovative, such as with plowshares and harrows, grindstones, mortars, automatic and semi-automatic threshing machines.

Some ordinary implements have been sorted out. At some locations, comrades carry the sheave bundles back home on their heads after they are harvested. This method cannot serve large scale agriculture. They can only carry two sheaves. When they carry using shoulder poles, they can carry four. So, we must be innovative to sort out contradictions. Cadres must see these problems. We might use manpower using the shoulder pole carry method; that does not demand machinery. We propose that you don't use machinery too much; you must conserve and keep the machinery for use at far away locations. We must use manpower and ordinary implements. Many locations have sorted this out well. So then, use implements that have the characteristics of the masses. This is the strategic direction. Whenever we see a contradiction that cannot be sorted out, we take it for discussion during meetings with the masses in the cooperatives; they can sort it out.

6. Planting, growing, and maintenance techniques:

This year we worked well, in great leaps. We must continue. In later years, make further leaps. As for transplanting methods, follow the soil conditions and the state of the rice seed. Some locations transplant closely together; some transplant further apart: this depends upon the soil conditions. In Kampong Chhnang, they transplant in rows. The sunlight penetrates equally. But we have not yet been able to summarize the experiences because we do not yet know the quality. The important thing is to work and draw upon experience. Don't be subjective. Work and draw upon the experience of the masses. The masses have experience. Let them express their opinions. Don't order them around.

D. Animal husbandry:

1. Our building socialist revolution fundamentally depends upon animals. For many more years into the future, it will fundamentally depend upon animals; it will not fundamentally depend upon machinery, even though the machines will exist.

Without animals, we cannot farm rice. So then, we must have plans to raise them and care for them. When we raise them, the problem of fodder arises. We must sort out fodder for the animals.

We draw from some of the experience in our country during 1976 together with experience from foreign countries that do not have grass for animals.

2. We must organize animal fodder as an industry.

At some locations such as the area surrounding the Tonle Sap, the cattle do not eat straw; they just eat grass. Now they eat straw, but straw does not have many nutrients, they eat it whole and must masticate it too.

So then, the experience in some countries is that they finely chop or grind the straw so that the animals can easily masticate it. Through discussion, we moisten the straw with water, finely grind it, and then mix it with rice bran. Example: One ton of ground straw is added to ten or twenty kilograms of rice bran. By doing this, we raise the quality of the animal food. First we grind it finely. Second, we mix in rice bran to raise the quality of the fodder to give the animals energy. So there is no need to take them to graze. When they leave the rice fields, they go straight to the corrals to be fed. Can we sort this out, or not? We can sort this out. This is because straw is not a problem and bran is not a problem. Taking it to be ground can be sorted out. So we make arrangements to do this and test how the cattle eat it, how many kilograms we use per day. By doing this, the animals will be stronger, and we profit in items of labor forces. In the dry months when there are shortages of grass, we will be able to fundamentally sort that out like this.

In other countries, they have no bran for the cattle, buffalos, or horses to eat. They just grind plain straw. When we add bran, the fodder is very good. The principle is correct and we can fully sort this out with our resources.

- Pig fodder: We can use the same methods. We are not short of pig fodder. We have bran, banana trees, morning glory. We arrange to mix it, and we raise pigs industrially. When there are potato scraps to mix with the straw too, that is even better. We plant potatoes and use the flour to make intravenous fluids and acids; but, we can use the scraps to keep for mixing into the pig fodder.

In the old regime, they bought animal fodder from Hong Kong. Hong Kong bought bran from Kampuchea as an ingredient to mix in and sold it back to the contemptible Nol at a hundred times the price.

2. Industry. We raise a number of views on industry and handicrafts.

Our country does not yet have anything industrial. We have repaired only one or two of the old industries. There is nothing substantial. This is the first thing. Second, the industry that we do have is subject to foreign countries; they are not independent factories because they require raw materials from foreign countries. So then, we let only a number of them operate, those that directly serve the livelihood of the people, such as textiles.

Furthermore, we set up factories or modify them to serve agriculture, whether in Phnom Penh or the Zones. We must continue in this direction. Doing anything other than this does not serve the concrete movement.

We must concentrate on small factories in the base areas, the Zones, the Sectors, or some districts, such as blacksmith shops, lathe shops, repair shops, textile mechanical shops, shops producing fish sauce or soy sauce, handicraft shops, rice mills, corn mills, and potatoes mills making animal fodder, etc. These shops must be strengthened and expanded in the base areas. The base areas have many preconditions for setting up these kinds of workshops. Lathe shops in the Sectors or Zones, even if they have only one or two machines, must be set up. Within four to ten years, they will transform into factories. Doing this is making guerilla war, making guerilla war to attack every day and serve the movement. In one or two years, they will expand. In four to ten years, they will expand. After ten years, they will become factories. Our militias are the same: after a while they become Sector forces, then main forces. As for the technology it is not necessary to search for it anywhere; we will learn how to do it by ourselves and gradually gain experience.

In the base areas, we have the preconditions to do this. We have the people. As for the craftsmen, we have some already. We will successively expand.

