



# REVOLUTIONARY FLAG

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**ឯកសារចម្លងត្រឹមត្រូវតាមស្នងបញ្ជី**  
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**The Cadres, Party Members, People, and Troops  
Of the Revolutionary Army  
Must be in Unity With the Party in  
Assessing and Evaluating the Situation  
In Order to Fulfill The New Task  
Of Gaining Victory in Leaps**



Revolutionary experience in every era, including political violence, armed violence, national people's revolution, and democratic revolution clearly shows us that when the cadres, Party members, people, and the Revolutionary Army are in unconditional unity with the Party in properly assessing the situation, evaluating the situation, evaluating the positives and evaluating the negatives in accordance with the stances of the Party, the revolutionary movement, in spite of difficulties and serious obstacles, still moved forward to successive victories.

In many cases, a lack of faith, a lack of unity with the Party, led to a lack of happiness and crystal clearness, and tasks were not well-fulfilled, were not successful in accordance with Party objectives.

If we want to assess the situation and evaluate the situation properly in accordance with the stances of the Party, the most important thing is to have proper stances, outlooks, and ideology in looking at problems, analyzing problems, and sorting out problems.

Based upon the above objectives, we wish to make a presentation regarding developments in the economic-financial situation of the Party from March 1970 until March 1975 for use as a foundation, so that based upon this foundation the cadres, Party members, people, and the Revolutionary Army can be in monolithic unity with the Party in implementing the Party's political line of building the country in leaps of victories and great victories.

## **The Economic-Financial Situation of the Party From March 70 Until March 75**

The first objective of this assessment is to see clearly the chronology of the struggles of the Party in the economic-financial sector with the enemy, the feudalists-capitalists and their henchmen.

The second objective is to assess the situation related to production and ownership of the means of production and the class composition of the society.

### **1. The Chronology of the Party's Economic-Financial Processes from Mid-1970 until Mid 1973**

#### **1. The problems of land and agriculture**

During the period from mid-70 until mid-73, the problem of land and the problem of agriculture had the following two aspects:

1. The state took into its grasp for government the land of the traitors and those who ran to the side of the enemy. Therefore, the state governed an amount of land. This was a new aspect.

2. A second aspect was that in terms of private ownership of land in general inside the liberated zones, those that already had land maintained their private ownership. Furthermore, the state distributed land to the peasants who from the beginning had no land and the workers who from the beginning had no land. Therefore, in general, land was privately owned.

3. A third aspect was that our revolution eroded private ownership somewhat in terms of the exploitation of the feudalist land owners. For instance, on the problem of leasing land, we struggled to sort that out to an extent. Therefore, this means that we eliminated the old production contacts of the feudalist land owners to an extent inside our liberated zones. Inside type I liberated zones we eliminated many; inside type II liberated zones, a few.

**Summary:** The revolution made some changes regarding the problem of land, with the state controlling the land of the traitors and those who had run to the enemy and eliminated exploitation in terms of land to an extent. But another aspect was that private ownership in general still remained.

In accordance with these aspects, we see that in part there was progress, but in another part the old society still remained.

**The outcome:**

1. The state controlled some land. This was the good part.
2. Privatism remained in general. They still were acting as landowners.

For example: The land owners, the rich peasants, the middle peasants, the poor peasants, and the laborers to whom the state distributed land worked that land privately. All the output fell into private hands. Which private persons? The businessmen, the capitalists, and through them it fell into the hands of the enemy. Therefore, that is why at that time, our revolution found things very difficult in terms of rice and paddy. Private persons acted as the owners of the entire paddy harvest: they sold it to the businessmen. The businessmen sold it to the enemy and used the money, used the dollars, to gather up more paddy from the people. Therefore, the business and the enemy were acting as masters to the point that at times the businessmen handed out paddy as a favor to make merit from the people when our people experienced shortages. It was precisely this that pained our Party the most. The revolution was ours, the state authority was ours, the land was ours, but we did not act as owners. Why? Because the land was still privately owned. The bad outcome was that the people ran away from and abandoned labor to be hired hands transporting merchandise for businessmen.

This experience showed us that by walking this road we were not acting as masters; that is, the enemy and the business men were acting as the masters because they had dollars and they collected the paddy from the people.

**2. The problems of handicrafts and industry**

From mid-70 until mid-73, our Party, our revolution, our state, had the following policies in terms of handicrafts and industry:

1. Private persons did it [handicrafts and industry]. What was done before, go ahead and do that. What was newly expanded, go ahead and expand it.
2. What was mixed was mixed, private persons and the state joined together.
3. The state also made calculations about doing it too.

We had those policies. For what? To get the products to serve the war and serve the people's living standards. In world experience from the beginning, they had done it like that. But what was the reality? In reality, they did not do it.

Secondly, little was mixed. Almost nothing. Only our state did some. Why did they not do it? Because they did not make huge profits. We let them make a reasonable profit. We did not take taxes when they purchased things from the outside and brought them in. We sponsored buying and trading things. If someone made a normal living, if they were a patriot, they did it. But now they do not do it. We were not corrupt. In the old

society, they bribed back and forth, but they sold at any price they pleased; they made huge profits. So, they did it. But now they do not do it.

Following past world experience, it became the policy that private persons must be allowed to do it, in order to use their forces. But now, in Kampuchea, they do not do it. Now the capitalists have changed their true nature to an extent. Almost all of them became compradors. Therefore, they did not join patriotically to serve the lives of the people, to serve the war of national liberation. Like in agriculture a moment ago. Like that. They did not do production work. They thought only of collecting products, killing the revolution, killing the war of national liberation, killing the people. Therefore, it was not our intention that they not do it; but, they chose not to do it. They did not do it, for one thing, because they did not make huge profits. For another thing, they wanted to kill the revolution.

### **3. Commerce**

From mid-70 until mid-73, commerce had the following aspects:

1. The state controlled some commerce.
2. Private persons and the state joined in some commerce.
3. Private persons remained in general.

What was the outcome? The state did little and got few results. But it was not enough to serve the war of national liberation, to serve the lives of the people.

The mixed part got some results for the state. In tandem with this, private persons cheated the state. They cheated when they purchased from the people. They cheated when they purchased from the enemy and sold to the state. Therefore it was done in a mix, but it had a negative impact on the lives of the people and a negative impact on the interests of the state.

As for their part, they did as they pleased. In overseas contacts, private persons played the leading role. In contacts inside the liberated zones, they played the leading role. In commerce in general, private persons still played the leading role. They still acted as the masters: rice was up to them, salt was up to them, gasoline was up to them, cloth was up to them, and machinery was up to them. What they wanted to get into or out of was up to them. Our state was subjugated to them.

The Kratie Market was approximately the same as before. Hondas were circling back and forth. Our militiamen, pants or not, shirts or not, were walking around, meaning they were still acting as masters. As for us, we were still acting as policemen like in the Sihanouk era, the Nol era.

Therefore, this commerce could not serve the lives of the people and could not serve the war of national liberation.

It was clearly seen by mid-73 that there was no way out for us. We could not gather up the people. The businessmen were the masters. They handed out this and handed out that in terms of commercial materials to the people. If we kept going along that road, there was no way out.

#### **4. Communication and transport**

In communications, the state did it, the people did it in their families; but, in general, private persons played the leading role.

The outcome: The war and the people were not very well-served. This was because private persons played the leading role. They transported their own cargo. They transported for those who hired them. This was because there was a lot of profit. They did not transport for us in the revolution.

As for us, when we only needed their motorboats to make a crossing, it was not easy to borrow them. This point confirmed that they were not serving the war of national liberation, that they were not serving the lives of the people.

#### **5. Finance**

Our state did a little bit of finance, as did the people, in some families. But the capitalists and the major businessmen had the most money: they collected the most in order to horde merchandise.