It is imperative to have views like this. Do not rely upon large factories. By doing it like this, we will whip up the potential of the people. Anyone can do it. After a while, some of our districts with populations of 60,000 to 100,000 may expand their industries from small to large operations. Actually, we have already done this. During the war, some districts gained mastery in sorting out factories to a certain extent.

By working like this, we gain mastery. When there is war, we will have mastery and fight for 100 to 200 years without any problem.

As for these industries, if we talk about tile and bricks, beginning today the Party will not purchase galvanized or fibrocement sheeting. Tiles and bricks must be set up strategically. Example: The railway workshop is very large and has a tile roof. Estimates are that those tiles are not going anywhere for 50 years.

Galvanized and fibrocement sheeting must be purchased from abroad and they are very expensive. We make tile and brick here and the quality is not inferior to fibrocement. When we have tile and brick we can arrange good housing for the people

and arrange good corrals. Later our canals will be brick too. We are able to make cement too. The Zones, Sectors, and some districts can set up cement. When there is cement, we can set up our various water construction projects, dams, canals, housing, and factories, very quickly.

III. Various factors in being able to accomplish the Draft 1977 Plan

The 1977 Plan is far more highly systematic than the 1976 Plan. According to the plan, we will arrange every field. It is the first plan of our socialist construction.

1. What are the factors in accomplishing it? Who will accomplish this plan?

First, the Party must be strong.

Second, the people must be strong.

Third, the Army must be strong.

Fourth, the ministries and offices and various specialties must be strong in order to accomplish this plan.


2. Strong in what sense?

A. A strong Party is strong politically, ideologically, and organizationally.

1. To be politically strong means absorbing the political line of the Party, and especially absorbing the implementational meaning in terms of agriculture, industry and other fields, following the direction of the Party. When we absorb the line, our rice will be good, our crops will be everywhere and our livestock will be fat, not thin. Understanding this, go do it. After doing it, draw successive experience. Draw experience in what went right and what went wrong, and pioneer forward. This has to be done before we can be strong.

2. To be ideologically strong means completely eradicating private ownership. It is imperative to put in place the slogan of eradicating it all. Do not use the slogan of eradicating some and keeping some. Subjectively, we must constantly assess Party documents and build ourselves.

Another thing, the Branches criticize and self-criticize and refashion constantly. Third, study by undergoing successive revolutionary life views.



To push the missions of defending and building the country at great-leap speed, revolutionary workers of the State Rubber Plantations went on rubber-tapping offensives to get the maximum as quickly as possible.

It is imperative to refashion oneself time and time again. Don't be subjective and say that you have studied already, are crystal-clear now, and will not do wrong again. When we do not refashion, after a while forget ourselves and it returns. So then, it is imperative to refashion constantly, to build good personal histories, and to not be entangled with the enemy politically, ideologically, or organizationally. What were our personal histories like before we joined the Party? What were they like after we joined the Party? How have they evolved during the socialist revolution era? We must refashion constantly.

Generally speaking, only when the Party's politics and ideology play a role and when we are uncomplicated, crystal clear, and confident in the masses can we push the movements strongly. It is the same in the cooperatives. It is the same in the unions. When the Party is strong, the cadres are strong, and the masses are strong.

3. It is imperative to train within the Branches. Even though it may be complicated, it must be sorted out. When it could not be sorted out in one try, sort it out again. Do not fear contradictions. When we avoid contradictions, we avoid the movement. We gain no experience. So then, it is imperative to sort things out within the Branches to raise all matters within the Branches. When the Branches can be led, the Sectors can be led, the Zones can be led. This is because all leadership matters must be sorted out within the Branches.

We can only lead well and be able to sort things out and gain experience when we have go into the fray in the Branches. We must enter the Branches before we can understand the problems, understand the contradictions, and resolve the contradictions. Cadres must understand the contradictions and strive to resolve them before they can become good cadres. We fear that cadres absorb only the politics and cannot grasp the contradictions and resolve the contradictions: such cadres are not yet good.

B. The people factor:

When the Party is strong, the people are strong. The people are precious diamonds. Even when some cadre have violated the people, the people still follow the Party. If the cadres love and respect the people and serve the people following the Party line, the people will be even warmer and will support the Party and the socialist revolution even more. Most of our Party members are good, but a few negatively impact the people. When all Party members are good and all the people are in support, the enemy cannot penetrate.

- The people being strong has one more meaning: Food being sufficient; shelter being sufficient; housing, and medicines being sufficient. However, the housing does not have to be too beautiful, just appropriate. Aside from this, it is imperative to think about salt, fermented fish and meat pastes, and vegetables to feed and maintain the strength of the people. Generally speaking, there must be a high spirit of responsibility toward the people.

C. The Army factor:

All categories of troops must be strong. Constantly educate politically and ideologically. Organizationally, there must be constant purging/screening. Fundamentally, our troops all very good. However, the enemy has inserted one or two of their elements among the troops in order to destroy our revolution.

Therefore, our troops must be set up to be strong before building the country and defending the country can be good.