Therefore, the businessmen acted as the masters of finance. They bought paddy as they pleased; they transported it as they pleased. As for the revolution, they gave us only 100 to 200 or 10,000 to 20,000, as if that was a terribly great amount. Therefore they did not serve the revolutionary war, and they did not serve the lives of the people.

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In summary, assessing every sector of economics and finance in mid-73, our Party saw that:

We had military state power and political state power, but we were entirely economically and financially subjugated by the businessmen. Therefore, the economic and political tasks of serving the war of national liberation and serving the lives of the people were insufficient. To the contrary, if we continued in this fashion there was a danger that the businessmen would become our bosses, the bosses of the army, the bosses of the revolution, and the bosses of the people. Therefore, the politics would go their way.

Therefore, in terms of the measures from mid-70 until mid-73, we imagined that the revolution was well-off, but in fact, it had only reformed a little bit; it had not changed its true economic and financial nature. One part of our state power was different than the previous state power; but another part, the society, was still the old society. If we continued on like that, it would have been dangerous for gathering the forces of the people, dangerous for the war of national liberation.

During that period, they people were not warm toward us. This was a bad point for the revolution. Another bad point was there was not very much conflict with the capitalists. They bragged that after only one or two years of war, they had bought motorboats to hand out to each of their children. If the war lasted five to ten more years, they would be vastly rich. So they were happy with themselves. If we looked in terms of appearance, we saw it was very easy to manage everything, “the broad front.” The problem of bandits had not yet come up; neither had the problem of pacifist agents.

But our Party made an assessment and saw that going down this road was dangerous. Therefore, there had to be a solution. In 72, the initial-step measures were taken. In 73, the measures became firmer.

## **2. The Economic-Financial Chronology of the Party From Mid-73 Until Early 75**

During this period, we did not reform like before, meaning we carried out **absolute democratic revolution**. Made absolute democratic revolution for what? To be able to serve the war of national liberation, to be able to serve the livelihood of the people.

### **An assessment by sector:**

#### **1. The problems of land and agriculture**

During this period, there were two aspects:

1. We fundamentally eliminated exploitive production contacts. In type I liberated zones, they were totally eliminated. In the type II liberated zones, in general, they were fundamentally eliminated. The businessmen and pawnbrokers were totally gone.

2. We set up a process of gradual cooperativization in type I liberated zones in quick steps and in type II liberated zones it was in slower steps that in type I liberated zones, but we made progress in eliminating private ownership of land and means of production, and in general we put cooperative ownership in place.

**The outcome:**

1. Agricultural products, in particular the paddy harvest, was in the hands of the revolution. The businessmen and capitalists died. They were no longer acting as the masters of the people. The revolution acted as the master, along with the people.

2. Allocation of the forces of the people was good. Serving the forward battlefield was good. Serving the rear battlefield was good, different than it had been previously. Previously it had been very shaky. Now, since each battlefield was able to arrange its own forces, it is able to sort out the family livelihoods of its combatants and cadres.

3. Production was well whipped up: dams, feeder canals, dry season rice, rainy season rice, and various others crops.

4. Government agents, spies, and pacifist agents were eliminated.

Therefore, it was seen that making democratic revolution after mid-73 produced concrete results: it served the war of national liberation and served the lives of the people. The people were very pleased, and they worked unceasingly at the forward battlefields and in the rear battlefields. Thus, they were very warm. But how about the businessmen? They cursed us horribly. They reacted with bandits, spies, and pacifist agents. They organized these groups, but they were unable to make that work.

**2. The problems of handicrafts and industry**

We had the policy of letting them do it [handicrafts and industry] privately, but they did not do it. Only our state did it. But in a state of war, our potential was limited in terms of tools and raw materials. Therefore we could only do it to a certain extent.

In the state of total liberation of the country, we had the full preconditions.

**3. Commerce**

We had total control of the state. Initially we got control of commerce in terms of the five strategic materials: rice, salt, oil, cloth, and gasoline. Gradually we got a larger grasp on commerce, and the petty merchants were gone. Only pure state commerce remained.

**The outcome:**

We were able to serve the revolutionary war, able to serve the lives of the people, this despite the fact that there were minor shortages. If left as it had been previously, it would have become a major danger; there would have been not just minor shortages of this or that, but a crash. State commerce was fundamentally sorted out. The people were



happy. The troops were happy. But the businessmen were not happy. They were out of smiles for us. We were not subjugated to them. Previously they were playful toward us. Now we have them do production labor just like everyone else. As for them, their reaction has not been strong, because the people are pleased with the revolution and the troops are pleased with the revolution.

#### **4. Communication**

The state has total control of major communication. In this matter of communication, we have not been authoritarian to eliminate private persons, but they disappeared on their own: they are totally gone. They had no gasoline. They sold their trucks, sold their motorboats, and sold their tractors to the state.

#### **5. Finance**

Beginning in mid-73 we took gradual financial measures.

We gradually reduced the use of the enemy riel currency. In tandem with this, we made preparations to use our own new riel currency with the policy of putting an end to the use of the enemy riel currency. By the end of 74 we had basically stopped using it.

#### **The outcome:**

The businessmen and those who had enemy riels do not act as masters. The people are the masters. The state is the master. When the enemy currency is no longer in use, the people are even more so the masters and the state is the master.

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This is the true, concrete situation of the economy and finance of the Party. It is an economy and finance that has changed with the content of the revolution. And this economy and finance has served the war of national liberation and served the people very well. A re-assessment shows that if it were not for the democratic revolution, clearly national people's liberation would not have totally succeeded on 17 April 75. The people would have scattered. The line of democratic revolution came from the concrete movement. It followed the rules of our national people's movement. It did not violate the rules of the national people's movement. It was in concert with the national people's revolutionary movement. Therefore, the national people's revolution was strong. Therefore, we had great faith in our line of democratic revolution.

### **3. The Changing State of Current Kampuchean Society**

We implemented the line of democratic revolution from 1970 until 1975. We caused Kampuchean society to change very profoundly. We wish to raise a number of matters for examination as follows:

## **1. The matter of paddy-land reform inside our revolution**

Paddy land reform is gathering land, confiscating land from traitors and from landowners, and placing it in the hands of the revolution to eliminate the exploitation committed by the feudalists in the countryside by their exchanging labor, pawn-brokering, and buying cheap and selling high.

How have we implemented this matter inside our country?

We had no laws or rules. We did it all. There are no more landowners. Exploitation by landowners in the countryside is gone.

Paddy land reform was not done during any one single period. We finished it without some people even realizing it, meaning there were no major obstacles because paddy land reform was done by confiscating land from the owners and giving it to private peasants. Now all land is under collective ownership.

Now this period of paddy land reform has passed, and the land is in the ownership of the state and the cooperatives. Therefore we easily passed through this period of paddy-land reform.

## **2. Regarding the people's democratic regime**

What is called people's democracy has the following nature:

The state sector controls the economy to an extent.

- The cooperatives control the economy to an extent.
- Private persons: private capitalists, minor private producers, peasants
- A mix of state and private persons

Therefore, this means that in a people's democratic regime there are still many private persons.

Where have we arrived now? The form of economics and finance in our society is:

- State ownership and cooperative ownership plays a role that covers everything. Private ownership is subjugated to these two forms of collective ownership. Therefore, our regime has already gone beyond people's democracy. If we speak of economic production, it is not yet socialist. But, if we speak of ownership regime, it is already socialist.

### 3. An Examination of the Various Types of Ownership In Current Kampuchean Society

We see the following types of ownership:

1. Ownership of the revolutionary state: This is the joint ownership of the people in general.

2. Cooperative ownership: This is the collective ownership of the collective masses inside the cooperatives.

Both these forms of ownership play most important roles in current Kampuchean society. They are very powerful.