D. The office-ministry and various specialties factor:

All these forces must be set up to push our movement of building the country. Furthermore, the offices and ministries must be lightened in order to push our agricultural movement.

None the matters that we have raised here are new. The conference has already absorbed them. This has only been a reconfirmation as a light for the conference's further discussion.

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Strengthening and Expanding Party Leadership During the New Period Of Socialist Revolution And Socialist Construction



1. Strive to strengthen and expand the Party's centralized democracy by concentrating on strengthening and expanding the stance of collective leadership and work, and in the stance of separate mission responsibility.

This is one core content of strengthening and expanding Party leadership during the period of our socialist revolution and building socialism. So then, these provisions must be strengthened and expanded time and time again.

This is because for one thing, the understanding, absorption, and implementation of collective leadership, in particular responsibility, even though understood, known about, and done successively, are still problems facing the Party, because there are still shortcomings. These shortcomings are why our leadership is not yet really effective.

Furthermore, our leadership does not lie within a narrow framework like it did previously. Party leadership throughout the country leads everything, politics, the military, building the country, defending the country, economics, social action, culture, etc. In the Zone, in the Sectors, and in the various other lower echelons, we are responsible for everything. This is a very heavy task. Therefore, in order that leadership be effective, there must be centralized democracy. Centralized democracy sees every aspect, sees every problem. When only one or two persons lead or only one committee leads every aspect of very matter is not seen. When there is a gap on some matter, that gap is large.

Example: Even the problem of food supply must be sorted out in many aspects or thought about by many people with many people's opinions on the difficult points, the easy points, and the possibilities. When many people do not discuss this, there are gaps. We get one part and we lose another part. Missing one part does not impact just one or two persons; it impacts many of the people. It impacts one subdistrict, two subdistricts when the district framework leads. It impacts one or two districts when the Sector framework leads. It impacts one or two Sectors when the Zone framework leads. So then, it impacts the movement, it impacts the livelihood of the people, it impacts the health of the people. Through this, it impacts politics and the defense of the country.

Therefore, this is why we must raise these matters and then raise them again. Centralized democracy in committees and centralized democracy among the masses centralizes many fields of knowledge and many opinions. The we decide what to use and what not to use according to the stances and lines of the Party.

Regarding the essence of centralized democracy, we must grasp that it has both democracy and centralization. The two are not separate. Don't go heavy on democracy or heavy on centralization. Both must be connected to one another in the sense of implementation. They are not just connected to one another in form; they are connected in implementation. In what form? In form, there is a meeting on anything. For small work that could be decided by one person, there is a meeting. When the work is accomplished, there is also meeting. So then, there is no separate work. What we decide upon is the policy, and in terms of responsibilities they are accomplished individually or by an entire committee. Therefore, the implementation must be done in a concrete sense.

To the contrary, when small matters are not met upon, intermediate matters are not met upon, major matters are not met upon, we make decisions separately and we cannot see everything and it goes wrong. Sometimes we see just one aspect and assume that we are correct, but we do not see other causal factors and it goes wrong. Sometimes when we decide on some matter, we are partially right and partially wrong, and it goes wrong just a bit. We accomplish something else, and it goes wrong a little bit too. It transforms quantitatively without our knowing it. Then one day it transforms qualitatively, and it becomes a major problem and then we seek a collective resolution. Sometimes when it becomes a major problem the collective cannot resolve it, this leads to danger. So then, it is imperative to be alert. When deciding one thing it is imperative to assess whether or not that decision will lead to any later quantitative change. If so, that must be resolved, resolved collectively.

When sorting things out using centralized democracy, stances are firm, views are full and complete, ideology is crystal clear, methods are mighty, and solidarity is good. Even though the analysis is not yet complete from every angle, we are in good solidarity because we all see that that is all we were able to analyze.

When we resolve some issue on our own, views are not complete, ideology is not yet crystal clear; there is not yet any warm confidence. So then, the stances are not firm,

the measure are not mighty, and solidarity is not good. Our ranks break. The enemy is able to penetrate.

As for the actual operational methods of implementing the principle of centralized democracy, we don't just wait for meetings.

First: Decide alone based on principles that the collective has already decided.

Second: Decide by discussions inside the organizational framework of the committee; or, if it is bigger than that, decide in plenary organization conferences, in plenary committees, or propose opinions to upper echelon.

This is a style of collective leadership and separate responsibilities. Imagine that the people at our location face shortages. We are there. We are responsible. We raise the problem with the collective. This shows separate responsibility. Separate responsibility is solid. No matter how we raise the matter within the committee, it is only 30-40 percent resolved. We raise the matter again to upper echelon, but it is still 30-40 percent resolved. We take the matter and whip up the masses, and it is 60-70-80 percent solved. Working like this democracy and centralization go together as one. But when we are not separately responsible, when the people face shortages, we do not see that; when the people are without shelter, we do not see that; when the people sleep in the water and the mud, we do not see that. When the Zone does not come down, no one sees that. But with separate responsibility, whether we can sort it out or not, we raise the matter. When separate responsibility is not strong, the collective is not strong. When we are strong separately, the collective is strong. The two are mutually dependent. When there are no shelters, how is it sorted out? Where can bamboo be found? Where can leaves be found? What do we have,? What do we lack? Now some forces are buried because their separate responsibility is weak. Example: The cattle are sick; the water buffaloes are sick; we do not take this problem to be resolved in the district framework. That comes from not being responsible, not from opposing socialist revolution, but from not understand. So then, there must be more education and indoctrination again and again.

Without the collective, sometimes we see a problem and we see another problem too. Imagine that the people face shortages. Seeing that we think that is normal for revolution: hardships are the normal thing. This is an incorrect view. Hardship is normal, but we must strive to resolve the difficulties to the maximum in accordance with our actual capabilities so that the people will have good health and have the energy to fight to increase production.

Sometime when a problem is seen, we talk nonsense. Example: We say the cattle are normally thin; collective cattle are thin like that. Se, that is not being responsible. We do not join in sorting that our more with the collective attack. The enemy attacks more through that. Minor cadres have little influence. When district or Sector cadres talk like this, their influence broadens.

Individual responsibility and collective leadership are one unit. When this is absorbed, this raises the quality of the leadership to an extent. When the spirit of separated responsibility is even higher, we don't see wait and see; we can predict in advance. This is because we are being responsible. We grasp the situation. We analyze the situation. Then we predict in advance. So then, we prepare ideology in advance, prepare measures in advance. Having prepared views and measures, we do not yet discuss them with the collective. So then, the habit of separate responsibility leads us to see, leads us to make predictions, and the habit of responsibility leads us to think. After we think, some of the problem appears; sometimes it does not come immediately. But when we think, if there is any little sign we keep on understanding the situation better, and we are able to find the causal factors.

Example: The issue of three tons of paddy per hectare. When we have a spirit of responsibility, we keep thinking: How is the soil? How is the water? How are the livestock? How about the manpower? How about the fertilizer? We keep thinking.

The plowing and harrowing is slow. We keep on thinking about that. Why is it slow? Are there any measure to sort this out faster? We think on our own, then discuss it more with the collective.

This kind of thinking is revolutionary ideology, revolutionary organization, revolutionary technology.

The fertilizer number one and water that we are sorting out today is revolutionary technology. But these are initial steps. We must continue the revolution, but keep successively changing the technology and organizing water use and water conservation to avoid being extravagant. We must think. This thinking is because of separate responsibly. Keep on innovating; innovate because of thinking.

On this matter, our fundamental class, the poor peasants and lower-middle peasants, lack initiative and lack thinking. This problems does not come from nature. It comes from oppression. Previously they were oppressed. Therefore, they just wait to follow orders. Now it has completely changed. We are masters now. So then, by studying thinking, by studying figuring things out gradually they will certainly be able to innovate. After a while they will be even more innovative than intellectuals and capitalists. Why? Because they are absorbed in their work. We must push this matter more in the cooperatives. There are two reasons why our collective people are not innovative. The first is because they were previously oppressed. The other reason comes from Party leadership. The Party has not yet whipped up democracy; it has just centralized. So this is why those of us who hold power go give instructions and whatever we instruct, they just do it. Give wrong instructions and the people dare not express an opinion. We have not yet whipped them up to express opinion in order to implement centralized democracy to hold meetings to express opinion and summarize opinion. We just ask this or that person for their opinion. There are no meetings to summarize opinions. This is unacceptable. This person says this; that person says that: they are not in

unity. There must be meetings to whip up discussion and summarize opinion in order to reach unity.

When we have whipped up centralized democracy well, there will be no shortage of cadres. If we do not whip up centralized democracy, after we study we will just go back and lead according to what was printed. Forces will be buried because the masses will not dare express opinions. Our proletarian dictatorship will not be mighty.

When we implement centralized democracy, when we don't know where to use the manpower, the people will dare to propose their opinions to us. In doing this, no-good elements will flatter us, but when we implement centralized democracy, we will know which opinions must be listened to and which must not be listened to. Then when we make a collective assessment inside the committees, we will be able to summarize opinion and we will know which opinions came from the masses and which opinions are enemy plots.

2. It is imperative to always closely grasp and firmly stand upon the political line of the Party, the strategic and tactical lines, and the various operational lines of the Party

What do we rely upon in order to lead? Speaking fundamentally, we rely upon the political line, rely upon the path that the Party has determined must be followed. Do not follow any other paths that the Party has designated, and don't follow any path other than the that the Party designates. So, when assessing any issue, analyzing any issue, solving any problem, arranging any issue, it is imperative to stand on the political lines of the Party, the domestic political line, the foreign policy line, the politics of building the country, the politics of resolving transitional food supplies, etc. Whatever you do, try to stand and implement correctly. When we strive to take the correct stance, we will be correct to the maximum. If we take it lightly, we will clearly be wrong. Assess each manifestation, each situation. Stand on the line.

Example: Collective cattle are thin; private ownership cattle are fat. Standing upon the line to assess this and see that this is wrong. When we don't stand upon the line, we won't see that this is wrong and we may even sing along with them. In fact, this is an enemy slogan that they raise to oppose the cooperative, oppose feeder canals, oppose paddy dikes.