3. Types of private ownership: For instance, in some agriculture and some handicrafts private persons do not play an important role. They have been subjugated to state ownership and collective cooperative ownership. And they are not concentrated: they are scattered. They have no forces. Therefore, they have no power to oppose. Since we do not allow them the opportunity to strengthen and expand, they will dissolve without fail. If we had left them in Phnom Penh, they would have had strong power. In the countryside we had power over private persons; but when we entered Phnom Penh we subjugated them; we did not leave them in Phnom Penh. So then, in terms of private ownership, they have no power.

4. The issue of class composition in current Kampuchean society

- The feudalist class has been attacked and overthrown in terms of economic fundamentals and political regime.

- The capitalist class has also been attacked and overthrown both in terms of economic fundamentals and political regime.

- The petty bourgeoisie, the government officials, the intellectuals, or the petty bourgeois minor merchants -- Previously this class relied upon the feudalists and the capitalists or the colonialists. Now the colonialists and imperialists have been overthrown, the landowners and feudalists have been overthrown, the capitalists have been overthrown, and the petty bourgeoisie has no one to rely upon. Therefore, they are subjugated to the state power of the worker-peasants, and they have been transformed into laborers, just like the peasants. Individual landowners and individual capitalists have to go do production labor. All of these persons are the new peasants who came from the petty bourgeoisie, the feudalists, and the capitalists. Their class has been overthrown. Their economic foundations have been overthrown, **but their outlook and their**

desires remain the same. Therefore, they continue to be in conflict with the revolution. But, whether they can carry out activities or not, that is the concrete situation in which we continue to carry out revolution.

In summary:

1. We see that the old exploitive contacts of the feudalists and the capitalists have been overthrown. We are setting up and organizing new and non-exploitive production contacts with mastery and equality and mutual support of the laboring masses. Therefore the large mountainous obstacle of the feudalists and landowners and the large mountainous obstacle of the capitalists have been overthrown in tandem with the large mountainous obstacle of the imperialists. Therefore, we see that the path we are walking is flat and our gait is quick and fast.

2. The collective ownership of the state and the cooperatives plays the most important role. It has power over private ownership, and private ownership has been subjugated to collective ownership. Therefore, the state and the cooperatives are going fast, shoulder-to-shoulder, and there are no substantial obstacles. So, it is fast.

The conditions of our new society are hugely favorable for us. Despite the fact that the imperialists still create more obstacles for us, the feudalists and capitalists have already been overthrown. When we glance back, we see that our people, our Party, and our army, are phenomenal, magnificent. Not just phenomenal in attacking the American imperialists, but phenomenal in attacking the feudalists and capitalists and attacking them so that no one will ever be frightened of them again.

When all of the cadres, Party members, people, and our Revolutionary Army are in unity with the Party like this, they are truly a mighty and magnificent force for successfully fulfilling the missions of defending the country and building the country in great leaps of absolute victory moving toward a bright, glorious future.

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## **Long Live the Magnificent Revolutionary Army Of the Communist Party of Kampuchea!**



On 22 July 1975 on the occasion of the ceremony of the Communist Party of Kampuchea Center (មជ្ឈមណ្ឌលកុម្មុយនីសកម្ពុជា) to establish the Revolutionary Army (កងទ័ពជំរុញ), the comrade chairman of the High-Level Military Committee (គណៈកម្មាធិការយោធាជាន់ខ្ពស់) of the Party convened an important political conference of the Communist Party of Kampuchea Center for approximately 3,000 representatives of every unit of the Revolutionary Army.

The complete content of this important conference was as follows:

1. The meaning of the great historical victory of our nation, people, army, and Party
2. A brief history of our Revolutionary Army
3. The reasons for the great victory of our Revolutionary Army
4. The new missions of our Revolutionary Army

### **I. The Meaning of the Great Historical Victory of Our Revolutionary Army that Totally Liberated Phnom Penh, Totally Liberated the Country and Nation of Kampuchea, and Totally Liberated the Kampuchean People**

After strenuous, difficult, pitiful, and winding struggles of many decades, in particular during the recent 5 year revolutionary war to liberate the nation, we achieved the greatest victory in our history on 17 April 1975. This great victory has a huge and

magnificent meaning and is very special, very pure, like none other throughout our two thousand year history.

## The first huge and magnificent meaning

During our more than two thousand year history, we had never liberated our country and made it totally independent like it is now. Now we have liberated the country and our people and have made them totally independent from the yoke of all the feudalists-colonialists, both old and new. We have not just liberated the country. We have liberated the people too, especially the poor and lower-middle worker-peasant people and the various other laborers. We have totally, absolutely, and extremely purely liberated our nation and people. The Kampuchean people under the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea seized **total** victory, meaning the political, economic, cultural, social, ideological liberation of the entire nation and people. We took this total victory **absolutely**, meaning we were victorious by constantly being on the offensive attacking with no compromise and with no negotiations whatsoever. We seized this total victory **absolutely** and **purely**, meaning without any confused involvement with any other countries.

## The second huge and magnificent meaning

This historical victory of ours casts a huge influence upon the people of the world. Since the end of World War II (1939-1945) nearly thirty years ago, no people have liberated their country or liberated themselves totally, absolutely, and purely like our Kampuchean people, our Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea, our Kampuchean Revolution, and our Communist Party of Kampuchea. That is, during the past nearly thirty years, throughout the entire world, only the Kampuchean nation, the Kampuchean people, the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea, and the Communist Party of Kampuchea have liberated their own nation and people totally, absolutely, and purely this way.

This is a magnificent model that the peoples of the world extremely respect and admire, in the sense that we have liberated our nation, our people, totally, and in the sense that our country is small, our people are few and face shortages of all kinds, and we struggle based on a stance different from that of world revolution. World revolution struggles with all kinds of vast sponsorship, material and economic-financial, from the peoples of the world. As for us, we carried out revolutionary struggle fundamentally based on the stance of independence/mastery and self-reliance. So then, the peoples of the world are in extreme admiration of us because they never imagined that the Kampuchean people and the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea could seize a great, historical, magnificent victory like this.

The world constantly and closely monitored our revolutionary war under the leadership of our Party. However, they never imagined that the Kampuchean revolution could drive out the American imperialists, because our country is small, are people are

few, we face shortages of every kind, and our army is new too. Furthermore, in the entire world, since revolutionary war has existed and since the birth of the American imperialists, no country has ever, no people has ever, no army has ever, driven them all out and seized total victory like this. Never!

But the international world is still paying attention to and monitoring our struggle movement every single hour of every single day. On 12 April 1975 the American imperialists were attacked and made to flee from Kampuchea. As I recall, on 12 April, the American imperialists sent more than 50 helicopters to pull out their people. The American imperialists fled from Kampuchea in a state of panic and misery, their troops broken. This shows that they were afraid of the Kampuchean people and our vast Revolutionary Army. The events of the American imperialists fleeing from Kampuchea have been made into films which have been broadcast throughout the world. Thus, the American imperialist fled in the morning, and that evening the peoples of the world saw it all. The events of 12 April were great events that made it clear for the peoples of the world to see that while Kampuchea is small and the Kampuchean people are few, they bravely attacked the American imperialists to make them to flee in shame from Kampuchea.

This is what is called the huge and phenomenal meaning of our great victory on the international stage, because in the past world history of revolutionary warfare there was never any event like this. Therefore, this is why the world takes the great victory of our people and our Revolutionary Army as a model for the international communist movement! A model for the world revolutionary movement! As a model for the oppressed peoples of the world! As a model for newly-liberated countries! And as a model for the worker-peasant class and the various other classes who are being oppressed throughout the world. This is what makes us proud. We are very pleased and are extremely excited for our people, for our Revolutionary Army, for the magnificent cadres and the male and female combatants who are being praised by the peoples of the world near and far on all five continents of the world.