Sometimes the enemy whispers, but others do not understand and they just sing along in chorus. So then, we must know who to make assessments. Anyone who is confused, we must educate.

So we must stand clearly on our path. Don't stand to the side of the path. Don't stand on another path; be vigilant, or you will get lost; be vigilant, or the enemy will entice you. When you think you are lost, listen to the collective. When elements in the base framework are not yet clear either, propose it to upper echelon.

Therefore, leadership must rely upon Party line, rely upon Party ideology.



To contribute to the restoration of the livelihood of our collective worker-peasant people to always be more prosperous, the brothers and sisters of the Blanket Factory are on a mighty day-and-night offensive to produce blankets.

3. Good leadership requires concentration on doing meticulous, crystal-clear and constant political and ideological work

Leadership is a matter of correctly analyzing and sorting out contradictions. In order for leadership to be good and for every contradiction to be well-resolved to the maximum, it is imperative to concentrate on purifying ideology to be crystal-clear so that others can carry out their missions while-heartedly and confidently. Before doing anything, they must be crystal-clear; they must have confidence first. No matter how difficult the path, no matter what the obstacles are, when they have faith, they will be crystal-clear and they will fight. When not crystal-clear, they will act incorrectly, and when they encounter obstacles, they will pull back.

How will they do political work? In an implementational sense, there are many ways, and they must act concretely.

1. Study and be involved with the movement clearly so that they will see what is right and what is wrong. Study in large and small scale every one, two, or three days. Study with revolutionary life views; study without revolutionary lifeviews.

While studying, it is imperative to bring up the reasons in a crystal-clear and clear-sighted manner. Do not say that the Party is having you do this, so Comrades, you must do this. It is imperative to clearly bring up the reasons. The reasons must be based upon the movement. Use the movement to make clear which experiences were correct and which were incorrect.

Study one time; draw experiment one time; there will be a little light, and they will move forward by one or two steps. To the contrary, when we do not educate and study, they will be left in the dark. After a long while, morale will fall.

2. Another method is to hold conferences, conferences to sort out their views to be crystal-clear and to make the reasons clear. Do not just scold and blame. Do not just grind away at them on discipline. When criticizing what went right and what went wrong, it is imperative to use the experience of what was right and what was wrong. So then, their doing wrong will not lead them to be hopeless because they will learn the political and ideological lessons and they will be crystal-clear.

3. Another method is holding lifestyle meetings in the Branches. Branch life is the routine guiding lantern. Our lantern needs more fuel and more wicks before it can be routinely bright.

Whatever the level of capacity is in the base area Branch framework, the level of experience is the same. Therefore, not everything can be resolved, but it does help some: it helps routinely.

4. Aside from this, political and ideological work is done individually. The Branch Secretary helps the other comrades who are Branch members. Or if some Branch Secretary develops in a bad way, the district must go to help. Following this rule, the majority will be effective and will progress. Some will not progress, but the absolute majority will progress.

5. As for criticism/self-criticism inside the revolutionary life view framework, it is the same. It is imperative to think primarily in terms of politics and ideology. Do not think too heavily in terms of organization. This is because criticism/self-criticism must be aimed at sorting out ideology and politics so that they will be more clear-sighted, so that they will absorb more, and so that they will understand. As for the organizational weapons, they follow; when out of possibilities, we then use the organizational weapons.

So then, the method of criticism must use the political and ideological lines to explain to them so they will understand. And this must be gentle and flexible. Be firm, but do not pressure. If you pressure, they will not be crystal-clear.

Political and ideological work is long-term work. Sometimes great progress is made, but then it develops: it may progress and it may not. It is imperative to constantly do political and ideological work. This is our leadership stance.

4. Leadership must analyze the manifestations of problems or various events according to the state of the contradictions, according to their weak and strong aspects, then resolve those contradictions according to whether their concrete states are secondary or antagonistic, weighing the strong and weak points clearly and correctly.

Leadership is seeking and discovering the various manifestations of the contradictions of each issue, each event, or each individual. What are these contradictions? The contradictions are the strong points, the weak points, the difficult aspects, the easy aspects, etc. After seeing them all, make clear calculations before sorting them out or taking measures according to the actual states of the contradictions. Example: Contradictions within the ranks with individual one-person elements. The manifestations are this or that trouble impacting Party discipline on some issue. We assess that individual and analyze that person according to that state of the contradiction. There were weak points, so this impacted Party discipline. This is one aspect. However, in taking our analytical stance, we must analyze one more aspect: What are that person's strong points toward the Party, toward the revolution, toward the people? Weigh both the weak and the strong points. Which are heavier currently? What are the possibilities that the weak points will develop and become even weaker or even more strongly stubborn? We make an estimate to prepare measures in advance. Assess them individually. Assess them collectively. If there is not yet any danger, we personally warn the person. These are measures appropriate to the level of the contradictions as we analyze them.