Recently, delegations of the Central Committee of our Communist Party of Kampuchea departed on trips to a number of friendly countries. Through these trips, we demonstrated the great and phenomenal victory of our people and our Revolutionary Army. Also through these trips, brother and sister communist parties, friendly parties near and far, the people, the worker classes, and the revolutionaries of the world sent back word to our people and to our Revolutionary Army including cadres and male and female combatants of their praise and their warmest and closest revolutionary respect!

This is the huge meaning of our great historic victory.

Summarized in a word, the great victory of our people and our Revolutionary Army under the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea has become an especially valuable model for the peoples of the world, for the world revisionary movement, and for the international communist movement.

Therefore, our brave Kampuchean people and our brave Revolutionary Army have recorded in their own fresh blood - not in gold ink – a magnificent page in Kampuchean history! And not just a page in their own Kampuchean history, but our people and our Revolutionary Army have recorded an extremely special page in the history of the entire world. My saying this is not an exaggeration in the least. It is an understatement of the extent of the model of our people and our Revolutionary Army which the world holds in supreme admiration. They praise, they are in awe, that a small country, a small people, a new army, without any supplies at all, took a stance of total self-reliance and seized this great phenomenal victory. This came from our people being phenomenal! From our Revolutionary Army being phenomenal! From the revolution being phenomenal! From the Party being correct and phenomenal!

It was our Revolutionary Army that seized this great phenomenal victory. This army has a bright historical record.

## **II. The History of the Building of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea Under the Leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea**

Our Revolutionary Army was born of the strategic political line of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, which states in one clause that: “The enemy uses violence. They use acts of political and military cruelty as weapons to oppress, to kill, to wreck and destroy the people. Therefore, the Party must lead the people in the use of violence, in the use of acts to repay in blood, whether politically or militarily.” This means that the Party must use revolutionary violence and must assemble the people to use revolutionary violence to oppose the reactionaries and the oppressor classes and to oppose the colonialists and imperialists. For self-defense and self-liberation it is imperative to use violence, whether political violence or armed violence. It is imperative that the people be armed, that is, there must be an army.

Another clause of our line clearly states this. This line has been correct since the beginning. This is why we subsequently set up and organized our Revolutionary Army.

The strategic and tactical lines of the Communist Party of Kampuchea were clearly and fundamentally correctly drawn-up in 1960 during the First Party General Assembly (even though it is true that our Party was created in 1951).

Since our Party line was clear in this way, our cadres working in the various rural base areas in every Zone, like the cadres working in the various cities such as Phnom Penh, gradually set up and organized our Revolutionary Army. What was the name of our Revolutionary Army at that time? At that time, we were in an oppressive feudal, neo-colonialist regime. Therefore, we could not use the name “Revolutionary Army” or “Kampuchean People’s National Liberation Armed Forces.” We chose a name



appropriate to those circumstances. There were many names, but one name that I still remember was “Secret Defense Unit” (កងការពារសំងាត់).

Secret Defense Units were organized at every location among the people. The peasants, the workers, the laborers, and the students that were armed, whether they bore arms legally or illegally, were the Secret Defense Unit of the Party.

What mission did they have? The mission of the Secret Defense Unit was to defend the revolution’s base areas, to defend the revolution’s people, to defend the cadres moving around working, and to defend the assemblies and the various meetings, and in tandem with this, to covertly smash the enemy, the government agents and the various reactionaries in order to defend the Party, the revolution, and the people.

The Party’s Secret Defense Unit gradually grew, but it did not expand in a straight path, meaning it expanded in a winding path, in many fits and starts. Everywhere our comrades were arrested by the enemy, were put in chains and imprisoned, and many were killed. The victims sacrificed their lives, and those who survived continued their mission, kept on getting stronger and expanding their ranks non-stop under the leadership of the Party.

Therefore, our Secret Defense Unit kept on making progress everywhere, every single year. In 1960, 61, 62, 63, 64, it constantly made progress with us building it by ourselves and also with us entering to control the “militias” (កងជំរំពល) and the “volunteer units” (កងអាសាស្ត្រ) of the oppressor classes during that era. That is, we assembled armed forces to use violence. Because of this, when our messengers and our cadres moved about to work here and there, whether in the countryside or in the cities, they were safeguarded because we had the Secret Defense Unit and legal bodyguards. The legal bodyguards were the Secret Defense Unit who took the form of the enemy. Therefore, we were able to carry out activities. We were able to strengthen and expand the Party. We were able to strengthen and expand the people’s base areas, the revolution’s base areas. Our movement kept on prospering everywhere. Therefore, many cadres were tortured and sacrificed their lives, but the cadres who survived continued their non-stop activities to strengthen and expand our defense units until 1967, when the forces had grown to a general extent. In 1967, the revolutionary movement in general was growing, the Party was growing, and the defense units were growing everywhere. Our defense units were growing everywhere because they were born from the people, in particular from the peasant people in the countryside who were the male and female combatants. Therefore our army was subsequently born by implementing the line of revolutionary violence, the line that said it was imperative to have weapons, that it was imperative to have a Revolutionary Army, in order to defend the people, to defend the revolution, and to go on the offensive to counter-attack the enemy.

By 1967, the Secret Defense Units everywhere had grown and the conflict between the oppressor classes - the feudalists, the capitalists, the subjugates of the

American imperialists - and the people grew very sharp. They seriously oppressed the people; in particular, they exploited them in terms of land. Our people rose up and struggled everywhere. Revolutionary people were at a mighty boil everywhere. Our peasant people rose up to struggle by using political violence (demonstrating, striking, making motions, and counter-attacking using knives and hatchets of all kinds). In tandem with this, in Battambang Province during March-April 1967, gunfire broke out as a result of both the conflicts throughout the country and local high-level conflicts. But at that time the Party forbid and postponed this in order to make an assessment and draw experience from the state of the conflict and the potential for the use of weapons. Upon examination, it was seen that we had the forces of the people to carry out political struggle and we had defense units that could carry out armed struggle. Through these events the Party determined that it was imperative to fight both politically and with weapons. Thus, it was imperative to transform the defense units at every location into guerilla units, into small- or medium-size guerrilla units.

The guerilla units were set up, and it was not even a year before war exploded in 1968, because the conflict was sharp and at a high level, and political struggle alone was not guaranteed, so it was imperative to have armed struggle too. Therefore, the Party's Secret Defense Units had already transformed into armed guerilla units (the weapons were taken from the enemy), and those guerilla units transformed into our initial revolutionary Army and attacked the enemy in 1968. We waged this armed struggle in seventeen of the nineteen provinces that existed at that time. The fighting was very widespread; only two provinces remained in which we were not fighting. We were able to made widespread attacks like this because we had the guerilla units that the Party had built generally and those guerilla units had additional fighting capabilities.

In combat, there are defeats and there are victories: this is normal. You military comrades all already know this. During 1968 we fundamentally won the fighting with the enemy, won in the sense that our guerilla units began to fight and were able to defend forces, strengthen forces, expand forces, expand their territory, liberate the people, and build and strengthen and expand our guerilla areas ever more broadly.

At that time all the traitor military commanders, LON Nol, Chou-Long, and SAK Sutsakhân, with the leadership assistance of American imperialist military advisors, personally came to attack us at every location, but they were unable to attack our people, attack our revolutionary Army, attack our guerilla units.

Where did our Revolutionary Army get the weapons to arm itself?

- We seized the weapons from the enemy; we made them by ourselves; we repaired them ourselves, under the leadership of the Party. In some locations there were very few weapons. Some locations had quite a lot of weapons. But in general we had very few weapons. This shows that in the past the Party had built the army based upon a tradition of fundamental self-reliance.

Sometimes, some persons were not pleased with us. The imperialists and capitalists were already displeased with us! This is normal, because we were making revolution to overthrow them and we attacked them as a revolution. They were not pleased with us, and they helped support the feudalists holding power in every way, with military supplies, politically, with diplomatic activity, to attack our revolution, to attack our army.

We fought in difficult conditions, facing shortages of supplies both economically and in terms of morale. But our Party determined that with or without the support of others, there was no problem. The Party determined that the enemy was attacking us, and that if we did not attack them in return, whether politically or with weapons, we would be unable to protect our revolution and people, we would not be able to strengthen and expand our revolutionary Army, and we would not be able to strengthen and expand our revolution. In reality, we had had that understanding from the very beginning. We did not just have a theoretical understanding. So then, this line had been very correct, the building of our guerilla units had been very correct. Our military line had been correct. We had built the military with self-reliance, relying upon our people. We were able to fight.

On this, I want to clarify the line of self-reliance. Our line was very correct because it was based upon the actual situation of conflict between us and the enemy inside Kampuchean society. How was this to be solved? It had to be solved by armed struggle. If solved through political struggle alone, the enemy would have smashed our revolutionary forces. They would have smashed our Revolutionary Army. It was exactly this point that some countries did not understand. They did not understand, and they compromised with the oppressor classes. As for us, we took the stance of revolution. We stood upon the actual situation of our national society. We resolved it by armed struggle. We were able to protect our forces, defend our people, strengthen and defend our revolutionary ranks, and the ranks of our Revolutionary Army grew more.

Therefore, in 1968, we attacked in seventeen of the nineteen provinces. By 1969, we attacked throughout the country. It was just a matter of in some locations there was major fighting, in some it was moderate, and in some it was small scale. We even fought in Phnom Penh, because we had our Secret Defense Units. There was gunfire, pistols were fired, grenades were fired, mines were emplaced, and there was even machinegun fire. Therefore, at that time the revolutionary war movement grew by way of the correct lines of the Party, meaning, **the line of revolutionary violence and the line of independence/mastery and self-reliance.**

I wish to remind you of some examples that show that during that era some people were mocking us strongly. They said, “What army? If there are no guns, no ammunition, like this!” “What kind of war is it, when there is not a single medic like this! Where does the money come from? No!” Ask for this, and no! Ask for that, and no! No on everything! No on everything! But we made war! On this, I want to make it clear that we waged war with our bare hands. There were just the people. Our Revolutionary Army

relied upon the people, and the people were the poor base area people living hand-to-mouth. This is because revolutionary war comes from the forests, the mountains, and the countryside where people live hand-to-mouth, places that have only poor people who face shortages of every kind, even shortages of food. Therefore, we were able to determine that our Revolutionary Army fought and won in 1968 and 1969 and constantly kept growing larger.

In every Zone we had our fall-back bases. We strengthened and expanded our fall-back bases in terms of people, in terms of economy, in terms of increasing production, in terms of the Revolutionary Army, and in terms of revolutionary state power. Beginning in 1969 we much increased these preconditions with our bare hands.

Therefore, the line or the opinion that wanted to confuse us, to induce us to depart from the line of revolutionary struggle using violence, could not pry us away. We kept on constantly driving forward, doing it ourselves along with the people, with our guerilla units, and with our Revolutionary Army under the untiring leadership of the Party until we had strengthened and expanded our revolutionary bases in every way.

The preconditions for an army were already there. As I recall, in 1969, in some locations, in the major Zones, there were already companies, many units, platoons, squads, teams. Other locations had just platoons, squads, and teams. However, those forces were the ranks of a Revolutionary Army! They had fighting capability too! We fought the LON Nol traitors. We knew them well; we knew them politically, militarily, strategically, tactically, and we fought them and won even though we were bare-handed. This shows the capability of our army. In 1969 those were the preconditions we had.

By 1970, there was a reactionary coup. This coup was still the LON Nol traitors. They did it as a reflex action by the American imperialists. When the coup exploded, the preconditions in the country favored us, and the preconditions outside the country also favored us. Our Revolutionary Army grew and prospered immediately in great leaps. We had already organized battalions, and subsequently we organized regiments on up to today's divisions.

In 1970, there were problems that were major obstacles that I wish to tell you about. We had to fight both the American imperialists and their servants, the Prey Nokor traitors and the traitors in Phnom Penh. This was a major battlefield that required a large army to fight and win.

In this complicated situation, our Party, our people, and our Revolutionary Army, were able to find a way out easily by building our Revolutionary Army with independence/mastery and self-reliance into the pure Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea without any vague stances vis-à-vis reliance upon any foreign country. This came from the solid line of the Party based upon a stance of fundamental self-reliance: regardless of the attitude of the world, we did it by ourselves. And we were able to do it, to make it into a mighty revolutionary army. It was precisely this that makes the world stand in awe of us. This Revolutionary Army did not study in military colleges or go overseas to study.

This army studied during warfare, during combat, under the Party line; it studied its own highest heroism.

There were many complications in 1970. In 1971 there were more complications, but we organized our Revolutionary Army very beautifully: its ideology was beautiful; its politics were beautiful; and its organization was beautiful too. So then, this army prospered from 1970, 71, 72, 73, all the way up until today.

Another matter which I want to make clear is that immediately after the coup in 1970, the leadership organization in the various Zones found it very difficult to communicate with one another. But it was imperative to have meetings of the Central Committee of the Party to assess the situation after the coup and bring up the measures of waging war and estimate how the war would go. Would we win or lose? Could we get through it, or not? At that time our Revolutionary Army had only recently reached company-level, and some locations had only recently set up battalions. However, the Party's analysis was that the enemy situation had the American imperialists and the Thiêu group, but their core forces were the traitors in Kampuchea, meaning the contemptible Nol's group. As for the contemptible Nol's group, we knew them already, and we knew the contemptible Nol's army. We knew the contemptible Nol himself. We knew his military commanders. We knew Nol's politics. We knew the capabilities of the Nol group. In comparison, we were fully capable. We had the military capability, because in reality we had already fought them. We had the political capacity. We had the economic capacity. We had capabilities inside and outside the country. As for the enemy, he was isolated. The Party estimated that there were two possibilities for this war:

1. We might win quickly. Our Revolutionary Army might expand quickly and be able to attack them and win quickly. We estimated that this would take, three, four, or five years. The potential of a quick win was great.

2. But there was another possibility. The enemy had many tricks. Therefore, it was imperative to prepare the ideological outlook of waging long-term war. However, the potential of a quick win was great.

Seeing these two possibilities, the Party in its position of being on the offensive had to strive to overcome and seize the first possibility. Therefore, we strove to increase our subjective circumstances by ourselves at maximum speed in order to go on the offensive against the enemy at all times, to not let them breathe, so that we could seize a quick victory. This came from our outlook and stance of correctly analyzing both the enemy's situation and our own. The enemy was still the same old enemy. When we were bare-handed, we had been able to fight them. When our forces are strong like this, are we unable to fight them? We will fight and be even more likely to win. Therefore, there remained just readying the forces, readying the military lines, the correct the tactical and strategic combat lines, and get ready to strengthen and expand the army correctly and quickly in order to fight and win. We saw that the Party's estimate was correct to the maximum. This is because we had analyzed the situation correctly. We had taken the proper measures. We had readied and organized the forces correctly. This is why we were

able to seize victory quickly like that. The world never imagined this. As for us, we estimated it would take three, four, or five years. Our estimate was very correct because we made comparisons of the forces in every aspect. Despite the fact that at the time militarily we were few and there were more than 40,000 of the enemy, and including the royal police, there were more than 60,000 of them. This was the army. As for the militia and the village defense forces, there were many more tens of thousands, many hundreds of thousands. As for us, we had at the most companies, but after several months of fighting and sweeping them away, the enemy was smashed. We were mighty, militarily mighty and politically mighty, both inside and outside the country.