Example: Another manifestation is the phenomenon of making propaganda within the ranks the Party. But another aspect is that they joined the revolution. We assess further. If they joined the revolution to embed themselves to attack the Party, that is an antagonistic contradiction, and we take measures accordingly. Sometimes there is propaganda against the Party, but previously there were also loyal and proper activities that the masses saw and the collective saw. We assess further. Why did they make propaganda against the Party? Was it because they were led to do so, or did they act on their own? If they were led to do so, was the subject confused, or what? If so, we might be able to educate and construct them so that we can assess them further. So then, the measures are different. When we do not analyze like this, we cannot clearly distinguish the contradictions: those that are traitors, those that are confused, those unwittingly enticed by others, we place them all in the same group; in doing this, we push away and get rid of forces that were only hesitant.

Other issues are the same. We know that the enemy attacks us. We must analyze their strong points, their weak points, our strong points, our weak points. We must analyze so that we can take measures. Analyzing from every angle and estimating the state of development leads us to take the correct measures. We must increase this within the Party in order to increase the quality of our leadership. When we make successive correct analyses, we do not have to worry about the successive measures we take toward the enemy that wants to destroy us. Though we are small, we operate quickly.

The food supply problem is the same. We are short of food supplies. This is a difficult point. However, we have land, we have rice fields, we have seed, and we have manpower. These are strong points. When we analyze like this, we can sort it out. We are not at a dead end. When our analyses are not good, we are in the dark and there is turmoil.

Analysis must be based upon the law of causal action and reaction and must be based upon our successive experiences. This is one thing. Another thing is that we must analyze collectively. Sometimes we analyze collectively and then it is not done from every angle; however, we are in unity. We analyze again and again. We draw experience again and again. Therefore, we are strong.

5. To lead well, there must be a correct and effective activity line.

With a strategic line, with a tactical line, and with various policies, there must also be operational methods and proper management and preparation of operational methods before the strategic and tactical lines and policies can be well-implemented. If operations are not properly managed, the lines are nothing and cannot be implemented. We have the strategic lines of socialist revolution and building socialism; we have a clear policy of national defense; we have a clear policy of decreasing enemies and gathering friends; we have a policy of increasing rice production to three tons of paddy per hectare; and we have a clear 1977 Plan. However, in order to achieve these policies, we must act on them. If they are correctly acted upon, they can be achieved. If they are incorrectly acted upon, they cannot be achieved. This acting is the operational line.

Example: The line of three tons per hectare is already clear. The line of sorting out food supplies is already clear. However, there is still the preparation and management of manpower too. If that is incorrectly done, food supply cannot be sorted out. Therefore, how must manpower be arranged appropriately? If it is not, the line cannot be achieved.

Seeing this, in order for us to lead well, leadership is not just educating on the strategic and tactical lines and the plans. It is imperative to lead the implementation too. Leading implementation is joining in the activity line. Education is only theory, principle. There is still the issue of actually doing it. Actually doing it has its difficult side and its easy side. Thus, we must monitor the movement and draw experience from the movement so that they will do it more effectively. It is like that with the Zones. It is like that with the Sectors. It is the same with the districts, all the way down to the cooperatives. They combine together to exchange experience and draw experience together to be able to make corrections in a timely manner. Push the weak to become strong. Push the strong to be even stronger.

Example: The issue of sorting out the water problem. We have agreed and have already set up 30 percent of the paddy dike and canal systems. Water is the line, but paddy dikes and canals are the activity line. In tandem with this, we have canals, dams, and reservoirs. We keep on improving our activity line again and again. Later on we will

keep coming up with new activity lines, doing whatever we can to get water, water for growing one rice crop a year, for two rice crops a year, clearly sorting it out; but actually, only the movement can make it clear. This means that if we lead just the politics, lead only the ideology and do not think about the activity line, no matter how we sort it out or manage it, it will get bogged down. In our experience, at this time we have lots of light in terms of the activity lines on the water problem. Within three to four years, we will have full mastery of major and sub canals. In tandem with this, we see that we must sort out making more reservoirs, both small and large, in accordance with our manpower. When we do this, within four to five years, we will have full mastery. By the end of this year and the following year, experience will improve. Using the actual movement to assess the right and the wrong, we improve our activity line. With a correct activity line, the movement will push forward very strongly. So then, it is imperative to keep on striving to sort things out. A one-time solution will not be 100 percent, but the movement shows the experience of what went right and what went wrong. Through this experience, we will successively improve our activity line. We will sort things out again and again. We should be able to solve 80 percent or more of the transitional food supply. Some locations will resolve only 40 percent or 20 percent. This comes from the activity line. Therefore, do not be checkmated. Do not be just observers. Grasp the mission and raise the principles; you must be lively. Do not wait for upper echelon. Upper echelon helps in terms of stances and lines. We still have to manage the doing. When we work like this, anything can be sorted out with correct strategic and tactical lines, with correct policies in every field. When the activity line is correct, anything can be done. This is what we want. We lack technical materials, but when we manage like this, we are very strong and manpower is not buried.

6. Good leadership must have clear planning and meticulous methodology; especially, keep a constant grasp on the numbers.

This is an old problem, but it arises again.