Therefore, we see that our Revolutionary Army was very quickly built. By 1973, there came the Paris Agreements regarding Vietnam and the agreement in Laos. So the American imperialists who in the past had fought on three battlefields now assembled their forces to fight on just one battlefield, Kampuchea. The peoples of the world estimated that the Kampuchean people would certainly be “flattened,” because as they saw it from afar, the Kampuchean people were tiny: they were tiny and they fought without negotiating, without compromising, without hesitating or retreating. The contemptible Kissinger made the threat, “After the Paris Agreements, if the Kampuchean people do not compromise, if they do not negotiate, we will use B-52s to smash Kampuchea within 72 hours, three days and three nights.” But our Party, our people, our Revolutionary Army were unafraid because for national honor, for national independence, we had to fight on. On this, the world estimated that if Kampuchea fought on alone and the battlefield was concentrated only in Kampuchea like this, the war in Kampuchea would go on even longer because they estimated that we did not have the strength. Their estimate was wrong. Our Party, our people, our Revolutionary Army firmly believed that we would win, and as I recall, the Party determined that in late 1973 we had to go on a general offensive. That was fighting alone on the Kampuchean battlefield, going on a general offensive, constantly attacking and not allowing the enemy to step back. We estimated that we would prepare the decisive offensive for the 73-74 dry season. If we were unable to make the decisive attack during the 73-74 dry season, we would create the preconditions for a decisive attack during the 74-75 dry season.

By 1974, we attacked. We attacked, and then we drew experience from our offensive during the 73-74 dry season, and in mid-1974 we decided that we would absolutely attack and cut off Phnom Penh and the entire country during the 74-75 dry season. Not one person in the world believed us. They said that attacking Phnom Penh was not easy, that attacking the American imperialists was not easy with shortages of ammunition for the guns like this. Not a single person imagined it. But as for us, we prepared all the preconditions to attack. We prepared our Revolutionary Army. Our main forces that attacked Phnom Penh in mid-74 had just several divisions. Four, five, or six divisions. But to attack and cut-off Phnom Penh and the entire country required many divisions. Therefore we had to double, to triple. We had to have 12, 13, or 14 divisions to attack Phnom Penh, to attack in accordance with our Party’s line, meaning to take the Mekong River battlefield as the key to attacking and cutting off Phnom Penh and the area

surrounding Phnom Penh and to attack the various provincial towns in combination. This line was very correct, and the estimates of our Party were very correct.

On 17 April 1975, we achieved the mission of totally liberating Phnom Penh and the entire country. Our army achieved this mission in a phenomenal victory never before seen in the world. Therefore, when Kampuchea won, phenomenal admiration came from everywhere in the world. The win came from the people being phenomenal! The win came from the Revolutionary Army being phenomenal! The win came from phenomenal Party leadership! Said in ordinary language, the win came from the assistance of the gods, because this was beyond huge. However, in fact, our victory was just as had been determined by the Party: we did not win by accident. Nor did we win with the aid of any objective circumstances. We won because we, the troops, the people, the Party, the forward battlefield, the rear battlefield inside and outside the country, made very thorough ideological, political, and organizational preparations: very systematic and very thorough.

This is a brief history of our Revolutionary Army. Now this army is very mighty. Foreign visitors who have travelled to our country, in spite of seeing whatever deficiencies there may be in our dress, greatly admire us. The world greatly respects and admires us despite our material shortages because our great victory is a major marker in the history of Kampuchea and a major marker in world history! And we made this major marker in a contest with the American imperialists, the largest and the most vicious and cruel imperialists in the world.

### **III. The Reasons for the Great Victory of Our Revolutionary Army**

#### **1. The first reason**

The first reason that led our army to grow and prosper and become able to get this great victory like none ever seen in the world:

This came from the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea: correct political, ideological and organizational leadership that was very effective. This is the Party leadership factor. The Party indoctrinated the army in the political lines. The army absorbed them. The Party indoctrinated the army in ideological stances. The army absorbed them. The army -- the main force units, the Sector units, the guerilla units -- absorbed the organizational lines in which the Party indoctrinated them. All three categories of the army received indoctrination by the Party all the time.

Thus, this arose from political stances, ideological stances, and organizational stances. Our Party had correct political stances, ideological stances, and organizational stances. This is why it was able to lead the Revolutionary Army and the people to fight and win this phenomenal victory.

## 2. The second reason

That led us to be able to seize this great victory came from our having phenomenally brave people. Speaking materialistically, our people were poverty-stricken. But the people were phenomenally brave both at the forward and the rear battlefields and in providing their children and grandchildren, their spouses, and their parents, letting them join all three categories of the army. In tandem with this, they provided everything to the forward battlefield and they also went all-out to increase production of every kind in the rear battlefields. The people were phenomenal because in a state of poverty and difficulty and all kinds of shortages, the people waged war and also supported the war in a huge way. If it were not for the people being so brave like this, we would not have been able to seize such a major great victory.

The people were a people already enlightened to a high level in terms of revolutionary ideology and in particular were a people already organized into cooperatives. These cooperatives were an organizational line that was very effective from 73-74 up until 75. These cooperatives were a very important factor that led us to be able to seize this victory. The cooperatives supplied the troops, supplied the male and female combatants, supplied the labor force to increase production, and supplied foodstuffs of all kinds. Therefore, the strategic political meaning of the cooperatives played a very important role among our people. By having the people but without having the cooperatives, there would not have been the forces to support the front and there would not have been the forces to increase production in the rear like this.

This shows that the victory of our army cannot be separated from the correct leadership of our Party and cannot be separated from the support of our base area people.

## 3. The third reason

This is a contributing reason, meaning the Party had the correct economic line of increasing production in order to supply food to the forward battlefield and the rear battlefield. We were not fully-equipped, but we were able to sort things out and support ourselves, including the army, the people, the forward battlefield, and the rear battlefield.

Thus, the line of increasing production to supply food to the forward and rear battlefields was an important factor in our victory that must be understood in order to be taken as experience for the future.

## 4. The fourth reason

Another factor in this victory of ours that we must not forget, even though it was a contributing factor, is the support from the world, the spiritual, the political, the



diplomatic support, and some material support. The material aid was very sparse, but they helped spiritually, politically, and diplomatically.

This factor was not a decisive one, but it did play an important role.

Here I wish to make it clear that our great victory was a joint great victory. It was the great victory of the army, because the army played the greatest role, was the bravest and fought to the highest level. However, the army had the Party in the lead. The army had the people as its foundation, its mighty force. The army had an economy supplying it. And in tandem with this, the army had world support. All of this contributed, and it turned into a our great, phenomenal victory.

Therefore, we must see this great victory clearly; we must study the experience of this victory and must maintain the traditions of our Revolutionary Army from its creation up until the present. And we must strengthen and expand these experiences and traditions to make them even mightier and not allow them to fade. Only when we stand upon these experiences, only when we stand upon these traditions, can our army become even mightier and seize even more new victories in the missions which it must have in the future.

Now, we have already finished the phenomenally huge mission of liberating our nation and people on 17 April. However, new missions for our Revolutionary Army appear.

#### **IV. The New Missions of Our Revolutionary Army**

The missions of our Revolutionary Army, that is, the missions that the Party has assigned, are two:

- to defend the country, and
- to build the country

These are the two major missions that the Party has raised. These missions are connected because only when the country is defended can the country be quickly built, and only then can the country be well-defended.

These two major missions of the Party are the joint affairs of the entire Party, of the entire people, and of the entire Revolutionary Army. What are the concrete implementation meanings of both of these new missions of ours?

## The first mission

The primary mission of the army is to defend the country. Why must the country be defended, when our country has already been completely liberated? When we have already driven away and scattered all the imperialists? No one will ever dare come again! The problem is not like this. We have already liberated the country, but a war situation still rears its head, because in the world, imperialism and colonialism, both new and old, still exist. They carry out all kinds of activities all the time to wreck and destroy the people, to wreck and destroy weak countries, and to wreck and destroy revolutions. This is their true nature. Therefore, a situation of war still rears its head, whether world war or regional wars or war upon our country. If we are unable to grasp this situation and if we are not vigilant in accordance with this situation, if we are subjective toward this situation, if we are careless, then we will lose mastery.