In the national democratic revolution framework, we had clear plans and clear methods. During the political struggle, we had plans and we raised those plans again and again, plans within the Branch framework, plans within the frameworks at every echelon. During wartime, we had plans. During the rainy seasons, we met to assess if we were achieving or not achieving the plans, and we raised more plans. This was our system of working by following plans. We constantly had the numbers in our grasp, how many enemies were in this battlefield, what our strength was, how much ammunition there was, etc.

Now, just like before, we have to have plans. Defending the country requires planning, requires estimates, and requires projections.

Building the country is like that too. It requires planning on how much land must be worked and how much water must be sorted out. Example: Each Sector thinks about making dams, but no rice fields are constructed. So then, the dams do not serve rice fields. The cooperatives are like this. How many people do the cooperatives have? How

many rice fields are worked? Is that enough, or not? How many cattle and buffaloes are there? Is that enough, or not? How is that being sorted out? So then, keep the numbers in your grasp. Keep the people in your grasp. Grasp the numbers of livestock in your hands. Is that enough, or not? How to sort that out? Make estimates in advance. Make meticulous plans. Think about food supply in advance. How much is there? What is lacking? How much has to be sorted out? The solution is planting. How much early year rice to plant? How much corn to plant. How many potatoes? Make plans and ready the manpower. So then, there is nothing difficult about this, nothing that is beyond the capacity of our fundamental class. Whether you calculate the numbers in bushels or in pecks, that's alright; just make it easy for the masses to grasp.

Operating following plans like this, we are strong. The cooperatives can do it. There remains only the fear that we won't discuss it with them. How many people are in the cooperatives? Who many rice fields are there? Which rice fields are good? Which are not good? How much of a harvest has each field produced in the past? They know all of that. They are able to estimate all of that. How many hectares can one person can plow per day? They know that. When working like this, the capacity of each cooperative will increase tremendously within one year. They can accomplish the plans. They can grasp the plans. Without this direction, when we do not rely upon the masses like this, we will be unable to build the country and there will be dangers for the revolution too.

7. Correct leadership requires relying on the masses inside the Party, inside the ranks, and among the people, concentrating primarily on the experience of the people.

Cadres inside the Party and cadres outside the Party, whether they lead in the Branches or in the cooperatives, must be indoctrinated to rely upon the masses in accordance with centralized democracy. If we do not rely upon the people and just give instructions to the people, the masses will not dare express opinions. This is wrong, politically wrong and ideologically wrong, and the actual work of building the country will not be able to be done. When we rely upon the masses, we whip up the masses mightily. The forces will keep pushing upward. There will be few weak forces.

Relying on the masses does not mean carrying out democracy alone: it is carrying out centralized democracy. The people have opinions. We have opinions. Afterwards, we draw experience along with the masses again and again on what went right and what went wrong. This is very strong.

8. Correct leadership requires strengthening and expanding the stances of mastery, innovation and initiative, going on active combat offensives in constant revolutionary optimism

in all circumstances.

In order to gain mastery, there must be a high spirit of responsibility to fulfill and grasp the mission. We strive to do whatever can be done that is a gain for the revolution. Initiative is like that as well, meaning it too comes from a spirit of responsibility. When we are responsible, we are not happy; we keep thinking. When we think, the problems come to us. When the cattle have no grass, we think of that. When the people have no food supply, we think of that. The more we think, the more problems appear. When problems appear, we join with the people and we are able to resolve them.

Going on the offensive it also like that. Active combat is like that. It comes from our spirit of responsibility. Our spirit of responsibility does not lie in a state of wait. We keep thinking and the problems keep appearing, and the more we know how to join with the collective to sort them out.

Optimism is like that too. It also comes from a spirit of responsibility. When we are responsible, we keep thinking. After thinking, we join with the collective and raise the direction for the solutions. After setting the direction, we go down close to the movement. There are two aspects of the mass movement: one is the difficulties, the other is that the movement is always going forward. These two aspects are always present. So then, no matter what the difficulties are, we are revolutionarily optimistic. With revolutionary optimism, we are calm.

Tense war is also like this. When we were emerging from war, there were hardships in terms of food and medicine and clothing. We were clam. We had firm confidence that during the war, the people under the leadership of the Party would be able to fight. After emerging from war, the people are even more able to fight.

The entire Party at every echelon must have this stance of relying on the masses in the Party and outside the Party in all circumstances. Do not break and scatter. Do not be in turmoil. If the Party were to break and scatter, there would be turmoil. The people would not be calm; the troops would not be calm.

To the contrary, this optimism does not come from nothing. Calm comes only from standing upon correct analysis of both the difficulties and the easy things and how they are to be clearly sorted out.

We know that the enemy is striving to wreck our revolution. However, we are not worried. We are clam. We have clear confidence that we have the Party and we have our people who have fought the enemy before.

Previously the French were able to oppress us. This was because we did not fight. Not fighting came from the ideology of slavery, the politics of slavery. One or two of them came and we did not fight. When we did fight, they made contacts with the elite to stop the fighting. They we lost to them. The defeat was not due to a shortage of weapons or people. The defeat came from not having any politics, not having any ideology.