This is in terms of the external enemy. However, the external enemies contact the internal enemies. The feudalists and capitalists in their status as oppressor classes have already been attacked and overthrown. However in being overthrown, will they entirely disappear and will they never return, or what? – It is not like that. They were overthrown organizationally. They were overthrown in terms of regime. However, their outlooks, their stances, their trickery, and their plans to resist the revolution and seize state power back from the revolution still remain the same. They use every tactic: they come overtly; they come covertly; they come directly; they come indirectly; and sometimes, they even enter our ranks. For what? To destroy the revolution, to smash the revolution, and to seize state power back from us. Therefore, the problem of war, the problem of class combat, national people's combat, still rears its head. It's just that now, we have risen to become the masters of the country, have risen to govern the country, but class combat, national people's combat, still rears its head. Previously we seized control of the country. Now that we have seized control, we must defend the country, because the external enemies and the internal enemies want to seize back power, to seize it overtly by warfare, to seize it ideologically and economically by espionage, to seize it overtly and covertly in every way so that war will re-emerge.

The situation is like this. Because of this, our army must fulfill the mission of defending the country with high and constant revolutionary vigilance. Defending the entire country, defending the territory, both the interior and the borders, defending the territorial waters, defending the airspace: all this is the mission of the army. This is the new mission of our Revolutionary Army. As for the missions you comrades are fulfilling right now and in the immediate term, such as defending Phnom Penh for instance, this is not the fundamental mission. That is, as for defending Phnom Penh and smashing espionage groups and smashing saboteurs that want to wreck and destroy our revolution, we will continue to smash the defeated enemy remnants to consolidate our victory. However, the fundamental mission is to defend the entire country, to defend the territory and the territorial waters and the airspace. In this defense, the important matter is a stance of high revolutionary vigilance appropriate to the situation that I have just mentioned. That is, the external enemies and the internal enemies still exist. Class combat and national people's combat still exist. If we are constantly revolutionarily vigilant and have

constant mastery in terms of measures, the enemy will be unable to do anything; this is because previously our forces were few, but we gained mastery and we won a major victory. Now that we prospering, we will keep on prospering. Given our constant mastery in terms of the Party's ideological stances, revolutionary vigilance, political stances, and measures, we have mastery over the enemy, be they external or internal.

If the army defends the country well in accordance with the Party's correct lines, building the country will be very fast.

## The second mission

Our Party led in warfare and gained substantial victories quickly. The world has designated it as having taken five years because we only fought major attacks during those five years. Five years and gaining such a huge victory is very fast. However, as for building the country beginning now and on into the future, the Party has determined that this will also be fast, in order to become a dignified country, a country with prosperous agriculture and industry, in order to be able to quickly modify the lives of our people.

The Party designating the objective of quickly building the country to prosperity is posited upon the concrete situation of the country. We stand upon the concrete situation of our Party that has led the people and the Revolutionary Army to victory over the enemy in a short time. We stand on the concrete situation of our Revolutionary Army, a mighty Revolutionary Army with experience and heroism in fighting and quickly winning against the American imperialists. And we stand on the concrete situation of our people that had the phenomenally high revolutionary heroism to bravely fight the enemy both in the forward and the rear battlefields in conditions of great shortages and hardships.

All our subjective factors are complete. The movement is at a mighty boil. In tandem with this, we have very good natural circumstances. In the world, they calculate on average that there are seven or eight people per hectare of land used for farming rice and other crops. But they go all out to make their countries prosper. Turning to look at our land throughout the country, on average one family has from ten to fifteen hectares. This is much higher than the world average. So, our capital in terms of land as a means of production is very great, and there remains a lot of good land that we have not yet worked. There remains only the matter of correctly preparing the forces to use that good land well and to the maximum.

All these preconditions have been determined by the Party to be very good: The Party is good. The people are good and are all living in the cooperatives. Ownership rights are good, because most everything is already under collective ownership. The land is good. The forests and vegetation, the water, the fish, the oceans, are good. It was in accordance with all these preconditions that the Party determined that building the country will be fast, as fast as we waged war to liberate the nation and the people.

We waged war in order to seize victory quickly. As for building the country, that also must be quick. We have very many good preconditions.

Therefore, in order to build the country quickly, the mission of the Revolutionary Army is to defend the country well in accordance with the Party line. If we correctly implement the Party line, the defense will be good. If we defend the country well, our people will build the country quickly because there will be no difficulty with the enemy harassing us and poisoning us so we will not be able to increase production. This is the fundamental mission of the Revolutionary Army.

## Contributing missions

In tandem with this, the Revolutionary Army must directly or indirectly support increasing production. The tradition of our Revolutionary Army has been to both attack the enemy and to increase production to supply food on its own. But the core mission is to defend the country. However, as a contributing mission it must increase production, meaning support the people increasing production or increase production on its own in accordance with the concrete situation and in accordance with its potential. Our ideological, political, and organizational stances are to serve increasing production. Therefore, the people will increase production, and the army will defend the country and contribute to increasing production and support increasing production. Our movement to build the country will be strenuous and will be very fast.

We have confidence that in one year it will prosper, in two years it will prosper, in three years it will prosper and change. Therefore, we see that the future outlook for our country is very bright. I wish to make it clear that I say this without any bragging by the Party, by the army, by the people, or by our country. However, our subjective potential, that is, the potential of the Party, the potential of the army, the potential of the people, and the potential capital in terms of land, in all things we have the potential and the prerequisites to build our country no less than any other country. This is because we have all the prerequisites. We are audaciously confident of this.

Therefore, the Revolutionary Army must grasp and implement its missions well.

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**If We Want to Struggle To Eradicate**

**The Stance of Individual Private Ownership**

**and Build and Strengthen**

**The Stance of Collective Ownership**

**We Must Struggle to Temper Ourselves in a**

**Concrete Combat Movement**



Currently, all together and on the offensive to fulfill the missions of defending the country and building the country to gain victory in leaps, the Party appeals to the cadres, Party members, the Revolutionary Army, and the revolutionary masses, to continue fighting the offensive struggle to eradicate the stance of individual private ownership and build and strengthen the stance of collective ownership to be solid and mighty in order to guarantee fulfillment of the missions of defending and building the country in a victorious leap.

In response to the Party's appeal, the cadres, Party members, combatants, and revolutionary masses struggle all-out to fight to build the stance of collective ownership. This is a major virtue. In the past, there were a number of negative phenomena that have to be paid attention to and must be reformed in a timely manner. Otherwise, it is feared things will not be in accordance with the Party's objectives. These negative phenomena were after the liberation of the various cities and Phnom Penh City, a number of cadres, Party members, combatants, and revolutionary masses had to go perform various missions in the provincial towns and in Phnom Penh. In the past, after a while some of these comrades brought their wives and children and even their parents and relatives from the rear battlefield to live with them in their offices. Office work has a framework. Therefore, those people who went there had no office work to do, but they received daily living rations just like the people who worked in the offices. In order to settle the

atmosphere, those people went to work to increase production, for instance growing some vegetables around the offices, and they relied upon these offices to act as bases to refashion themselves to fulfill revolutionary missions. Some lived easily, and no conflicts at all occurred. Some others had no office work to do or any production work to do. Therefore, conflict occurred. How were these conflicts resolved? They sent their wives and families to this office or that office according to whomever they knew in order to rely upon those offices or “teachers” to help educate and refashion their revolutionary stances. This was similar to the old society entrusting their children and grandchildren to the pagodas.