Now we have the Party in the lead, and our people have fought before. We are revolutionary optimistic. Clearly, there will be losses and sacrifices. However, we clearly will be able to win. We can fight any enemy.

They may say that our revolution will only last for a while, and that later it will turn to revisionism. This is the analysis of the enemy. However, we have set up the politics and readied the ideology and organization not to fall under that rule.

We did not use money; we have no salaries; the cooperatives have no private ownership; the workers have no private ownership. Aside from this, we fight politically, ideologically, and organizationally. When we strengthen and expand in this direction, we already have many preconditions. There are still difficulties. There are still remnants of private ownership: the views, the living and working habits. However, we continue to fight. We have a good model. We have a great many good preconditions. We are still strengthening our leadership ranks at every echelon.

9. Good leadership requires constant maintenance and feeding, strengthening and expanding solidarity and internal unity.

This is an old issue, but it has a new and constant importance.

With good solidarity and internal unity, we can solve any problem. To the contrary, when solidarity and internal unity is not good, the easy things obstruct the difficult, meaning it becomes even more difficult and complicated.

To have solidarity and unity, we must think about a number of issues:

1. It is imperative to incubate a feeling for responsibility on the issues of solidarity and internal unity, knowing how to be patient and how to keep on struggling as best we can for unity in order to serve the Party. With this feeling, we will not do anything that negatively impacts solidarity and unity. Thus, whether in living or working or in leading or talking, it is imperative to think of solidarity and internal unity and doing whatever we can to progress toward solidarity and internal unity. However, we will be quick to realize this, and we will immediately reform.

2. Correctly implement all the lines of the Party, the ideology of the Party, the organizational line of the Party. This is fundamental. When we go out of bounds, we help one another by refashioning one another. But the important thing is advance prevention. Educate and study in advance not to make that have to be sorted out later. So then, strive to indoctrinate in advance. When the masses absorb the political and ideological lines of the Party, they will not do anything to the contrary. Even if they do not understand them in the sense of implementation, they will not do anything contrary to them.

10. Leading well to be successively stronger and mightier only comes with concentration on both quantitatively and qualitatively building,

strengthening, and expanding the cadre ranks at every echelon that come from the ranks of the revolutionary movement of the masses inside the framework of socialist revolution and building socialism, so that they will serve the revolutionary movement of the masses in the framework of socialist revolution and building socialism in the present and in the future.

As for the situation of our Party, we see that up until today we have been able to serve the movement within our existing cadre framework at every echelon. Since our cadres at every level are close to the movement, they understand the politics, the ideology, and the organization of the Party to an important extent, and they are able to serve the movement to an extent. With cadre numbers being what they are and cadre quality being what it is, we are able to serve the movement appropriately. This is a strong point.

But our cadre numbers at every echelon are not yet sufficient; they still fall very short. As for quality, that is not yet sufficient either. Politics are not yet profound; ideology is not yet mighty and audacious. Organization is not yet firm. Some cadres are fairly suitable, but they are waiting for leadership.

Another weak point: Our cadres implement the centralized aspect more heavily than the democratic aspect of centralized democracy. District cadres are like this. Some wait for instructions from above; others do not implement centralized democracy inside their district frameworks.

We must build our cadre ranks both qualitatively and quantitatively. We have the lines and the ideology. The key factor is the cadre factor.

Build how?

It is imperative to indoctrinate views clearly on the issue of cadres inside our Party at every level.

Building measures:

1. Indoctrinate in terms of Party politics, ideology, and organization again and again by studying, by conference meetings, and by drawing experience from the movement of the right and the wrong in every field.

2. It is imperative to indoctrinate on a number of principles of Party leadership. Specifically, the nine principles above by setting aside the time to sort out and pressure on any matter in which they are deficient.

3. The most important measure is to open up and whip up implementation of centralized democracy among the masses inside the Party, among the masses inside the ranks, and among the masses in the cooperatives and unions.


Do not dim them down. To the contrary, open them up to centralized democracy.

Hold meetings and conferences to draw experience in the factories and cooperatives. They join in discussions to solve problems. They join in state power. They are wholeheartedly pleased. They keep on thinking. This is what cadre training is. Cadres will keep coming from the movement. When we are able to whip up the cadres in the cooperatives and factories, they are good and strong. The cadres of the various other levels also originate there. Furthermore, when the masses understand the issues and understand the lines, the cadres in the cooperatives and the cadres in the factories must be vigilant, for if anything is different from the lines, the masses will struggle against it. Therefore, the plowing is correct; the transplanting is correct; putting up paddy dikes is correct: everything is very strong.


We are not worried. Whenever we sow, whenever we plow, whenever we transplant, whenever we irrigate, we are not worried. The masses have mastery. In the initial period, there may be a few obstructions, but after a while they will have mastery.

But we do not whip up just democracy alone. With democracy, the enemy can penetrate and attack us. We must implement democracy, but we must have leadership.

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These are automatic pill press machines that our revolutionary hospitals in the North Zone were able to invent and build with independence and mastery.



REVOLUTIONARY FLAG