If these negative phenomena expand further, this will certainly and without fail negatively impact the Party’s work of building the country. Therefore, let me emphasize: **If we want to struggle to eradicate the stance of individual private ownership and build and strengthen the stance of collective ownership, we must struggle to temper ourselves in a concrete combat movement. Only in a concrete combat movement can we:**

1. Be in unity with the Party in terms of stances, outlooks, and political, ideological, and organizational lines
2. Clearly see for ourselves the mighty power of the people - the peasant masses, the poor peasants, the lower-middle level peasants - see clearly the stance of collective ownership of the popular masses
3. Through this, meaning through items 1 and 2 above, we can see our positive and negative qualities. We will see our wrong stances and correct stances so that we can eliminate the negative qualities and give impetus to and whip up the positive qualities. Might our comrades suspect that going down to dig the soil, to plant bananas, to plant cabbage, to plant morning glory in the offices is not combat in a concrete movement? Let me tell you that increasing production in the offices is a good thing, but it is just to modify the livelihood to a certain extent; it is not a combat movement to modify society and build society.

So, if that is so, where do we go to fight to temper ourselves concretely? In the new and current situation, the best locations to go to fight to temper ourselves concretely are:

1. The cooperatives
2. The various industrial factories of the state and the state worksites

Both of the above locations are combat locations fighting to modify society and build society. The stances, outlooks, and political, ideological and organizational lines of the Party are concentrated to concretely implement at these locations. The excellent qualities of the worker-peasant masses and the poor and lower-middle level peasants are

concentrated at these locations. These are the locations to eliminate individual private ownership and to build and to strengthen collective ownership.

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## **Another Important Step in the Success of the Cooperatives And of Our Revolutionary Movement**



After the nation and the people were completely liberated, and in order to implement new missions leaping successes, the Party decided to expand the cooperatives to broader dimensions than in the past. Before liberation we organized cooperatives in groups with each group having 15-20-30 families in accordance with the concrete situation and in order to facilitate leadership. But now, in order to give impetus to the production movement and make it mightier, the Party has decided to organize the cooperatives as village cooperatives, that is, to take each village, to make it into a unit, and to organize a cooperative.

Therefore, organizing cooperatives in the villages is another important successful political, ideological, and organizational step of our cooperatives and our revolutionary movement to increase production and sort out the livelihood of the people.

According to the initial experience, the results of organization village cooperatives are as follows:

### **1. Politically:**

Back when the cooperatives were still organized into groups of 10-20-30 families, the role of the cooperatives in helping to strengthen revolutionary state power in the villages had a narrow framework.

Class struggle was inside a small group framework. The struggle to eliminate pacifist agents and spies was not broad. Propaganda and reeducation to whip up the mass movement of male and female combatants in the covert or overt organizations was still in the group framework. Therefore, there was a lack of the outlook to see the mighty and solid power of the popular masses, the poor peasants and the lower-middle level peasants.

After the cooperative were reorganized into village cooperatives, the cooperatives played an important role in combining forces to strengthen village state power in every sector: political, economic, military, cultural, and social action. The collective masses in the cooperatives, in particular the poor peasants and the lower-middle level peasants who were the members of the cooperatives, consolidated their position as the true masters of the village, the master of the communes. Leadership in governing revolutionary state



power in the villages was no longer monopolized in the hands of the people's service committees (គណៈបម្រើប្រជាជន) or the village chairmen. The village cooperatives also had an important role to play in contributing to building and strengthening revolutionary state power in the villages.

Concrete class struggle is sorting out the various internal conflicts in terms of political, ideological, and organizational stances inside the village cooperatives. It is centralized and stands firmly on the opinions of the village cooperative members. It is broad, and causes the understanding of the stance of class struggle of the cooperatives to be more complete and livelier than it previously was.

The poor peasants and the lower-middle level peasants when broadly assembled see more clearly the mighty force of their class and the role of their class in increasing production, building the country, and defending the country. Thus, they are even more strongly proud and they see the bright future of their class as being welded to the future fate of the country and nation.

## 2. Ideologically:

Back when the cooperatives were organized as groups, the collective ideology was limited to a group. In many cooperatives there was born a narrow group-favoring ideology toward the other groups. For example, thinking about solving rice seed, rice seedling plants, livestock, plows and harrows, that was all thought of collectively only in the group framework. When expanded into village cooperatives, collective ideology rose to a higher level than what had been seen previously. Therefore, collective stances and broad common stances were built and strengthened and expanded more than they had been previously. Taking this prospering collective stance, the movements to increase production of the cooperatives, whether in agriculture, handicrafts, animal husbandry, etc, gained momentum and were at more of a boil, much more strenuous than before.

## 3. Organizationally:

In terms of organization, the village cooperatives sorted out many problems more easily than the group organization had. For example:

### 1. The use of the working forces:

Back when they were organized in groups, many cooperatives were short of labor forces, and this had a negative impact in increasing production. When organized as villages, the labor force was sorted out. Even though at times two or three cooperative members were ill and could not do production work, there was no negative impact on production. Assume that when they were organized as groups, some groups were still left with one or two older persons who could not perform labor. These older forces were abandoned because there were too few of them and it was not known how to organize

them to do any work. When organized as village cooperatives, the forces of the older people who could not perform labor at times reached four to ten persons, and they were gathered up. The cooperatives could then assign this force to join together in light work such as making scoop-baskets and weaving small shallow baskets etc, appropriate to what the force was able to do. Therefore, the force of older persons was also able to serve increasing production.

## 2. The problems of distributing the produce:

Back when they were organized in groups, sometimes these groups had many forces and much land, good land, and they produced much, so they distributed much. Other adjacent nearby groups had few forces, little land, land that was not good, and they produced little, so they distributed little. Therefore, the differences were sometimes great. When organized as village cooperatives instead and all the calculations were made, the distribution of the produce was not so disparate among the members of the village cooperative. Thus, the problem of internal solidarity and unity visa-à-vis the problem of distributing produce did not give rise to very many complications.

## 3. Sorting out daily living inside the cooperatives:

Back when they were organized in groups, any groups with high potential, with many means, were able to find a lot of fish and meat and vegetables. Groups that lacked that potential faced shortages in daily life. When organized as village cooperative instead, sorting out daily life was easier than it had been before, meaning the families of the cooperative members could routinely have fish and vegetables, or when a pig of the cooperative was slaughtered it was distributed to every family.

## 4. Sorting out tools for increasing production:

Back when they were organized in groups, some groups had livestock, plows, harrows, hoes, knives, hatchets, etc. Some even had left-overs, but they did not think about cooperating to sort this out for the groups who faced shortages. Therefore, the groups that faced shortages were still short and could not resolve that, and the production movement encountered obstacles. When organized as village cooperatives instead, sorting out production tools was easier than it had been previously. Therefore, this gave an impetus to the movements to increase production, and they gained even more momentum.

Another important problem that must be paid attention to is the role of leadership in the Party branches in the base areas. Back when they were organized in groups, the forces of the Party members were greatly split-up and scattered, but when organized as village cooperatives instead, the leadership forces were centralized, were united in terms of the leadership and in terms of the ideological and organizational stances and the plans to increase production of the cooperative. Said in a word, the Party branches grasped the leadership of the village cooperatives, were more centralized than before, and were more solid than before. The summarizing of experience was more centralized, and


disseminating experience on what had gone right or wrong was more correct and quicker than before.

According to the several initial experiences mentioned here, village cooperatives should be organized everywhere. Locations where village cooperatives have already been organized must concentrate on strengthening them and making them more solid and on gradually drawing from experience to improve them.

With the current new situation and with the new missions of the Party, the cooperatives are important organizations and are one foundation giving impetus for backward agriculture to advance toward modern agriculture and to advance on toward a progressive industrialized country that has mighty strength to defend the country.

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## REVOLUTIONARY FLAG

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